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This report is the final report of work package 2, ‘border management and migration control’ 
of the Respond project, an EU funded research project on the multi-level governance of mass 
migration in Europe and beyond. As part of this focus, this report analyses and interrogates 
the accountability and transparency regime of the European Union’s border agency Frontex. 
Frontex was established as a European Union agency in the field of border, migration and 
asylum policies in 2004 and began operating in 2005. Over the last 15 years, the mandate of 
the agency, originally tasked with coordinating the operational management of the European 
Union’s external border through support to the EU’s member states, has expanded 
significantly. Through a series of reforms, most notably in 2007, and 2016 and 2019, the 
agency has become a pivotal actor in what is referred to as ‘European Integrated Border 
Management’. Most notably, its most recent reform has given the agency the mandate to 
recruit up to 10.000 staff to be deployed at the EU’s external border, thus creating, for the first 
time, a significant executive agency with operational capabilities on the level of the European 
Union. 
Since the creation of the agency and its first operations, there has been significant concern, 
both from the European Parliament as well as NGOs and other civil society organisations that 
the executive mandate of the agency has not been counterbalanced by effective mechanisms 
for accountability, particularly with respect to fundamental rights. Since 2011, monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms for addressing fundamental rights violations have been 
established and developed. There are currently six mechanisms; the Serious Incident 
Reporting system, Forced Return Monitoring, the Fundamental Rights Officer, the 
Consultative Forum, the Individual Complaints Mechanism, and the Fundamental Rights 
Monitors, the last having been introduced in 2019 and being not yet fully operational at the 
time of writing of this report. 
To an extent, the Frontex monitoring and accountability regime has improved since 2011 
through legislative change, thus strengthening the above mechanisms. The findings of the 
report however show that despite the continued expansion and strengthening of monitoring 
and accountability mechanisms since 2016, these efforts have again not resulted in an 
effective system for monitoring, investigating, addressing, and preventing fundamental rights 
violations at Europe’s external borders. The findings of this report suggest there are several 
reasons for this: 
1. The legal framework relating to fundamental rights and accountability mechanisms is 
often vague. This ranges from omitting references to specific operational activities to 
unclear provisions on the possible actions relating to investigation and remedies of 
fundamental rights violations. 
2. The expansion of the agency’s mandate and increased complexity of their operational 
responsibilities and tasks has further complicated matters of allocating responsibility for 
fundamental rights violations. The legal framework of Frontex does not help in 
establishing responsibility, especially in contexts where both Frontex and national border 
management actors are involved. This is compounded by the fact that establishing such 
responsibility relies on operational plans, chains of control and command and decisions 
which are generally not know publicly. 
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3. All key monitoring mechanisms are characterised by significant deficiencies which can 
be attributed to their weak design, the vagueness of legal provisions and often vague 
internal guidance, as well as an over-reliance on the implementation of provisions both 
by Frontex and national authorities. 
4. The investigation of complaints and incidents of fundamental rights violations remains 
the responsibility of member states. However, such systems often lack independence 
and impartiality and provide weak safeguards to complainants. Internal documents also 
suggest weak cooperation and communication between national authorities and Frontex. 
Further, the current legal framework does not provide for avenues to address systemic 
violations of fundamental rights by member states, while the only relevant provisions for 
withdrawing or not launching operations have never been used. 
5. The legal framework’s accountability mechanisms are internal to Frontex, and lack 
independence from the agency. At the level of monitoring on the ground, this raises 
concerns regarding the role of Frontex staff and deployed officers in recording 
fundamental rights violation. 
6. Since the internal accountability system is administrative, there is little scope for 
meaningful remedies. Victims of fundamental rights violations can seek remedies in 
national and EU Courts, but this would require considerable resources and is subject to 
complex legal arrangements. 
7. The role of the Fundamental Rights Officer is limited by lack of resources, lack of 
decision-making powers, and again vague provisions in areas such as investigating 
complaints. 
8. While the Consultative Forum has in theory the greatest potential for acting as an 
independent body within Frontex, it is constrained by its lack of resources and time, and 
working arrangements relating to the provision of information. 
9. Both bodies are constrained by the fact that decision making powers remain with the 
Executive Director. This has resulted in key recommendations aiming at safeguarding 
fundamental rights – as well as preventing the Agency’s complicity in violations – being 
rejected. 
10. The Serious Incident Reporting Mechanism is reliant on Frontex deployed personnel who 
might not have the appropriate training, expertise or willingness to identify and report 
fundamental rights violations. This results in a low number of reported incidents which 
contrasts with the reporting of external actors such as NGOs and human rights bodies. 
Significant weaknesses are observed in relation to Joint Returns Operations. 
11. The use of the Individual Complaints Mechanism has been limited, since few complaints 
were submitted since 2016. Possible reasons for this include restrictive legal provisions, 
the lack of dissemination and accessibility, and insufficient information and forms being 
available in operational areas. Further, only few complaints have been deemed 
admissibly by the Fundamental Rights Officer. 
12. There are significant shortcomings in relation to reporting and investigating violations 
committed by Frontex deployed officers. 
Our findings and analysis raise significant questions regarding the commitment of Frontex to 
complying with fundamental rights obligations within its operations. Frontex consistently 
engages in strategies and practices aiming at avoiding responsibility and accountability, which 
include: 
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13. An instrumental approach to information produced from their internal reporting systems, 
which could serve as the basis of decisions despite its inherent weakness; disregarding 
inconvenient knowledge such as recommendations by CF and FRO; remaining silent on 
knowledge gleaned from surveillance capabilities that could shed light on incidents of 
violations of fundamental rights. 
14. While maintaining that their presence in operational areas enhances compliance with 
fundamental rights, Frontex have also claimed to be absent from specific areas where 
fundamental rights violations occur systematically. Two such examples are the transit 
zone at the Hungarian-Serbian border and the ‘frontline’ at the Greek-Turkish border. 
15. Frontex still deflects responsibility for fundamental rights violations to national authorities. 
This does not mean, however, that they adopt a critical stance towards such practices. 
On the contrary, there are public expressions of support which ignore systematic and 
extensive fundamental rights violations. 
16. Frontex attempts to control the availability of information on its operational activities and 
fundamental rights accountability. Such tendencies are evident internally (towards the 
CF), towards institutions the Agency is politically accountable to such as the European 
Parliament, and externally towards the public through impeding access to internal 
documents under Regulation 1049/2001 and even adopting intimidatory tactics towards 
critics. The purposeful lack of transparency further weakens the Agency’s accountability. 
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About RESPOND 
RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond is a 
comprehensive study of responses to the 2015 Refugee Crisis. One of the most visible 
impacts of the refugee crisis is the polarization of politics in EU Member States and intra-
Member State policy incoherence in responding to the crisis. Incoherence stems from diverse 
constitutional structures, legal provisions, economic conditions, public policies and cultural 
norms, and more research is needed to determine how to mitigate conflicting needs and 
objectives. With the goal of enhancing the governance capacity and policy coherence of the 
European Union (EU), its Member States and neighbours, RESPOND brings together fourteen 
partners from eleven countries and several different disciplines. In particular, the project aims 
to: 
• provide an in-depth understanding of the governance of recent mass migration at macro, 
meso and micro levels through cross-country comparative research; 
• critically analyse governance practices with the aim of enhancing the migration 
governance capacity and policy coherence of the EU, its member states and third 
countries. 
The countries selected for the study are Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, 
Lebanon, Poland, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. By focusing on these countries, 
RESPOND studies migration governance along five thematic fields: (1) Border management 
and migration control, (2) Refugee protection regimes, (3) Reception policies, (4) Integration 
policies, and (5) Conflicting Europeanization. These fields literally represent refugees’ 
journeys across borders, from their confrontations with protection policies, to their travels 
through reception centres, and in some cases, ending with their integration into new societies. 
To explore all of these dimensions, RESPOND employs a truly interdisciplinary approach, 
using legal and political analysis, comparative historical analysis, political claims analysis, 
socio-economic and cultural analysis, longitudinal survey analysis, interview based analysis, 
and photo voice techniques (some of these methods are implemented later in the project). 
The research is innovatively designed as multi-level research on migration governance now 
operates beyond macro level actors, such as states or the EU. Migration management 
engages meso and micro level actors as well. Local governments, NGOs, associations and 
refugees are not merely the passive recipients of policies, but are shaping policies from the 
ground-up. 
The project also focuses on learning from refugees. RESPOND defines a new subject position 
for refugees, as people who have been forced to find creative solutions to life threatening 





This report is part of WP2 work package of RESPOND, which addresses border management 
and migration control, including European Union (EU) and domestic legal regimes, policy 
developments since 2011, the implementation of border management and migration control 
policies by EU member states and third countries, and how refugees and migrants experience 
and respond to the EU border management regime. Departing from existing work of the WP 
on national-level laws, polices and implementation in border management, this report focuses 
on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex. In particular, it explores one of the 
most controversial areas in the context of the Agency’s mandate of ‘protecting’ the external 
borders of the European Union: accountability and transparency in addressing fundamental 
rights violations. 
The activities of Frontex as an EU agency with executive powers in the field of border 
management have persistently raised concerns regarding the respect of human rights and 
refugee law in the context of operational activities. Since its establishment in 2004, Frontex 
has constantly been at the centre of controversies relating to practices that contributed to 
violations of fundamental rights of migrants at the external borders of the EU, in addition to 
violations of the principle of non-refoulement and access to asylum (Frelick, 2009; Keller et 
al., 2011; Correctiv, 2019; Marin, 2014b). While some progress has been made in 
strengthening the agency’s fundamental rights obligations and practices, and establishing 
mechanisms for accounting for fundamental rights compliance and violations, the persistence 
of violations and the equally persistent involvement of Frontex in such controversies suggest 
that the question of accountability is far from resolved. 
These controversies highlight two core issues at the heart of the Frontex’s character as an EU 
agency. First, despite the expansion of the mandate of Frontex and their powers to act as a 
de facto law enforcement body at the borders of the EU, arrangements for holding them 
accountable have not necessarily reflected their increasing capabilities and powers. This fact 
is specifically pertinent not only for the domains of migration policy, fundamental rights and 
border management. Rather, Frontex being the first European Union agency endowed both 
with a standing corps of up to 10.000 officers (projected to be hired until 2027), as well as a 
significant mandate to oversee member state border management strategies, raises 
significant questions for the overall constitutional structure of the European Union, indicating 
an imbalance between the executive branch on the one hand, and the legislative and judicial 
branches on the other. Therefore, another important question this report attempts to answer 
is whether there is a functioning system of checks and balances in the EU regarding European 
Union agencies endowed with extensive executive powers.1 
There is still, for example, no external or judicial oversight of the agency’s activities. Secondly, 
the question of the accountability of Frontex is also linked to the broader politics of border 
management, and in particular to the relation between border management practices and 
human rights. While the main activities of Frontex are in the realm of border management, EU 
law bestows the Agency with obligations to monitor, respect and promote fundamental rights. 
Yet these responsibilities are difficult to reconcile with the political drive to prevent 
 
1 We note that at the time of finalising this report, a similar political controversy takes place in the United 
States, i.e. the deployment of federal law enforcement bodies, incidentally drawn from two federal 
agencies (Custom and Border Protection [CBP] and Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]) in 
the city of Portland, Oregon, in order to curtail civil liberties and suppress protests for racial justice. 
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unauthorised entry into the European Union, manifested in a continuous increase and 
strengthening of border management capacities, technologies, and practices which entail an 
inherent risk of violating the rights of individuals, for example to seek asylum. Existing research 
on Frontex and fundamental rights accountability has evolved around two main areas. First, 
the exploration of legal responsibility of Frontex for fundamental rights violations, drawing on 
the relevant EU and international law (e.g. Fink, 2018; Mungianu, 2016; Papastavridis, 2010). 
Secondly, accountability has been addressed in the context of research on European 
agencies, in particular JHA. Yet, as Carrera et al observed in 2013, 
there is a lack of concrete knowledge and public information concerning the actual 
scope of their specific actions, which makes it difficult to carry out evidence-based 
daily monitoring and ex-post evaluation of their activities’ (Carrera, den Hertog and 
Parkin, 2013, p.354) 
One gap in existing literature of Frontex is research on the way the accountability mechanisms 
established to address the agency’s responsibility for fundamental rights violations function in 
practice. While there is some analysis of the relevant legal arrangements, the design of the 
mechanisms and the shortcomings in the architecture of the current arrangements, there is 
little research on the implementation of these provisions and the function of the mechanisms. 
One of the reasons why is was suggested by by Carrera et al (2013): there is still little 
information on this domain of activities of the agency, not least because most sources of such 
information are contained in documents that are not easily accessible to the public. Further, 
assessing practices around the monitoring and investigation of fundamental rights violations 
would ideally involve ethnographic/anthropological observations of actors in the course of 
such activities. Yet, while researchers have explored the perceptions and attitudes of Frontex 
actors on human rights (Perkowski, 2018), closer observation is not easy because of security 
considerations and secrecy surrounding the activities of Frontex. 
Our aim in this report is to address these gaps by examining in more depth the implementation 
of provisions on fundamental rights accountability. In order to do this we focus not only on the 
legal framework governing accountability provisions but on how provisions are acted upon 
through the existing monitoring and accountability mechanisms - the Fundamental Rights 
Officer (FRO), Consultative Forum (CF), Individual Complaints Mechanism, Forced Return 
Monitoring and Serious Incident Reporting systems - as well as by the Frontex executive. In 
order to achieve this, we undertook an extensive qualitative analysis of internal documents 
released through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests we submitted to the Frontex, as well 
as those released to other applicants and which are available online. We supplemented this 
core approach with interviews, informal conversations, insights from fieldwork and analysis of 
secondary sources. Based on this analysis we identify deficiencies in the existing 
arrangements and function of the monitoring and accountability mechanisms. Further, we 
identify five patterns in the responses of Frontex to criticisms and queries regarding its 
fundamental rights practices, interrogating their implications for the relation between border 
management and fundamental rights. 
Following Bovens, we define accountability as 
a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to 
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences (Bovens, 2007, p.450) 
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Accountability in this sense aims at ensuring ‘conformity between the values of a delegating 
body and those to whom powers are delegated’ (Curtin, 2005, p.87). Accountability 
mechanisms in extension can be understood as arrangements that enable the scrutiny of 
actions and their compliance with legal standards – in the context of this report fundamental 
rights obligations arising from EU and international law, as well as the legal framework of 
Frontex (Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 2018; Wolff and Schout, 2013). Since many of the activities 
of Frontex are conducted in contexts that are not accessible to the public and documentation 
on such activities is not publicly available, research on the agency also raises issues of 
transparency, broadly perceived as the principle of conducting activities as openly as possible 
(Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, p.15(1); Gkliati 
and Rosenfeldt, 2018). 
The report is structured as follows. After a discussion of our methodological approach, we 
begin by giving an introduction into the phenomenon of European Union agencies, the 
agencification of the Justice and Home Affairs field and an overview over the establishment, 
constitution and development of the European Union’s border agency Frontex. We then 
present the legal framework of the agency in terms of its fundamental rights commitments, 
describe its legal obligations and the internal mechanisms and implementations. As a second 
step, we discuss shortcomings and gaps in both the legal framework and the internal 
mechanisms and present existing obstacles to an effective accountability regime with respect 
to fundamental rights. 
We then present two case studies. The first case study evolves around the decade-long 
presence of Frontex at the Greek-Turkish land border along the river Evros, the practice of 
pushbacks and the agency’s failure to address their prevalence. This is particularly relevant 
in light of the ongoing – at the time of writing – RABIT deployment launched in March 2020, 
after the Turkish government declared the border open and the Greek government reacted by 
temporarily suspending its asylum system and deploying additional security forces in the area. 
The second case study focuses on internal recommendations for the agency to suspend 
operations in Hungary in order to avoid complicity in fundamental rights violations, which were 
however rejected by the management of the agency. 
After these case studies, we present strategies employed by the agency in order to evade 
accountability. The report closes with recommendations. 
 
2. Methods 
The findings presented in this report draw on a mix of methods used for data gathering and 
analysis. Equally, the report is partly based on prior work for the RESPOND project 
(Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2018b), as well as many years of research and field work both 
on the agency as well as on the Greek-Turkish land border in Evros. 
Our analysis largely based on internal Frontex documents. We obtained some of these 
through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests pursuant to regulation (EC) 1049/2001 
(‘regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents’), we 
submit through the website asktheeu.org. Other documents were already published and 
archived in asktheeu.org and in the Aleph database of the Organised Crime and Corruption 
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Reporting Project (aleph.occrp.org) following requests by other applicants, and one document 
was provided to us by a third party. In early 2020, Frontex changed their procedure for public 
access to documents, restricting the use of transparency portals such as asktheeu.org and 
providing their own, albeit considerably less user-friendly interface. Moreover, the agency 
warns FOI applicants against sharing documents obtained through requests by invoking 
copyright law, a highly dubious practice for a tax-payer funded institution which also lacks legal 
clarity in terms of potential consequences. For this reason, we maintain the anonymity of the 
person who kindly shared an internal document with us. Additionally, the Frontex Data 
Protection framework stipulates that PII-data of persons lodging public access to document 
requests with the agency are retained for five years (Frontex, 2020h), a practice we asked the 
Data Protection Officer about but received no reply by the time of the publication of this report. 
Further, we realized that Frontex keeps track of our Freedom of Information, at least those 
submitted through the new portal. For the case study on Hungary, we also draw on material 
made available to us by two GCU colleagues, Daniel Gyollai and Umut Korkut, who submitted 
a FOI request in November 2018. 
In addition to these documentary sources, we conducted several interviews. After some 
difficulties, we interviewed one of the Frontex Press Officers. However, while we requested 
access to Frontex staff involved in operation and the Fundamental Rights Office, this was not 
granted by the Press Office. Following the interview, we sent the press office a list of written 
questions regarding the Agency’s operations at the Greek-Turkish border, which were 
answered by email. We further interviewed four members of organisations represented in the 
Consultative Forum and one human rights organisation. Because of the protracted lockdown 
in Scotland, we were not able to access the consent forms signed by the interviews and 
detailing their preferences regarding anonymity, as they are kept in a locked drawer in 
Glasgow Caledonian University. Therefore, we decided to anonymise all participants. In 
addition, we had informal phone conversations with an NGO employee and two journalists 
regarding the situation at the Greek-Turkish border. We also refer to them anonymously, given 
that information was shared in confidence, the political sensitivity of this issue and the potential 
repercussions for them. For the Evros case study, we also draw on two interviews with local 
police directors we interviewed in October 2018. 
Moreover, we draw on a number of secondary sources, such as existing literature, reports, 
media articles and news, as well as the recordings of three LIBE committee meetings. We 
also draw on a webinar organized by the Dutch Green party, ‘’Under surveillance’: Monitoring 
at the border’ and the written answers from presenters that were circulated to participants 




3. European Union Agencies, European Integration and 
the European Border Agency Frontex 
In this section, we will introduce European Union agencies and discuss their role and 
significance for European integration. We then describe how agencies in the field of Justice 
and Home Affairs diverge from the more common regulatory agencies of the Single Market, 
in order to then introduce the European border agency Frontex.2 
3.1 European Union Agencies 
The term agency is often used to describe generic governmental institutions across the globe. 
In the context of the European Union, it takes on a specific meaning. The reason for the 
specificity of European Union agencies lies in the constitution of the European Union as a 
politically highly integrated entity which however does not meet the threshold of a state in the 
traditional meaning of the concept. To mention but one example, agencies in the US are 
usually associated with its federal government and have been granted extensive executive 
powers, such as enforcing federal legislation and regulation. 
In the European Union, with its lack of a recognisable executive entity in the common sense 
of government, European Union agencies take on a different character. They are usually 
closely associated with the de facto executive institution, i.e. the European Commission, 
however their particular constitution often reserves considerable influence for the 
governments of the member states, usually through the composition of their respective 
management boards. Additionally, their national counterparts, on whose cooperation and 
expertise European Union agencies often heavily rely, may also wield considerable influence. 
For this reason, European Union agencies are an interesting, but somewhat under-researched 
aspect of European integration, particularly from a multi-level governance perspective. 
Apart from the fact that the competences and powers of the European Commission are in no 
way comparable to those of the US federal government, there is a second reason why 
European Union agencies are comparably weaker than their US counterparts: the so-called 
Meroni doctrine. It stems from two judgments of the European Court in 1957 and 1958 
respectively and severely constrains the extent to which primary EU institutions may delegate 
regulatory powers to secondary institutions such as agencies. 
Generally speaking, if US agencies are tasked with regulation from above, i.e. enforcing 
federal legislation in the states, European Union agencies tend to pursue regulation from 
below, i.e. the gradual convergence of existing member state regulatory frameworks into a 
European one. This practice is also referred to as harmonisation and does not preclude the 
fact that European Union agencies may also enforce European legislation. The practice of 
harmonisation is by no means confined to European Union agencies, but represents a much 
larger modus operandi of the European Union. European Union agencies however play an 
import role in this practice and may not only ‘support’ (the preferred term over ‘enforce’) 
 
2 The argument in this section of the report is loosely based on the PhD-Thesis (Dissertation) Europe 
as Border. Eine genealogisch-ethnographische Regime-Rekonstruktion der Agentur Frontex in der 
Europäisierung des Grenzschutzes [Europe as Border. A genealogical-ethnographical Regime 
Reconstruction of the Agency Frontex within the Europeanisation of Border Management] submitted to 
the Philosophical Faculty of Göttingen University by Bernd Kasparek and accepted by its Commission 
on the 26th of May 2020. 
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member states’ implementation of EU regulation, but also play an important role in shaping 
the legislative process through the expertise they provide. 
European Union agencies are distinct from the primary European institutions in that they are 
not created through the various treaties, but that they have been set up through European 
legislative acts, i.e. regulations. There is no generally agreed upon definition, particularly not 
a legal one, of what constitutes a European Union agency, and prior to the entering into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) – which formally abolished the temple architecture established 
through the Maastricht Treaty (1993) – the constitution and mandate of a particular agency 
would also be dependent on the respective pillar it was situated in. This led to a now obsolete 
differentiation between Community and Union agencies in the 1990s and 2000s. Most third 
pillar agencies of the original Justice and Home Affairs field such as Europol would remain in 
the renamed PJCC pillar (Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters). The case of 
the European border agency Frontex however is yet a more particular one, as we will discuss 
later. 
In 2020, there exist a plethora of agencies in the European Union. A European Union website3 
differentiates between ‘decentralised agencies’ which make up the vast bulk of European 
Union agencies, ‘agencies under Common Security and Defence Policy’ (i.e. part of the former 
second pillar), ‘executive agencies’ that are set up for specific tasks and for a limited period of 
time, as well as the special case of EURATOM agencies. EURATOM as one of the three 
original European Communities has neither been consolidated into the European Community 
nor the post-Lisbon European Union, however, largely shares their institutions (such as its 
Commission) with the European Union. Decentralised agencies are described on the website 
as follows: 
Decentralised agencies contribute to the implementation of EU policies. They also 
support cooperation between the EU and national governments by pooling technical 
and specialist expertise from both the EU institutions and national authorities. 
Decentralised agencies are set up for an indefinite period and are located across 
the EU. 
At the time of writing of this report, the website lists 34 decentralised agencies. The very first 
European agency that was founded is the EURATOM supply agency (for this particular case 
see Barry and Walters, 2003), founded in June 1960. A first wave of agencification took place 
in the 1970s, when two new agencies were created. However, agencification as a 
phenomenon structuring the emergent executive order of the European Union only gathered 
speed in the 1990s with the so-called second wave of agencification: The 1990s saw the 
creation of an additional nine agencies, in the 2000s (this sometimes is referred to as a third 
wave), 17 agencies were created, and since 2010, another eleven agencies were created or 
significantly expanded. Amongst the latter is the former ‘European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union’, which in 2016 was expanded and renamed into the ‘European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency’, however retaining its short name Frontex. 
This brief overview of European Union agencies shows that the agency phenomenon in the 
European Union is highly heterogeneous and complicated. This makes it even more surprising 




section, important implications for the emergent executive order of the European Union as a 
supranational entity. 
3.2 European Integration and European Union Agencies 
The agencification of the European Union after Maastricht may well be one of the most 
fundamental dynamics of supranational governance in the European Union, as it relates 
directly to its governmental modes. The European Union as a ‘regulatory state’ has been 
extensively analysed by Giandomenico Majone (e.g. Majone, 1994, 1996, 1997). For the 
purpose of this report, we highlight his conclusions on the resulting democratic deficit and 
legitimacy problem of the European Union (Majone, 1999). Majone contrasts the ‘regulatory 
state’ with the ‘interventionist state’, the former relying on ‘extensive delegation of powers to 
independent institutions’. He argues that the independence of institutions such as regulatory 
agencies guarantees better policy outcome since independence is primarily perceived as 
inoculation from political short-term pressures. Majone however concedes that this creates a 
problem of democratic legitimacy, which he proposes to tackle by instituting a stronger 
accountability structure for such institutions instead of re-politicising the institutions. 
Recent research focusing explicitly on European Union agencies (e.g. Geradin, Muñoz and 
Petit, 2005; Groenleer, 2009; Busuioc, Groenleer and Trondal, 2012) after Majone continues 
to focus on these two issues: for one an explanation for why agencification is occurring 
(e.g. Ekelund, 2010), for the other the accountability of agencies as a core issue. However, 
these issues are usually discussed as reciprocal. Agencification is then, similar to Majone’s 
more general argument, explained with reference to the necessity, and even desirability of an 
increased power and performance of the European Union’s executive branch, thus echoing 
e.g. the rationale of the European Commission’s white paper on ‘European governance’ 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2001). The nominally de-politicised, 
i.e. independent or autonomous constitution of agencies, the perception that they are a-
political in a sense of merely organising expert knowledge and networking technical experts 
across the continent is seldomly interrogated, but taken as granted – as stated in the above 
quote from the European Union website, which explicitly refers to ‘technical and specialist 
expertise’ that is made available through the agencies. Expert knowledge is here again 
juxtaposed with political motives, and the insulation of agencies from democratic control, or 
autonomy, is highlighted as a necessary and positive pre-condition for the agencies to pursue 
harmonisation in a pure technocratic manner, i.e. irrespective of political trends. (Semi)-
autonomy is thus considered desirable. 
Again similar to Majone’s argument, the second issue of accountability then exclusively arises 
as a counter-balance to the desirable autonomy, and most studies (e.g. Groenleer, 2009) 
focus on taking an empirical account of the different accountability regimes instituted in the 
various European Union agencies and their respective performances. Accountability regimes 
are then theorised mainly along two lines. The first line applies the principal-agent approach 
of the new institutionalist school on European integration, originally designed to explain 
transfer of regulatory powers from member states to European Union institutions to the 
relationship between European Union institutions – usually the Commission – and their 
agencies. As we have already noted above, the outsized influence of member states in 
agencies necessitates an adjustment to this model of transfer of competencies, as one has to 
assume a multiplicity of principals (cr. Curtin, 2007). The other line references the approach 
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of ‘experimentalist governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010), i.e. a mode of governance 
(empirically observed in the post-Amsterdam European Union) where institutions are given 
considerable leeway to experimentally implement policies, coupled with a strong evaluation 
process in order to assess the outcome against a previously established benchmark. Good 
governance in this model then is a constant repetition of a benchmark-implementation-
evaluation cycle. 
In the existing literature, agencies are viewed as an integral part of the emerging executive 
order of the European Union, and alternatives to agencification are seldomly discussed. One 
has to bear in mind that the existing research usually focuses on European Union agencies 
which are de facto regulatory agencies, such as the European Labour Authority, the European 
Union Aviation Safety Agency, the European Chemicals Agency or the European Food Safety 
Authority. The operations of these agencies can credibly be described as regulatory and as 
based on expertise and technical knowledge. In the broadest sense, these agencies are 
connected to the European project of the Single Market. 
3.3 JHA Agencies and Accountability 
The field of border, migration and asylum policies first became Europeanised, although rather 
in theory that in actual practice, through the Maastricht Treaty, situating it in the third pillar of 
Justice and Home Affairs. It was only through the Amsterdam Treaty that this field was shifted 
into the first pillar, i.e. that it was communitarised. However, this shift was further complicated 
by the fact that the communitarisaton of border policies was largely an effect of the inclusion 
of the Schengen Agreements into the European Union framework. However, since Schengen 
dealt both with border policies as well as pan-European police cooperation, parts of Schengen 
were considered first pillar, while other parts remained in the third pillar (PJCC). Additionally, 
the Amsterdam Treaty contained a provision that would delay the application of European 
Community procedure, i.e. the inclusion of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament into the legislative process and adjudication through the Court of the European 
Union of matters in this field by a minimum of five years, thus guaranteeing the Council an 
outsized influence. 
The years after the entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty however coincide with the 
third wave of agencification in the wake of the European Commission’s white paper on 
‘European governance’, as well as with the proclamation of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice’ (AFSJ), the European Union’s term for Justice and Home Affairs minus the third 
pillar. Hence, agencification as a process to render the European Union more actionable was 
also applied in this nascent field. Already in 1998, the European Police Office and the Europol 
Drugs Unit were combined into the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(Europol), and in 2002, Eurojust, an agency for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, was 
formed. The term ‘cooperation’ is noteworthy in that it underscores the limited operational 
mandate of these agencies. They were not to supplant member state police units and criminal 
prosecutors, but network their expertise across the European Union, thus nominally replicating 
the model of the existing, regulatory agencies. 
Similarly, the ‘European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union’ (Frontex), founded in 2004, 
also carried the term ‘cooperation’ in its title. Jorrit Rijpma (2012), by highlighting the ‘hybrid’ 
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character of the agency, already points to the problem inherent in applying agencification to 
Justice and Home Affairs or AFSJ: 
‘On the basis of its powers, one can characterise Frontex as an agency with a dual 
nature. On the one hand, it is endowed with the type of tasks that would normally be 
delegated to an EU agency, namely assisting the Commission and the member 
states in the implementation of an EU policy through the provision of technical and 
informational assistance, such as the provision of risk analysis and the development 
of common training standards. On the other hand, it has an important “operational” 
role, or more precisely it is endowed with the task of coordinating joint operational 
activity of national border guard authorities. In this respect it can be compared to 
agencies like Europol, which act in support of the activities of member state’ national 
law enforcement authorities’ (Rijpma, 2012, p.90) 
Rijpma emphasises the ‘political nature’ of the agency’s tasks and the existing obstacles to 
coherent accountability, warning that ‘where member states’ border guards violate 
international (human rights) norms during joint operations, Frontex risks becoming an 
accomplice to such practices without the possibility of being held accountable’ (97). He 
concludes that the evolution of the agency does indeed fit the pattern of ‘experimentalist 
governance’ (cr. Pollak and Slominski, 2009; Monar, 2010) and argues that precisely because 
there is no constitutional framework for law enforcement cooperation in the EU, ‘it would be 
preferable to give priority to the development of Frontex’s more regulatory role, which is less 
likely to impact on individual rights and freedoms’ (98). 
We disagree with two points of Rijpma’s assessment. The first is his characterisation of the 
agency’s risk analysis as regulatory. While some researchers would contend that the task of 
advocating risk analysis approached to border management and harmonising risk analysis 
techniques is indeed an effect of the agencies work in this field (Horii, 2016; Paul, 2017a; b, 
2018), the mere provisioning of risk analysis artefacts to which Rijpma seems to allude should 
not be conflated with information gathering as carried out by other agencies. As even Frontex’ 
own Risk Analysis Unit admits (e.g. Frontex, 2012a, 2012b), risk analysis cannot be 
understand as anything akin to a rigorous scientific practice of data gathering, and should thus 
not be thought of as a practice like e.g. assessing the carcinogenicity of a particular herbicide 
as carried out by the European Food Safety Authority. If there is one finding that migration 
studies in all its heterogeneity would agree on, then it is that migration, and irregular migration 
in particular, is highly difficult to theorise and impossible to predict. 
The second point of disagreement is his comparison of the operational activities of Frontex to 
those of Europol. Indeed, as Rijpma also discusses, the second Frontex regulation, the so-
called RABIT regulation of 2007 (see below), expanded the legal mandate of national border 
guards employed in Frontex operations. Thus, quite early after the creation of the agency, its 
operational mandate had already surpassed that of Europol, which remains severely restricted 
in its operational mandate even today. 
Rijpma however is entirely correct in marking the operation aspect of the agency’s mandate 
as problematic. Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog and joanna Parkin present a similar 
assessment (2013). Comparing Frontex with two other JHA agencies (Europol and EASO), 
they also conclude that the development of Frontex fits the pattern of ‘experimentalist 
governance’. They present various examples of inadequate accountability mechanisms within 
Frontex, writing that 
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‘these factors result in the paradoxical scenario whereby agency interventions of 
Frontex and Europol, despite being highly politicised, largely evade the full legal 
accountability and public scrutiny that would enable determining their precise 
responsibility and potential liability in cases of fundamental rights allegations before 
a court of law. Despite several reports about the functioning of the Agencies 
(particularly Frontex) and their weaknesses in terms of accountability for possible 
fundamental rights breaches, there is a lack of concrete knowledge and public 
information concerning the actual scope of their specific actions, which makes it 
difficult to carry out evidence-based daily monitoring and ex-post evaluation of their 
activities’ (Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin, 2013, p.354) 
They suggest that the usual balancing between autonomy and accountability, as exhibited in 
the bulk of research on European Union agencies, is not appropriate in the case of JHA 
agencies, and that it is highly problematic ‘given that the activities of these agencies hold 
profound implications for human rights and liberties, some of which are even absolute in nature 
and accept no derogation or exception by public law enforcement authorities’ (357). In turn, 
the authors argue a need for more independent monitoring of these agencies. 
In conclusion, agencification in the former first pillar and the third pillar need to be approached 
differently. Agencification in the first pillar can be theorised as a double act of delegation of 
regulatory powers, first from the member states to European primary institutions and then from 
primary institutions to secondary ones such as agencies, stretching out over many decades. 
In the nascent field of JHA however, agencification indeed fits the model of ‘experimentalist 
governance’ much closer, since the first act of delegation from member states to European 
institutions was never completed, thus there was no well-defined mandate to be delegated to 
agencies. Indeed, the central role of the Council in the JHA field in the five-year-period post 
Amsterdam underscores this argument. Agencification in the JHA field thus followed an 
experimentalist path, and accountability and respect for fundamental rights were not integral 
parts of the benchmarks against which the agencies would be evaluated. In combination with 
the fact that the operations of JHA agencies are much more like to directly and negatively 
impact fundamental and unalienable rights of individuals, we conclude that apart from the 
democratic deficit shared by all European Union agencies, JHA agencies additionally suffer 
from a fundamental rights deficit. This particularly applies to the European border agency 
Frontex, which will now present in the next section. 
3.4 Frontex: an overview of its mandate and accountability 
arrangements 
Frontex, i.e. the ‘European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union’, was created, after many years 
of discussions post Amsterdam (Monar, 2006), through Council Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 (Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 
establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union). As already noted, the 
Parliament was excluded from the legislative process. The regulation established the agency 
rather close to the regulatory model of non-JHA agencies, i.e. positing the agency as creating 
and maintaining a network of expertise in order to support the member states. Even if Rijpma’s 
assessment of a dual or hybrid nature for the agency is correct, the non-regulatory aspects of 
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the agency, i.e. its operations, still followed this model. The agency was supposed to finance 
and coordinate pilot project and joint operations, the ultimate control over these operations 
would however rest with the hosting member state. The long-term effect of the agency would 
rather be a transformation of European border and migration management practices 
(Kasparek, 2010), particularly through the introduction and dissemination of new knowledge 
practices such as risk analysis (Neal, 2009). The precise name of the agency is noteworthy in 
that it conceptualises the external border of the European Union still as belonging to the 
member states of the European Union. 
A mere three years later, in 2007, the mandate of the agency was expanded through 
Regulation (EC) 863/2007, creating the so-called Rapid Border Intervention Teams as an 
emergency or crisis reaction mechanism for the agency and at the same time addressing legal 
uncertainties concerning the executive powers of guest officers (Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for 
the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers). 
In 2011, the mandate of the agency was yet again reformed, through Regulation (EU) 
1168/2011, strengthening the agency’s access oftechnical equipment hitherto pledged by 
member states on a voluntary basis, introducing European Border Guard Teams as a semi-
permanent mechanism, and creating the first wave of fundamental rights mechanisms such 
as the Fundamental Rights Officer and the Consultative Forum (Regulation (EU) No 
1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union). 
In 2014, yet another regulation was passed. Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of 15 May 2014 
Establishing Rules for the Surveillance of the External Sea Borders in the Context of 
Operational Cooperation Coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
did not alter the agency’s mandate, but addressed the perception at the EU level that rules 
governing Frontex operations – particularly at sea – were necessary (Regulation (EU) No 
656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules 
for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union). 
The real expansion and reconfiguration of the agency however took place in 2016 and 2019. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 changed the name of the agency, it would become the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency, and together with the national border and coast guard 
institutions of the member state form the European Border and Coast Guard (Regulation (EU) 
2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 
2005/267/EC). The regulation was a complete recast of the agency’s mandate, introduced 
accountability to the Parliament, the Individual Complaints Mechanism, and most notably 
introduced, for the first time, a notion of shared responsibility between the European Union 
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and its member states over the European Union’s external border (International Commission 
of Jurists, ECRE and Amnesty International, 2016; Tsourdi, 2020) To this end, a binding 
framework of ‘European Integrated Border Management’ was introduced (Karamanidou and 
Kasparek, 2018b). In 2019, Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 entered into force, vastly expanding 
the resources of the agency and mandating the agency to hire, until 2027, up to 10.000 own 
border guards which would be direct staff of the agency and were to be deployed along the 
external border (Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) 
No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624). 
Gkliati and Rosenfeld (2018) have analysed the accountability framework of the Agency with 
reference to different ‘types’ of accountability. Political accountability reflects legal 
arrangements making Frontex accountable to the European Parliament, allowing for the 
Executive Director to report to the European Parliament on the Agency’s fundamental rights 
strategy and other areas of activity (2016/1624, Art 68; 2019/1896, Art 106). Legal 
accountability arises from EU primary law – specifically the TFEU – which designates potential 
avenues for victims of violations of fundamental rights to seek redress to national courts and 
the CJEU. As we further explore, legal accountability is complicated by the issue of 
establishing responsibility for fundamental rights situations which are characterized by the 
presence of many actors without clearly defined operational roles (Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 
2018). 
Administrative accountability is the type most relevant to arrangements within the Frontex legal 
framework that pertain to fundamental rights. While Gkliati and Rosenfeldt consider to role of 
the Commission, European Ombudsman and management board as ‘higher level’ 
administrative bodies with powers, in theory at least, to hold Frontex to account, administrative 
accountability reflects the character of mechanisms established to monitor, investigate and 
address fundamental rights violations within the Frontex legal framework (Gkliati and 
Rosenfeldt, 2018; Rijpma, 2016). Specifically, these include the Fundamental Rights Officer, 
the Consultative Forum, the Individual complaints mechanism, the Forced return monitoring 
system and the Fundamental Rights Monitors. We also include the Serious incident Reporting 
system, which is not included in the legal framework, to these mechanisms since it is 
instrumental in documenting fundamental rights violations which subsequently can be 
addressed by national authorities and by the Frontex accountability mechanisms. Following 
an overview of the position of fundamental rights within Frontex and the relevant provisions in 
its legal framework, we discuss these mechanisms in more depth in the following sections. 
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4. Frontex and Fundamental Rights 
Being a European Union agency, Frontex was from its inception bound by human and 
fundamental rights legislation, as stipulated by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union). Specifically, Frontex activities must comply with the 
provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which became 
legally binding when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009 (Fink, 2018; Majcher, 
2015; Keller et al., 2011; Moreno-Lax, 2018). Nevertheless, explicit references to fundamental 
rights were limited in the founding regulation 2007/2004 (Slominski, 2013), which stipulated 
solely that 
This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised by Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (Preamble 22). 
The absence of strongly stated fundamental rights commitments reflected perceptions within 
the Agency at the time, which viewed its role as assisting member states which had primary 
responsibility for activities that engendered risks for human rights (Campesi, 2018). As 
Moreno-Lax (2018, p.123) observed 
Rather than considering respect and protection of the EU acquis as a legal 
precondition for engagement in operational action, the Agency initially took human 
rights as a “strategic choice” […], on the understanding that legal responsibility rests 
“primarily” with the Member States – it lacking executive powers of its own and being 
merely a facilitator/co-ordinator of Member States’ co-operation. 
The Agency also attracted considerable criticism as, within a very weak legal framework, its 
operations at the external borders of the EU were complicit with violations of the rights to non-
refoulement and access to asylum (Campesi, 2018; Marin, 2014b; Frelick, 2009; Lemberg-
Pedersen, 2018; Papastavridis, 2010). In 2008, the European Parliament called 
for the mandate of FRONTEX to explicitly include an obligation to meet international 
human rights standards and a duty towards asylum seekers in rescue operations on 
the high seas, and for cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other relevant non-governmental organisations to be 
formalised within the mandate (European Parliament, 2008) 
In response to such criticisms, Frontex adopted a series of measures such as appointing a 
liaison officer for the UNHCR in 2007, signing a cooperation agreement with the organisation 
the following year, and with the Fundamental Rights Agency in 2010 (Guild et al., 2011). A 
2010 Council regulation introduced internal rules and guidance on maritime operations, 
including compliance with fundamental rights, which was however later challenged on formal 
grounds by the European Parliament and was eventually annulled by the CJEU (Guild et al., 
2011). Measures in responses to criticisms were, at this stage, primarily internal to the 
organisation and often ad-hoc, informal and non-binding (Guild et al., 2011; Slominski, 2013). 
Concerns were also raised regarding the attribution of responsibility for fundamental rights 
violations as well as the monitoring and accountability mechanisms (Guild et al., 2011; Keller 
et al., 2011). Reports by NGOs continued to highlight controversial practices in the context of 
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joint land and sea border surveillance operations including, for example, participation in 
screening activities which could prevent access to asylum or sea surveillance operations that 
resulted in refoulement (Guild et al., 2011; European Ombudsman, 2013a; Marin, 2014a; 
Frelick, 2009; Keller et al., 2011; Maniar, 2016). In parallel, the identity-creation of Frontex 
relied on the adoption of humanitarian narratives – as opposed to narratives explicitly invoking 
human rights – both at the institutional level and at the level of deployed officers (Campesi, 
2014; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Perkowski, 2018). 
However, the strength of provisions on fundamental rights law in the legal framework 
governing Frontex increased over time (Campesi, 2014; Hruschka, 2020; Fernandez Rojo, 
2016). Along with civil society organisations, the European Parliament was instrumental in 
applying pressure for the reform of the Frontex mandate (Campesi, 2018; Pascouau and 
Schumacher, 2014; Slominski, 2013). Consequently, the protection of fundamental rights 
during border management operations became more prominent in Frontex’s legal framework, 
and several mechanisms were introduced to enhance compliance with fundamental rights and 
monitoring of violations (Pascouau and Schumacher, 2014; Slominski, 2013). Regulation 
1168/2011 explicitly referenced fundamental rights and aspects of asylum and refugee law 
that pertained to its operations: 
This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised in particular by the TFEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
notably the right to human dignity, the prohibition of torture and of inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and security, the right to 
protection of personal data, the right to asylum, the principle of non-refoulement, the 
principle of non-discrimination, the rights of the child, and the right to an effective 
remedy. This Regulation should be applied by the Member States in accordance 
with those rights and principles. Any use of force should be in accordance with the 
national law of the host Member State, including the principles of necessity and 
proportionality (Preamble, 29) 
Further, Regulation 1168/2011 required Frontex to develop a Fundamental Rights Strategy 
(FRS) in order to ‘monitor the respect for fundamental rights in all the activities of the Agency’ 
(Art 26a) and prevent fundamental rights violations during joint operations. Several 
mechanisms were introduced as part of this strategy: the Consultative Forum [CF] and the 
Fundamental Rights Officer [FRO], two Codes of Conduct, a general one and one specific to 
joint return operation (Art 2a; Art 9), fundamental rights training for Frontex deployed personnel 
and members of the national teams in joint operations (Art 5), a monitoring mechanism for 
joint return operations (Art 9) and an incident reporting mechanism (Preamble, 16; Art 3a; Art 
8e). Further, provisions for cooperation with third countries, including financial agreements, 
specifically cited ‘respect for fundamental rights and human dignity’ (Preamble, 22; Art 9, par 
1a; Art 14). The FRS provided further details on the operationalisation of these provisions, as 
well as reiterating the Agency’s commitment to mainstream fundamental rights into its 
activities. It was to be implemented by an Action Plan, which would be included into the 
Frontex programme of work (Frontex, 2011; Fernandez Rojo, 2016). 
While these reforms strengthened fundamental rights obligations, concerns regarding 
violations, especially linked to maritime operations and surveillance, persisted (European 
Ombudsman, 2013a; Fernandez Rojo, 2016; Moreno-Lax, 2018). Policy provisions such as 
the FRS and the Code of Conduct remained largely non-binding (Slominski, 2013). 
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Contributions by civil society actors to the European Ombudsman own-initiative inquiry into 
the implementation of the 2011 provisions and the FRS highlighted the persistently weak 
accountability and monitoring arrangements (European Ombudsman, 2013a). The key issue 
raised in the inquiry was the absence of an individual complaints mechanism which would 
directly address violations against individuals during border operations (Fernandez Rojo, 
2016). Frontex argued against the introduction of a complaints mechanism, claiming that only 
‘member states could perform activities which may affect individuals’ rights’, that the Agency 
did not have executive powers, and that existing mechanisms were sufficient for addressing 
violations of fundamental rights (European Ombudsman, 2013a; b; Fernandez Rojo, 2016). 
Despite support by the European Ombudsman, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE) as well as by the CF, the introduction of a complaints mechanism was firmly 
rejected by Frontex (European Ombudsman, 2013a; Council of Europe, 2013; Frontex, 
2014a). It was eventually introduced by Regulation 2016/1624, following a further European 
Parliament Resolution (Fernandez Rojo, 2016). By that time, Frontex management came to 
see the mechanism as a ‘political priority’ that would enhance transparency and accountability 
for Frontex (Frontex, 2016a) reflecting the earlier perceptions of fundamental rights as a 
‘strategic choice’ (Moreno-Lax, 2018, p.123). 
The European Ombudsman inquiry also recorded a number of issues put forward by civil 
society organisations, some of which were represented in the CF. Similarly to the 2011 report 
by the European Parliament, contributors raised concerns regarding weak accountability 
structures, the absence of independent monitoring mechanisms, the vagueness of legal 
provisions and internal guidance on fundamental rights, and weak arrangements on the 
investigation of fundamental rights violations (European Ombudsman, 2013a). As later 
sections will discuss, these concerns and issues persist to this date, despite subsequent legal 
and policy reforms. 
In late 2016, Regulation 1168/2011 was replaced by Regulation 1624/2016. Provisions 
relating to compliance with fundamental rights and other relevant EU and international law 
were strengthened in this new regulation. One the one hand, this reflected the expansion of 
the operational mandate of the European Border and Coast Guard; on the other hand, it 
reflected efforts to strengthen the Agency’s commitment to fundamental rights and monitoring 
mechanisms and the need for the Agency to gain legitimacy in the face of persistent criticisms 
on its human rights record (Campesi, 2018; Hruschka, 2020). In addition to the numerical 
increase of references to fundamental rights in the preamble, Regulation 2016/1624 is more 
explicit on the legislative frameworks that govern the Agency’s activities: 
The European Border and Coast Guard, which includes the Agency and the national 
authorities of Member States which are responsible for border management, 
including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks, should 
fulfil its tasks in full respect for fundamental rights, in particular the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
relevant international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and obligations related 
to access to international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement, 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea, and the International Convention on Maritime Search 
 25 
and Rescue. In accordance with Union law and those instruments the Agency 
should assist Member States in conducting search and rescue operations in order 
to protect and save lives whenever and wherever so required (Preamble 47) 
The principle of non-refoulement at sea, one of the key areas where the Agency’s fundamental 
rights record has been controversial, is specifically referred to in Article 34 on the protection 
of fundamental rights, as well as in relation to the Agency’s return operations. Regula tion 
2016/1624 further reiterated the key components of the Agency’s FRS (Preamble, 48–49), 
while also introducing an individual complaints mechanism (Preamble 50; Art. 72). Despite the 
overall strengthening of the legal framework on fundamental rights, key issues such as the 
lack of independence of monitoring and accountability mechanisms and questions of 
responsibility remained (Campesi, 2018; International Commission of Jurists, ECRE and 
Amnesty International, 2016). Further, the expansion of Frontex activities, for example in 
coordinating return operations and involvement in third countries, as well as the changing 
character of maritime surveillance operations – including communications and cooperation 
with the Libyan coastguard –, involvement in hotspot registration centres since 2015, the 
increasing use of technologies of surveillance and data produced a further set of fundamental 
rights concerns (Campesi, 2018; FRA, 2016, 2018a; Monroy, 2020; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; 
Statewatch and PICUM, 2019). 
Fundamental rights became even more central to the Agency’s activities in Regulation 
2019/1896. Unlike its preceding regulation, it added a specific reference to compliance with 
Regulation 656/2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the 
context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union in the Preamble (par 20) and to the ‘continuous and uniform application of Union Law, 
including the Union Acquis on Fundamental Rights’ as an area of activity by the Agency (Art 
5, par 4). Further, fundamental rights became a key component of the definition of European 
Integrated Border Management (Art 3, par 2) (Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2018b). In addition 
to reiterating the provisions of Regulation 2016/1624 on non-refoulement, Regulation 
2019/1896 specifically cites forms of inhumane and degrading treatment, persecution and 
discrimination (Art 80, par 2) in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Further, 
monitoring fundamental rights compliance across all activities at the external border became 
one of the Agency’s key tasks (Art 10, par 1). While the provisions of this regulation have not 
been fully implemented at the time of writing this report (Council of the European Union, 
2020b), many of the fundamental rights issues discussed earlier in this section remain of 
concern, and some – for example involving the storage and use of data and communication 
and exchange of information with the Libyan MRCC – have increased in significance (Alarm 
Phone et al., 2020; Statewatch and PICUM, 2019; Monroy, 2020). 
4.1 The Legal Framework 
In the following sections we examine the key provisions in the three regulations corresponding 
to the time frame of this report in relation to three areas: Frontex operations, obligations of 
staff both directly employed by Frontex and deployed in its operations and the Agency and its 
executive bodies. While Regulation 2019/1896 has not been fully implemented at the time of 
writing, we examine its key provisions as they showcase developments in the domain of 
fundamental rights. 
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4.1.1 Provisions in Relation to Operational Activities 
In contrast to Regulation 1168/2011, where references to fundamental rights in relation to 
Agency tasks were limited to return operations, in Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 
fundamental rights are specifically referred in the context of a range of operations, reflecting 
the expansion of the Agency’s mandate. Therefore, descriptions of tasks and responsibilities 
in operational plans must be ‘with regard to the respect for fundamental rights’ (2016/1624 Art. 
16 (d); 2019/1896, Art. 38, par. 3(d)) and must contain procedures for receiving and 
transmitting complaints (Art. 16 (m); 2019/1896, Art. 38, par. 3(n)). Additionally, Regulation 
2019/1896 contains a clause stipulating that operational plans must contain ‘general 
instructions on how to ensure the safeguarding of fundamental rights during the operational 
activity of the Agency’ (Art. 38 par. 3(l)). However, there are no references to fundamental 
rights in relation to operational plans for rapid border interventions (2016/1624, Art. 17; 
2019/1986, Art. 39; International Commission of Jurists, ECRE and Amnesty International, 
2016). In terms of sea border surveillance operations and search and rescue aspects that 
arise in this context, the relevant provisions refer specifically to Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 
and international law (2016/1624 Art. 14, par. 2(e); 2019/1896 Art. 36, par. 2(3)). 
Return operations, as in regulation 1168/2001 (Art. 9, par. 1a), must be conducted in 
compliance with fundamental rights (2016/1624, Art. 27 par. 1; 2019/1896, Art. 48, par. 1) and 
more specifically both the Agency and member states 
shall ensure that the respect for fundamental rights, the principle of non-refoulement, 
and the proportionate use of means of constraints and the dignity of the returnee 
are guaranteed4 during the entire return operation’’ (2019/1896, Art. 50, par 3; also 
Art. 28, par. 3). 
The legal framework also stipulated that return operations must be monitored by forced return 
monitors (Regulation 1168/2011 Art. 9 par. 1b; Regulation 2016/1624 Art. 28, par. 6). 
Regulation 2016/1624, in addition included provisions for the constitution of pools of forced-
return monitors (Art. 29). Regulation 2019/1896 introduced provisions for Fundamental Rights 
Monitors, a body within Frontex structures (Art. 51, see also section 6.2.6). 
Further, activities and operations in third countries, both by the Agency and member states, 
must comply with fundamental rights frameworks (Regulation 1168/2011, Art. 14; 2016/1624 
Art. 54; 2019/1896, Art. 72; Art. 73). Regulations 1168/2011 and 2016/1624 stipulated that 
liaison officers can be deployed in third countries where ‘border management practices comply 
with minimum human right standards’ (1168/2011 Art. 14, par 3; 2016/1624, par 1). However, 
this stipulation was not included in Regulation 2019/1896). 
According to Article 25.4 of Regulation 2016/1624, a ‘joint operation, rapid border intervention, 
pilot project, migration management support team deployment, return operation, return 
intervention or working arrangement’ can be suspended if the Executive Director [ED] 
‘considers that there are violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations 
that are of a serious nature or are likely to persist’. In Regulation 1168/2011, the relevant 
clause referred only to joint operations and pilot projects (Art. 3, par 1a). Regulation 2019/1896 
 
4 The reference to the ‘dignity of the returnee was added in Regulation 2019/1896. 
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further stipulates that ‘any activity by the Agency’ may not be launched if the ED, in 
consultation with the FRO, 
considers that there would already be serious reasons at the beginning of the activity 
to suspend or terminate it because it could lead to violations of fundamental rights 
or international protection obligations of a serious nature (Art. 46, par 5). 
Further, regulations 2016/1624 (Art. 26) and 2019/1986 (Art. 47) stipulate that the evaluation 
of operation activities must include the observations of the FRO. 
4.1.2 Provisions in Relation to the Conduct of Staff 
Officers of member state forces and deployed at land and sea operation are obliged to respect 
fundamental rights (Regulation 1168, Art. 3b par. 4 ; 1624/2016 Art. 21 par. 5; Regulation 
2019/1624, Art. 43, par. 4 ) with ‘access to asylum procedures and ‘human dignity’ being 
explicitly cited in Regulations 2016/1624 (Art. 21, par 50) and 2019/1896 (Art. 43, par. 4). 
Regulation 2016/1624 also stipulated that deployed staff ‘shall not discriminate against 
persons on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation’ (Art. 21, par. 5), while Art. 43, par. 4 of 2019/1896 added further acts of 
discrimination that are prohibited such as on the grounds of membership of a minority and 
political beliefs5. Stipulations for compliance to fundamental rights and international law is 
reiterated in relation to specific roles such as liaison officers in EU member states (Art. 12, 
par. 3(e); Art. 31, par. 3(e)) - additionally tasked with liaising with the FRO in Regulation 
2019/1896 (Art. 31, par. 3(f)) - and in third countries (Art. 55, par 3; Art. 77 par 3), members 
of migration management support teams (Art. 18, par. 4(a); Art. 40, par. 4(e)), and coordinating 
officers who are tasked with monitoring the implementation of fundamental rights aspects of 
the operational plans (Art. 22 par. 3(b); Art. 44, par. 3(b)). Deployed personnel, members of 
the national forces and Agency staff are also to be provided with training on fundamental rights 
and asylum law based on common core curricula (Regulation 2011/1168 Art. 5; Regulation 
2016/1624, Art. 36; 2019/1986, Art. 62; Art. 55, par. 3; Art. 56, par. 3). 
Personnel deployed in operations and members of national forces are subject to the 
disciplinary and legal frameworks of their home member state in case of fundamental rights 
violations or violations of the international protection obligations (Regulation 2016/1624; Art. 
21 par. 5; Art. 72 par. 7; Regulation 2019/1986 Art. 111, par. 7). Employees of Frontex are 
subject to disciplinary measures by the Agency (Art. 72 par. 6; 2019/1986). 
Provisions regarding fundamental rights are also reiterated in the two Codes of Conduct. 
Further, the Code of Conduct on return includes a requirement to report violations of 
fundamental rights (Frontex, 2018e, Art. 21). The General Code of Conduct includes a less 
clear stipulation that staff must report breaches of the legal framework and the Code of 
Conduct through ‘appropriate channels’, but does not specifically refer to the Serious Incident 
Reporting mechanism (Frontex, 2019d, Art. 7). 
 
 
5 ‘While performing their tasks and exercising their powers, they shall not discriminate against persons 
on the basis of any grounds such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, 
religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age or sexual orientation in line with Article 21 of the Charter’ (2019/1986, Art 43, par 4) 
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4.1.3. Provisions in Relation to the Agency, its Executive Director and 
Management Board 
The Agency and its ED are also bound by certain fundamental rights obligations in relation to 
their roles and responsibilities. The agency, for example, is given responsibility for providing 
training on Fundamental Rights to staff and developing common core curricula upon which 
the training is based (Regulation 2011/1168 Preamble 18; 2016/1624, Art. 36; 2019/1896 
Preamble 51, 78; 2019/1896, Art. 62), although responsibilities for training national officers 
who might be deployed also lies with member states (2019/1896 Preamble 51; Art. 10 par. 
1(w)). Cooperation between the Agency and MS with third countries must also comply with 
fundamental rights (Regulation 2016/1624, Art. 54; 2019/1896 Art. 71, 72). Concerns about 
return operations ‘shall be communicated’ to member states and the Commission (Art. 28, 
par. 7; 2019/1896, Art. 50, par. 6). 
The ED has a range of specific responsibilities in relation to fundamental rights. In terms of 
accountability, the ED may be asked to report to the European Parliament on the Agency’s 
fundamental rights strategy (2016/1624, Art. 68; 2019/1896, Art. 106). A key power concerns 
the suspension of operations (Regulation 1168/2011, Art. 3, par. 1a; Regulation 2016/1624, 
Art. 25 par 4; 2019/1896, Art. 46, par. 4) if there are persistent violations of fundamental rights. 
Regulation 2019/1896 extended this provision to not launching an operation (2019/1896, Art. 
46, par. 5), stipulating that the ED 
must take into account relevant information such as the number and substance of 
registered complaints that have not been resolved by a national competent authority, 
reports of serious incidents, reports from coordinating officers, relevant international 
organisations and Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in the areas 
covered by this Regulation (Art. 46, par. 6) 
Regulation 2019/1896 further provided for the ED 
to assess, prior to any operational activity of the Agency, whether there are 
violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations that are of a 
serious nature or are likely to persist in accordance with Article 46(4) and (5) (Art. 
106, par. 3(m)). 
Regulation 2016/1624 also introduced a set of powers in relation to investigating fundamental 
rights violations. The executive director must follow up with complaints of fundamental rights 
violations against staff members, decide on disciplinary measures in consultation with the 
FRO, and can request that member states remove team members who committed 
fundamental rights violations (Art. 72 par. 6; par. 8; 2019/1896, par. 6, 8). 
4.2 Fundamental Rights Monitoring and Accountability 
Mechanisms 
The establishment of mechanisms to advise on fundamental rights, monitor the Agency’s 
compliance during its operations and address fundamental rights violations was a response 
to the widely observed shortcomings of the foundational regulation 2004/2007 and the 
Agency’s practices during operations. The CF, FRO and Monitoring of Forced Returns were 
established by Regulation 1168/2011 and as part. of the Agency’s Fundamental Rights 
Strategy, while the individual complaints mechanism was introduced by Regulation 
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2016/1624. The Serious Incident Reporting mechanism was also established in the context of 
the Agency’s Fundamental Rights Strategy (Pascouau and Schumacher, 2014) and is 
mentioned in Regulation 1168/2011, although not in subsequent ones. 
4.2.1 Consultative Forum 
The CF, established by Regulation 1168/2011 and operational since 2012 (Frontex, 2020a; 
Pascouau and Schumacher, 2014) is a primarily advisory body, tasked with advising the 
Management Board [MB] and the ED ‘on the further development and implementation of the 
Fundamental Rights Strategy, Code of Conduct and common core curricula’ and submitting 
an annual report on its activities (Art. 26a). Regulations 2016/1624 (Art. 70, par. 1) and 
2019/1896 (Art. 108, par. 1) designate it as an independent body, providing ‘advice on 
fundamental rights matters’ to the ED and the MB. In practice, this advice takes the form of 
recommendations, opinions and annual reports, which are addressed at the ED and the MB 
(Frontex, 2014a). Recommendations and opinions can be issued at the initiative of the ED 
and/or the MB, or the CF itself (Frontex, 2014a). 
The formal tasks of the CF have remained the same in regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896, 
with the addition of developing and advising on the individual complaints mechanism 
(2016/1624, Art. 70, par. 1). The CF’s advisory tasks have included a wide range of areas: 
offering opinions on legislative proposals, such as the EBCGA and EUROSUR regulations;, 
on key policy areas such as the Agency’s child protection strategy and gender mainstreaming 
activities; making recommendations on operational activities and border management 
practices, such as issuing advice to the Agency to withdraw from operations in Hungary in 
2016; and contributing to the annual programme of work (Frontex, 2014a, 2017f, 2018f, 
2019m). 
The CF is composed of 15 members. These include two EU agencies, the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) and the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), intergovernmental 
organisations such as the UNHCR, IOM, the Council of Europe, OSCE, and since 2020 the 
UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as non-governmental 
organisations such as Amnesty International, ECRE and the Jesuit Refugee Council 
(Giannetto, 2019; Frontex, 2020a; g). Organisations serve for a term of three years, beyond 
which they can be re-appointed. Most of the NGOs that are members of the CF are large 
organisations even though the European offices, which normally provide representation in the 
CF, can be quite small in terms of staff (Giannetto, 2019). While they are diverse in terms of 
their key activities – for example advocacy, service provision and litigation – most tend to be 
active across Europe and have substantial financial resources (Giannetto, 2019). 
The composition of the CF is decided by the MB, following a proposal by the FRO in 
consultation with the ED, and on the basis of a number of criteria which have been amended 
over the years. Some, such as expertise, relevance, extent of representation in Europe, 
evidence-based approach and commitment to accountability, transparency and fundamental 
rights have remained the same in MB decisions between 2012 and 2019. In 2015, an 
‘obligation of professional secrecy’ was added to the selection criteria (Frontex, 2015b). The 
open call for applications in 2019 introduced several new criteria, such as the ‘degree of 
recognition of potential members’ work by other relevant actors which are not members of the 
CF , past or ongoing involvement in EU projects or actions, and neutrality, impartiality and 
abstention from any political affiliations (Frontex, 2019i). However, it is not clear how the 
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selection process works in practice: for example, the application of the NGO SeaWatch, which 
is heavily involved in SAR operations in the Mediterranean, was rejected on the grounds that 
its ‘operational focus did not match the Agency’s need for expert and targeted advice on 
fundamental rights issues from across the Agency’s enlarged mandate’ and its ‘knowledge 
and expertise’ did not match the criteria for participation in the CF (Sea-Watch, 2019). 
Another key procedural area is the transmission of information from Frontex to the CF. 
Regulation 1168/2011 merely referred to ‘modalities of transmission of information’, which 
were to be decided by the ED and the MB. This provision was implemented by informal 
arrangements, whereby members of the CF signed confidentiality agreements in exchange 
for access to a Frontex database and information being made available through the Frontex 
Consultative Forum Secretariat (Frontex, 2014a), which however operates under the structure 
of Frontex. The 2014 working arrangements stipulated that Frontex would make available to 
the CF Information necessary for its work, while the CF could request additional information if 
needed. The ED was to grant the request, unless it was considered unjustified (Frontex, 
2014b). The CF could also be invited by Frontex to visit joined operations, subject to the 
approval of member states, including the one hosting the operation (Frontex, 2014a). In 
Regulation 2016/1624, these arrangements were formalised into a provision for the CF to have 
effective access to all information concerning the respect for fundamental rights, 
including by carrying out on-the-spot visits to joint operations or rapid border 
interventions subject to the agreement of the host Member State, and to hotspot 
areas, return operations and return interventions (Art. 70, par. 4). 
Regulation 2019/1896 further specified that information should be transferred in a ‘timely’ 
manner – reflecting persistent issues around the provision of information which we discuss in 
section 6.3 – and stipulated that refusals by member states to allow on-the-spot visits should 
be justified (Art. 111, par. 4). The purpose of such visits is not to monitor fundamental rights 
matters, but for the CF to ‘learn the reality on the ground’ and be in position to offer 
recommendations (Frontex, 2014a). Yet, such visits can only be initiated by Frontex itself 
(Frontex, 2014a). 
4.2.2 Fundamental Rights Officer 
The position of the FRO, also introduced by Regulation 1168/2011, was a further measure to 
strengthen fundamental rights monitoring and accountability. The FRO was to be ‘independent 
in the performance of his/her duties’ – a description which, as we’ll discuss in sections6.2, is 
contested (Art. 26a par, 3, also 2016/1624, par. 2). Further, the FRO would have access to all 
information concerning fundamental rights (Art. 26a, par 4, also 2016/1624 Preamble 49, Art. 
71 par 3). Regulation 2016/1624 additionally specified that the FRO would be provided with 
‘adequate resources and staff corresponding to its mandate and size’ (Preamble 48). A further 
task was the development of the individual complaints mechanism. 
Regulation 1168/2011 contained little detail on the key tasks of the position, other than 
contributing observations for the evaluation of joint operations and pilot projects (Art. 3 par 3). 
Other documents suggest that the FRO was tasked with monitoring Frontex operations, 
including by in situ visits, receiving, providing fundamental rights assessments for proposed 
operations, monitoring and following up Serious Incident Reports [SIRs] and individual 
complaints, contributing to the revision of reporting and monitoring procedures, managing 
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records on reported incidents of fundamental rights violations, providing advice to the Risk 
Analysis Unit and contributing to the development of fundamental rights training for staff 
(Frontex, 2014a). However, they did not have a mandate for investigating individual complaints 
(European Ombudsman, 2013a). 
Most of these activities were codified in Article 71 of Regulation 2016/1624, which stipulated 
that that the FRO ‘shall have the tasks of contributing to the Agency’s fundamental rights 
strategy, of monitoring its compliance with fundamental rights and of promoting its respect of 
fundamental rights’ (par. 1) and ‘shall be consulted on the operational plans’ (par. 3). 
Specifically, the FRO’s responsibilities included advising the ED on the suspension of 
operations (Art. 25 par. 4); providing opinions for the evaluation of operational activities and 
operational plans, including return operations (Art. 26, Art. par. 8; Art. 73 par. 3); advising on 
the constitution of forced return monitors (Art. 29, par. 1), cooperation with third countries (Art. 
34, par. 4) and common core curricula (Art. 36, par. 5). Beyond these activities, the FRO is 
involved in the administration of the individual complaints mechanism, which is described in 
section 4.2.3. 
The role of the FRO was strengthened with Regulation 2019/1896, following the input of the 
European Parliament (Kilpatrick, 2020). In addition to the tasks above, the FRO can now 
provide advice on their own initiative (Art. 109, par. 2 (d)), opinions on working arrangements 
(Art. 109, par. 2(e) and (f)) and conduct investigations into the activities of the Agency (Art. 
109, par. 2(b)). The independence of the FRO and their staff is reiterated, and the regulation 
stipulates for rules to be developed by the MB so as to guarantee the FRO’s independence. 
Moreover, the regulation states that ‘the management board shall ensure that action is taken 
with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer’ (Art. 109 par. 4). 
4.2.3 The Individual Complaints Mechanism 
While provisions in the 2011 Fundamental Rights Strategy and Code of Conduct for return 
operations stipulated a right for individuals to submit complaints, no such mechanism was 
formally introduced until 2016. 
Regulation 2016/1624 stipulated that 
[a]ny person who is directly affected by the actions of staff involved in a joint 
operation, pilot project, rapid border intervention, migration management support 
team deployment, return operation or return intervention and who considers him or 
herself to have been the subject of a breach of his or her fundamental rights due to 
those actions, or any party representing such a person, may submit a complaint in 
writing to the Agency (Art. 72, par. 2). 
Regulation 2019/1896 amended this clause by adding ‘failure to act’ by staff as well as their 
actions (2019/1896, Art. 111, par 2). Complaints can be submitted by individuals in writing 
directly to Frontex or through an online submission form6 (Frontex, 2020f), designed by the 
FRO and made available in the agency’s website and in hard copy during operations ‘in 
languages that third-country nationals understand or are reasonably believed to understand’ 
(2016/1624, Art. 72, par. 10, 2019/1896 Art. 111 par 10). Further, the Agency must ensure 




10, 2019/1896 Art. 111 par. 10). Regulation 2019/1896 also stipulates that the form shall be 
easily accessible on mobile devices and that the Agency must make further guidance and 
assistance on the complaints procedure available to complainants (2019/1896 Art. 111 par. 
10). Complaints can also be made regarding data protections issues (2016/1624, Art. 72, par. 
6). 
The procedure is managed by the FRO, who is responsible for liaising with the involved parties 
(2016/1624, par. 5; 2019/1896 Art. 111 par. 4). However, not all complaints are automatically 
admissible (Art. 72, par. 3). The FRO decides on their admissibility (2016/1624, Art. 72, par. 
4; Art. 111 par. 4) based on a set of criteria: the complaint must refer to events ‘that occurred 
or whose effects continued after 6 October 2016’ (Frontex, 2020f) are substantiated and 
‘involving concrete fundamental rights violations’ (2016/1624, Art. 72, par. 3; Art. 111 par. 3). 
The FRO then informs the complainant that the complaint has been registered and is in 
progress, and of responses to the complaint by national authorities (2016/1624, Art. 72 par. 5; 
Art. 111 par. 5). If the complaint is deemed inadmissible the complainant must be informed of 
the reasons why and be provided with information on other routes to pursue remedies 
(2016/1624, Art. 72 par. 5; Art. 111 par. 5). In addition, Regulation 2019/1896 stipulated the 
introduction of ‘an appropriate procedure in cases where a complaint is declared inadmissible 
or unfounded’ and stipulated that the FRO must reassess the complaint if new evidence is 
submitted (Art. 111 par. 5). 
Admissible complaints about Frontex staff members are forwarded to the Executive Director, 
who in consultation with the FRO ‘ensures appropriate follow up’, decides on disciplinary 
measures and reports the outcomes of investigations to the FRO (2016/1624, Art. 72, par 6). 
If an admissible complaint concerns deployed Frontex officers or members of the forces of the 
host state, the FRO forwards the complaint to the relevant national authorities state authorities 
(Art. 72, par. 4)7 whose responsibility to investigate and ‘ensure appropriate follow up, 
including disciplinary measures as necessary or other measures in accordance with national 
law’ (2016/1624 Art. 72 par. 7; Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 2018). Member states are to report to 
the FRO on findings and follow up actions in response to complaints received ‘within a 
determined timeframe’ (Art. 72, par. 7). If there is no response from the member state, the 
regulation stipulates that the Agency ‘shall follow up the matter’ (Art. 72, par. 7). Regulation 
2019/1886 further stipulates that if a member state ‘within the determined time period (which 
is not determined in legislation), does not report back or provides only an inconclusive 
response, the FRO shall inform the executive director and the management board’ (Art. 111, 
par. 7). 
Regulation 2016/1624 stipulated that the FRO reports on information on the complaints 
mechanism and the outcome of individual complaints investigated by the Agency or member 
states to the executive director and to the management board and that the agency includes 
such information in its annual report (Art. 72, par. 9). The equivalent provision in Regulation 
2019/1896 states that the FRO includes such information in their annual report (Art. 111, par. 
9). 
 
7 However, the Frontex Code of Conduct currently available in the Frontex website states that it is the 
executive director who ‘communicates the incident to the responsible Member state’ (Art 21.2) 
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4.2.4 Serious Incidents Reporting 
The 2011 FRS referred to creating 
an effective reporting system to ensure that any incidents or serious risks regarding 
fundamental rights are immediately reported by any participating officer or Frontex 
staff member and can be acted upon (Frontex, 2011, par. 17) 
The 2012 and 2013 European Ombudsman’s inquiries similarly refer to the internal reporting 
system as a key mechanism for deployed staff to report fundamental rights violations. The two 
Codes of Conduct state the obligations of staff to report legal violations and violations of the 
code of conduct, in the case of the Code of Conduct on return specifically citing the Serious 
Incident Reporting system. A 2019 press release likewise stated that 
The Code of Conduct obliges every officer who has reason to believe a provision of 
the code or fundamental rights was violated, to report this immediately to Frontex in 
form of a Serious Incident Report (SIR)’. (Frontex, 2019f) 
Unlike the mechanisms discussed in the preceding sections, the Serious Incident Reporting 
system is not specifically oriented towards monitoring fundamental rights violations but 
towards recording a wide range of incidents (Frontex, 2016c). Only Regulation 1168/2011 
refers to it as a mechanism to report and record fundamental rights violations (preamble 13). 
Yet, it is the key mechanism for reporting fundamental rights violations occurring during 
operations and monitoring the progress of related investigations by national authorities 
(Frontex, 2016c; e). 
There is, however, very little publicly available information on how the system operates. The 
Frontex website states that ‘the established procedure for dealing with such situations includes 
fact collection, assessment and final report to be prepared by an appointed SIR coordinator’ 
(Frontex, 2020e). Annual reports also state that SIRs are submitted by ‘the nominated 
responsible Frontex Coordinating Officers’ who are ‘responsible for collecting all relevant 
information in order to create/provide the SIR, following the provisions of the SIR SOP’ 
(Frontex, 2016c, p.56, 2016e). 
Internal documents released through FOI requests offer greater clarity regarding how Serious 
Incident Reporting works in practice. SIRs are submitted to the Frontex Situation Centre8 by 
Frontex staff on the ground, who are either directly involved in an incident or obtain information 
about it, following the ‘chain of command of the operational plan’ (Frontex, 2016c). These 
provisions are reiterated in operational plans we obtained through freedom of information 
requests, although a 2018 operational plan had the relevant section redacted (Frontex, 
2017k). 
Three different types of SIR can be submitted: the initial SIR, within two hours of an incident 
occurring or becoming known, the SIR submitted based of developments on the incident, and 
the follow-up SIR, submitted in order to report updates (Frontex, 2016c). While the initial SIR 
can be submitted by any staff on the ground, SIRs and follow-up SIRs are submitted by 
divisions such as the international coordination centre (ICC) or the Frontex Situation Centre 
 
8 The Frontex Situation Centre is tasked with gathering and managing information on external 
borders, and act as a point of contact for operational matters. See also: 
https://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/information-management/ 
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(FSC) and more senior staff such as Frontex Support Officers (FSO), Frontex Operational 
Coordinators (FOC) or Frontex Coordinating Officers (FCO) (Frontex 2016 SIR). SIRs are to 
describe the incident that happened, its location, time and actors involved, the means used to 
carry out the action, the source of information, the actions taken by Frontex personnel and 
home state authorities, and possible consequences and effects of the event (Frontex, 2016c). 
A coordinator is appointed by the Frontex Situation centre, but the FRO can request to be 
appointed as a coordinator if the SIR concerns a fundamental rights violation (Frontex, 2016a). 
In 2018, the Consultative Forum recommended the revision of the Serious reporting 
mechanism, based on the under-reporting of fundamental rights violations. 
4.2.5 Forced Return Monitors 
A mechanism for forced return monitors was introduced with regulation 1168/2011, which 
stipulated that the Code of Conduct had to ‘provide for an effective forced-return monitoring 
system’ of national and joint return operations (JROs) in compliance to the provisions of Article 
8(6) of the Return directive 2008/115/EC (Art. 9, par. 1b). In practice, forced return monitoring 
was to be implemented by national bodies such as national ombudsperson organisations 
(Carrera and Stefan, 2018); However such mechanisms were not in place in some member 
states at the time of Regulation 2011/1168 coming into force (Frontex, 2014d). Frontex, at that 
stage, had no formal monitoring responsibilities for JROs, but was working with the designated 
national MS authorities to develop monitoring mechanisms (Frontex, 2014d). 
Forced return monitoring was to be carried out on the basis of objective and transparent 
criteria and cover the whole JRO from the pre-departure phase until the hand-over of the 
returnees in the country of return (1168/2011 Art. 9 1b). The 2011 FRS stated that the forced 
return monitoring system was to be the responsibility of member states, although supported 
by Frontex, and that ‘failing to meet this condition could ultimately lead to postponement or 
cancellation of the operation or of the participation of the respective Member State’ (Frontex, 
2011, par. 18). However, it also stated that Frontex would endeavour to include persons with 
a qualified fundamental rights expertise among participating staff (Frontex, 2011, par. 20). The 
objective of the monitoring mechanism was to focus on ‘concrete incidents’ as well as ‘on more 
general consequences or impacts of the JO on fundamental rights’ in order to inform JRO 
practices (Frontex, 2011, par. 20). 
Regulation 2016/1624 expanded on the provisions of 2011/1186, introducing an obligation for 
forced return monitors to submit a report on each operation to the Executive Director, the FRO 
and the designated national mechanisms (Art. 28, par. 6). It further specified the establishment 
of a pool of forced return monitors, drawn from the national monitoring bodies (Art. 29, par. 1). 
The number and profile of the forced return monitors was to be determined by the 
Management Board, while member states were responsible for nominating forced return 
monitors who met the profile criteria, including child protection experts (Art. 29, par. 2). The 
selected forced return monitors would then be made available to Frontex, who in turn would 
make them available for deployment at the request of member states (Art. 29, par. 4). These 
provisions remained the same in regulation 2019/1896, with additional input stipulated from 
the FRO. 
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4.2.6 Fundamental Rights Monitors 
Regulation 2019/1896 introduced a further monitoring mechanism, the Fundamental Rights 
Monitors, to be employed as statutory staff of the agency (Art. 110). The key tasks of the FRMs 
are 
(a) monitoring compliance with fundamental rights and providing advice and 
assistance on fundamental rights in the preparation, conduct and evaluation of the 
operational activities of the Agency which the FRO has assigned to them to monitor; 
(b) acting as forced-return monitors; 
(c) contributing to the training activities of the Agency on fundamental rights as 
provided for in Art. 62, including by providing training on fundamental rights. (Art. 
110, par 2) 
FRMs are to be assigned to operations by the FRO, whereby they are to conduct visits in the 
locations of operational activities and ‘report to the FRO on any concerns related to possible 
violation of fundamental rights within the Agency’s operational activities’ (Art. 110 par. 3(d)). 
They are selected and appointed by the FRO (Art. 109, par 2 and 3), are ‘independent in the 
performance of their duties’ and trained in fundamental rights (Art. 110 par. 5, 7). At the time 
of writing, Frontex was in the process of recruiting FRMs, a process expected to be completed 
by the end of 2020. Further, Frontex signed a Service Level Agreement with FRA regarding 














5. Key Issues with the Legal Framework 
5.1 Gaps and Omission in the Legal Framework 
Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 include extensive fundamental rights provisions 
regarding Frontex operations and activities, especially in comparison to the two earlier 
regulations (Campesi, 2018; Hruschka, 2020). However, the legal framework is often unclear 
in applying fundamental rights obligations in several areas of activity. 
First, fundamental rights as enshrined in articles 6.3 of regulation 2016/1624 and 5.4 of 
regulation 2019/1896 are only related to the external borders of the EU. This wording excludes 
activities of Frontex at the internal borders of the EU, for example aimed at preventing 
secondary movements (FRA, 2018b). A further omission is the absence of references to the 
humanitarian exception clause in Council Directive 2002/90/EC (Art. 1, par. 2) in relation to 
anti-smuggling operations (FRA, 2018b). Other contentious areas include the absence of 
obligation for instructions issued by national authorities to comply with fundamental rights (Art. 
82) and the lack of provisions for responses by Frontex staff in such instances (ECRE, 2018). 
While the coordinating officer is expected to report non-compliance to the Executive Director 
[ED], there is no specific description of actions to be taken, other than what implied in the 
provisions regarding termination of operations. This omission, for ECRE (2018), runs the risk 
of rendering Frontex complicit to fundamental rights violations. 
The vulnerability assessment mechanism (2016/1624 Art. 13; 2019/1896, Art. 32) does not 
include fundamental rights in its scope, despite proposals to the contrary by both the 
Consultative Forum (CF) and external organisations (International Commission of Jurists, 
ECRE and Amnesty International, 2016; ECRE, 2018; Interview 3; Interview 4). Further, the 
definition of EIBM specifically refers to activities related to access to international protection 
(ECRE, 2018; International Commission of Jurists, ECRE and Amnesty International, 2016). 
SAR operations are also excluded from the scope of the vulnerability assessment mechanism 
(ECRE, 2018). In contrast, the Schengen Evaluation mechanism specifically takes into 
account fundamental rights (Regulation 1053/2013, Preamble 14). Moreover, there are no 
references to fundamental rights in the articles concerning the multiannual strategic policy 
cycle (Art. 8) integrated planning (Art. 9) and risk analysis (Art. 29). These omissions raise 
questions regarding the extent of mainstreaming fundamental rights protections into the 
Frontex legal framework (FRA, 2018b). 
A further grey area concerns the role of private actors within Frontex operations. For example, 
local travel companies were contracted by Frontex in order to transport returnees from the 
Greek hotspots to Turkey or within Greece in the context of JROs (dm-aegean, 2018). Private 
companies are also increasingly used by Frontex to provide support to border surveillance 
operations, for example in the Central Mediterranean. Yet, the legal framework is unclear 
regarding the fundamental rights obligations of privately contracted actors, and whether there 
is a monitoring protocol regarding their activities (Fotiadis in ‘Under surveillance’: Monitoring 
at the border, 2020; RSA and Pro Asyl, 2019). 
The provisions for suspension, termination and non-launch of operations in Regulation 
2019/1896 still lack in specificity. In Regulation 2016/1624, the suspension of operations was 
left entirely to the discretion of the ED, and there were no specific criteria according to which 
such decisions could be made – for example by reference to individual complaints or the 
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Serious Incident Reporting system (International Commission of Jurists, ECRE and Amnesty 
International, 2016). While regulation 2019/1896 inserted a requirement to consider such 
information, the provision remains vague as it sets no procedures or criteria for deciding when 
fundamental rights violations are serious enough to warrant suspension, termination or not 
launching an operation (ECRE, 2018). These provisions were not extended to explicitly include 
operations in third countries (Frontex, 2016b; ECRE, 2018). Moreover, proposals to take into 
account reports by human rights bodies and NGOs when assessing fundamental rights 
violations (ECRE, 2018) were not adopted. 
The key fundamental rights accountability mechanisms are also constrained by a number of 
omissions and grey areas. The provisions on the complaints mechanism, which remained 
largely unchanged between regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896, create a number of 
exclusions which limit the scope for submitting a complaint. While in Regulation 2019/1896 
the relevant provisions have been extended to include those affected by omissions of border 
guards as well as actions, the possibility to submit a complaint is still limited to persons directly 
affected by such actions (ECRE, 2018). This places the burden of proof on the claimant, 
excludes actions of Frontex deployed personnel who work in coordinating roles, and does not 
provide for complaints to be submitted ‘in the public interest’, for example by NGOs and other 
organisations who often possess information on individual but also systematic fundamental 
rights violations (ECRE, 2018, p.22; Frontex, 2017f, 2016b). Other limitations include imposing 
a time frame of one year, not taking into account lack of access to legal assistance, and not 
providing an appeals mechanism against the Fundamental Rights Officer’s [FRO] decisions 
on admissibility or final decisions (ECRE, 2018; FRA, 2018b; Frontex, 2016p; Moreno-Lax, 
2018). A further shortcoming of the legal framework is the lack of detail regarding follow up 
actions by both the FRO and the ED, and of a specific time frame for member states to report 
back on complaints (ECRE, 2018; FRA, 2018b; Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 2018). The only 
addition to these arrangements in Regulation 2019/1896, the responsibility of the FRO to 
inform the ED and the Management Board [MB], is still without any concrete references to 
actions they should undertake. Similar issues were noted in relation to the provisions for 
member states to report back on the monitoring of return operations (Frontex, 2014a). 
Further, the roles of the FRO and the CF have remained limited and sometimes unclear. The 
monitoring role of both bodies is limited as neither of them have a constant presence at 
operational areas (Baldaccini cited in Strik and Fotiadis, 2020). While the FRO was granted 
investigative powers into any area of activity of the Agency by regulation 2019/1896 (Art 109, 
par 2(b)), these are not detailed in the text (Kilpatrick, 2020). Unlike the ED, they do not have 
significant decision-making powers. Neither is it specified what actions should the MB take on 
the recommendations of the FRO and the CF. 
Further concerns have been raised, mainly by the CF and the FRO, on the clarity of guidance 
provided in documents such as the Codes of Conduct and operational plans. The CF, for 
example criticized the Code of Conduct on returns for not providing ‘sufficiently detailed and 
concrete provisions on several essential issues’ (Frontex, 2014a, p.22). While both Codes of 
Conduct were subsequently revised, the lack of detail and clarity has persisted (Moreno-Lax, 
2018). The Serious Incident Reporting mechanism, while crucial for monitoring and reporting 
fundamental rights violations, is not governed by the legislative framework, and relies instead 
on internal guidance. In the context of sea border surveillance operations, the FRO noted the 
lack of clear guidance on assessing the personal circumstances, needs for international 
protection and vulnerabilities of intercepted persons (Frontex, 2017p). 
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5.2 Responsibility for Fundamental Rights Violations, 
Accountability and Legal Remedies 
The question of which actor is responsible for fundamental rights violation committed during 
operation at EU borders remains contested within the fundamental rights accountability regime 
of the EBCGA. It is beyond the scope of this report to explore how legal responsibility, and 
especially responsibility when more than one actors are involved, can be established in the 
case of Frontex joint operations by reference to European and international law. The 
implications of international treaties and human rights law for a range of Frontex activities have 
been explored by several scholars such as Fink (2018), Mungianu (2016), Papastavridis 
(2010), Majcher (2015) and Gkliati and Rosenfeld (2018). Rather, we focus on the limitations 
of the legal framework governing Frontex in accounting for the responsibility of the different 
actors involved in the operations and activities of the European Border and Coast Guard and 
their practical implications. 
The position of Frontex, in particular before the introduction of its enhanced mandate with 
Regulation 2016/1624, was that member states were responsible for fundamental rights 
violations since the Agency did not have executive powers and its role was limited to support 
and coordination (Campesi, 2018; European Ombudsman, 2013a; ECRE, 2018). This was, 
for example, the position adopted in the context of the two European Ombudsman inquiries 
(European Ombudsman, 2013a; b) and in statements by the EDs (Laitinen, cited in Keller et 
al., 2011). Regulation 1168/2011 designated member states as the main actors performing 
border control and surveillance (Campesi, 2018; Majcher, 2015). In this context, the legal 
framework suggested that primary responsibility for fundamental rights violations lay with the 
member states (Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin, 2013; Fink, 2018). 
This position has been challenged by various actors, including human rights bodies, NGOs 
and scholars (European Ombudsman, 2013a; Keller et al., 2011; Majcher, 2015). On the one 
hand, the issue of concern was the participation of Frontex teams in activities such as in the 
context of the RABIT deployment in Evros or interceptions in the Mediterranean which, while 
directed by member states, resulted in inhumane or degrading treatment, violations of the right 
to asylum and of the principle of non-refoulement, and the prohibition of collective expulsions 
(Majcher, 2015; Keller et al., 2011). On the other hand, even if Frontex teams are not directly 
involved or directly responsible for such actions, such violations were occurring within the area 
of Frontex joint operations (Majcher, 2015; Interview 4). The claim that Frontex had no 
responsibility over fundamental rights violations was challenged through its practical 
involvement in operations, contribution to the design of operational plans and its capacity as 
a coordinating agency (European Ombudsman, 2013b; Keller et al., 2011; Majcher, 2015). 
Regulation 2016/1624 introduced for the first time the concept of implementing European 
Integrated Border Management as a shared responsibility between European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency – Frontex - and the relevant authorities of member states (Preamble, 6; 
Art. 5; ICJ et al 2016). Frontex competencies were enhanced even though operational 
command and control, and hence the responsibility for fundamental rights violations, remained 
largely with member states (Campesi, 2018). Regulation 2019/1896, however, while 
reiterating the primary responsibility of member states, accorded the agency executive powers 
and specified tasks to be undertaken by the Agency’s statutory staff (ECRE, 2018). In theory 
at least, the expanded competencies of Frontex increase the possibility for being responsible 
both directly and indirectly for fundamental rights violations (Interview 4). Direct responsibility 
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could be incurred in tasks performed by Frontex staff, such as border checks. Moreover, and 
similar to the previous legal frameworks, Frontex may incur responsibility in fundamental rights 
violations through both omissions and actions. Regulation 2019/1896 specifically cites 
omissions to act as a ground for submitting complaints against personnel (Art. 111, par. 2). 
Providing assistance to member states through personnel and assets can also be argued to 
incur complicity to violations (Majcher, 2015; International Commission of Jurists, ECRE and 
Amnesty International, 2016). A further issue concerns knowledge about fundamental rights 
violations and failure to intervene or act (Fink, 2018; Majcher, 2015; Interview 6). 
Yet, while the legal framework suggests a degree of shared responsibility, it remains difficult 
to establish the responsibility of each actor in practice. legal arrangements remain vague and 
do not clarify the nature and extent of the specific responsibilities of each actor. For instance, 
the language used in Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 to describe the allocation of 
responsibilities and tasks to the Agency is unclear. Terms used throughout the text of the 
regulations to describe Frontex tasks – such as ‘coordination’, ‘cooperation’, ‘facilitation’ and 
‘support’ – are not defined (International Commission of Jurists, ECRE and Amnesty 
International, 2016; ECRE, 2018). As determining responsibility for fundamental rights 
violations depends on the exact powers of the different actors in given situations, the legal 
framework obscures rather than clarifies this task (International Commission of Jurists, ECRE 
and Amnesty International, 2016; Fink, 2018). 
In reality, the allocation of responsibilities between Frontex and member state personnel in 
specific tasks (for example, border patrols) depends not only on the legal framework, but on 
range of internal documents such as operational plans (Fink, 2018; Majcher, 2015). These are 
not publicly available, therefore raising issues of transparency and accountability (Alarm 
Phone et al., 2020; Fink, 2018). Even though command and control in operational plans 
normally rests with member states (Interview 4), according to Fink, the dispersal of provisions 
across documents creates an unclear authority regime which further complicates the 
allocation of responsibility for fundamental rights violations. Further, reflecting the complexity 
of terms used in the regulations, operational plans invariable employ terms such as 
‘instructions’ and ‘command’, which are also not defined and can be different from those used 
in the legal framework (Fink, 2018). The lack of clarity is increased by the fact that 
responsibilities depend heavily on decisions and practices taken by actors – both Frontex and 
national authorities – on the ground (Fink, 2018; Interview 4). Such decisions, which might 
involve instructions given to Frontex teams, might differ from operational plans and create 
further complexity regarding the responsibility of actors. One such example, described in the 
case study on the Greek-Turkish border, revolves around the contested presence of Frontex 
and national actors in a specific operational area and the vagueness regarding the actors 
responsible for this decision (see section 7.3). 
While issues around responsibility have remained unresolved, the existing mechanisms 
designate distinct avenues for holding different actors accountable. As stated previously, 
member state authorities are responsible for investigating and remedying fundamental rights 
violations by members of national teams, while the ED has responsibility over those committed 
by Frontex staff. In essence, the Frontex accountability mechanisms are not designed to 
account for the shared responsibility in multi-actor situations (Fink, 2018). 
In addition, given that the internal mechanisms of accountability are administrative, they are 
insufficient for providing remedies. The individual complaints mechanism, being internal and 
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not sufficiently independent, does not meet the requirements of good administration stipulated 
in article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and does not constitute an effective remedy 
in the sense of Article 47 of the same text (Carrera and Stefan, 2018; Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 
2018; Fernandez Rojo, 2016). Beyond its non-independent character, issues that we will 
discuss in the following sections suggest that it is neither effective nor accessible. 
In the same vein, arrangements for seeking judicial remedies against Frontex and national 
actors are problematic. Provisions for civil liability render host member states responsible for 
damages incurred, which in the case of statutory staff can be reclaimed from Frontex 
(2016/1624, Art. 42; 2019/1896, Art. 84). Member states and their national border control 
bodies can be held accountable for fundamental rights violations in national courts and, failing 
this, in the European Court for Human Rights (ECRE, 2018; Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 2018; 
Fink, 2018). As the EU itself has not yet acceded to the ECHR, remedies against it or its 
agencies cannot be sought in the ECtHR (ECRE, 2018; Fink, 2018). For the same reason, 
remedies against violations committed by Frontex staff can only be sought in the CJEU, and 
not the ECtHR (ECRE, 2018). The establishment of statutory staff further complicated issues 
around criminal liability. According to ECRE, unlike other categories of staff they do not have 
a ‘home’ member state, which might result in them being excluded from provisions of criminal 
liability. This, according to ECRE, presents an increased risk when staff are deployed in third 
countries which are beyond the scope of EU criminal liability law, and where status agreement 
might grant Frontex team members immunity from prosecution in countries of deployment 
(ECRE, 2018; Fotiadis, 2020; RSA and Pro Asyl, 2019). 
The Agency can, in theory, be held accountable for its share of responsibility in fundamental 
rights violations before the CJEU either through a party requesting an annulment to review the 
legality of actions of EU bodies by or seeking damages under article 340(2) of the TFEU 
(ECRE, 2018; Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 2018). However, the threshold for such cases to be 
accepted as constituting sufficiently serious breaches of the law is high, and the claimants 
might lack the resources to take legal action before the CJEU (ECRE, 2018; Fink, 2018). 
Therefore, it is doubtful if these provisions constitute effective remedies against fundamental 
rights violations involving the Agency or its staff (ECRE, 2018). 
In essence, provisions for legal accountability and judicial remedies in the legal framework of 
the EBCGA are both limited and inaccessible. Further, they cannot easily account for 
fundamental rights violations involving shared responsibility of multiple actors since legal 
actions against different actors would have to be brought to different national and European 
courts (Fink, 2018; Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 2018). Yet, the underlying issue, as an interviewee 
noted, is the constitution of agencies within the European Union: 
there is really a problem of accountability, and retribution and responsibility, which 
is structural. This [Frontex] is an operational agency with executive powers, and the 
European Union model was not built for agencies or systems with direct powers on 
people, it was more on entities (Interview 4). 
5.3 Administrative Character and Lack of Independence 
One of the main criticisms on the architecture of monitoring and accountability mechanisms is 
that they are primarily administrative, internal to Frontex and therefore not independent 
(Carrera and Stefan, 2018; ECRE, 2018; FRA, 2018b; Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 2018). The CF, 
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FRO and Individual Complaints mechanism are internal to Frontex in the sense that they aim 
to ensure fundamental rights compliance within the Frontex legal framework (ECRE, 2018; 
Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 2018). The FRO is directly employed by Frontex and appointed by the 
MB and the ED, and thus cannot be truly considered independent from Frontex (Fernandez 
Rojo, 2016; Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 2018). Similarly, while the CF maintains a degree of 
independence through its primarily advisory role, it still operates within the Frontex framework 
and does not have support resources – such as a dedicated Secretariat – independent of 
Frontex (ECRE, 2018). During discussions on the then proposed Regulation 2016/1624, the 
CF itself raised concerns regarding these bodies ‘being included in the Frontex administrative 
structure’ as this ‘may hamper the independence of both bodies’ (Frontex, 2016b). Similarly, 
the return monitoring mechanism is partly reliant on Frontex personnel and partly on 
arrangements at the level of member states (Carrera and Stefan, 2018; FRA, 2018b; 
Hruschka, 2020). The Serious Incident Reporting system and Individual Complaints 
Mechanism are entirely internal to Frontex, and external review mechanisms are notably 
absent. 
The role of the FRO is particularly significant. While a Frontex employee, they enjoy a degree 
of independence in the performance of their duties, which is explicitly referenced in 
Regulations 2016/1624 (Art 71, par 2) and 2019/1896 (Art 109, par 5). Yet, the position of an 
employee with duties to oversee the implementation of fundamental rights and investigate 
violations committed under the Agency’s authority in the context of operational activities is 
inherently tense (Carrera and Stefan, 2018). On the one hand, the CF members we 
interviewed were positive towards the FRO’s activities and that they maintain a good degree 
of independence. One respondent commented that they are ‘not part of the Frontex system. 
The ED cannot order her to do something or to leave something’ (Interview 2). This is also 
evidenced by reports which can be critical of practices on the ground and the shortcomings of 
arrangements and practices (e.g. Frontex, 2019j). Similar views were expressed regarding the 
role of the future Fundamental Rights Monitors, who ‘are selected by the Fundamental Rights 
Officer and report to her’ and therefore ‘they are also part of the more or less independent 
structure’ (Interview 2). 
On the other hand, one interviewee commented that the FRO ‘needs more institutional 
guarantees of independence, because still she’s an employee … There is a problem there 
structurally that should be solved, and the new regulation says it must be solved’ (Interview 
4). Concerns were also raised by both the CF and external evaluators (Frontex, 2019m; b) 
regarding the independence of the CF Secretariat, which is appointed by the ED. Another 
interviewee commented that in practice the independence assumed in formal arrangements 
might be difficult to maintain. For example, in 2018 the then FRO took sick leave. Due to the 
additional absence of senior staff within the FRO office (see also section 6.2), the ED 
appointed a member of his own Cabinet as an interim FRO. The appointment of a member of 
staff still directly accountable to the ED, for the CF, was not in line with the provisions of 
Regulation 2016/1624 regarding the independence of the FRO, and did not 
provide for the necessary conditions to ensure that the Fundamental Rights Officer 
ad interim and the Fundamental Rights Officer’s team maintain their independence 
in the performance of their duties and avoid potential conflicts of interest. (Frontex, 
2019m) 
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Another interviewee noted the emphasis placed on the person rather than the mechanism of 
the FRO, stating that ‘if you get an FRO who is really a human rights person and knows 
operational stuff, then it makes a difference’ (Interview 4). A similar point was raised in relation 
to the Fundamental Rights Monitors, noting that independence might be difficult to maintain in 
practice: 
at least in theory there is a sort of separation […] of course […] we will see how it 
plays out because if you have to do everyday with certain colleagues […], of course 
you develop certain relations. That’s to be seen how impartiality can be insured […] 
but […] I trust the FRO to have a sharp look at that […] that has  also a lot to do with 
personality and […] even the best practices in regulation can only be lived by 
individual personality but at least the current FRO is […] somebody who can be 
trustable (Interview 2) 
These comments highlight the shortcomings of the formal arrangements. While officially 
independence is guaranteed by the legal framework, the reality is more complex. Given this 
institutional set up, the views above suggest that the FRO’s independence needs to be 
enacted through the ability and character of the FRO as a person. Further, as Carrera and 
Stefan (2018) observed, the actions of the FRO might not always be in the Agency’s interest. 
Another aspect undermining the independence of the FRO, individual complaints mechanism 
and potentially the Fundamental Rights Monitors concerns the power to make decisions and 
act on matters pertaining to fundamental rights violations. While the FRO can advise, monitor 
fundamental rights practices and manage complaints, they have no power to make decisions 
in relation to these matters (Carrera and Stefan, 2018; Fernandez Rojo, 2016; Gkliati and 
Rosenfeldt, 2018). Such powers are allocated to member states in the case of complaints 
against national forces, or the Executive Director in the case of complaints against staff 
(Fernandez Rojo, 2016; Giannetto, 2019; Gkliati and Rosenfeldt, 2018). The power to remove 
officers involved in violations of fundamental rights is similarly reserved to the member states 
or the ED (Art. 111; Fernandez Rojo, 2016), who also has the power to investigate staff 
members (Carrera and Stefan, 2018; ECRE, 2018). Similarly, while the FRO – as well as the 
the CF in its advisory capacity – can inform decisions to suspend or not launch an operation, 
the decision is taken by the Executive Director alone (2016/1624 Art. 25, par. 4; 2019/1896 
Art. 46, par. 4, 5; Carrera and Stefan, 2018; Fernandez Rojo, 2016; Giannetto, 2019). This 
arrangement, along with the power to adopt or reject recommendations, as a following section 
will discuss, illustrates the limitations of FR mechanisms, since – as Fernandez Rojo (2016, 
p.233) succinctly observes – ‘the Executive Director […] is not independent from the Agency’ 
and is appointed by the MB. Thus, to a large degree the function of the accountability 
mechanisms depends on the ED and member states (Carrera and Stefan, 2018). 
The monitoring of JROs is similarly a mechanism whose independence is questionable. On 
the one hand, it is performed by monitors nominated by the bodies of member states, who are 
responsible for the monitoring of return operations in accordance with the provisions of the 
Returns directive and regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896 (see section 4.2.5; FRA, 2018b). 
The monitoring bodies include Ombudsperson offices and NGOs but also state inspectorates 
and bodies such as the Swedish Migration Agency, the German Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees and the Slovakian Ministry of the Interior (FRA, 2019). These state bodies are 
not considered as independent from the state authorities responsible for return procedures 
and the implementation of returns (FRA, 2018b, 2019). On the other, JROs are monitored by 
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Frontex staff and member state personnel from the pool of forced-return monitors stipulated 
in Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/1896. However, the monitors proposed for the Frontex 
pool may be different from those performing this task within member states, and as observed 
by M. Jaeger of the Nafplion Group, ‘may be less independent, less qualified’ (‘Under 
surveillance’: Monitoring at the border, 2020). These arrangements have been widely criticised 
for not being sufficiently independent since it is internal to Frontex and not institutionally 
independent (Council of Europe, 2019; ECRE, 2019; FRA, 2018b; ‘Under surveillance’: 
Monitoring at the border, 2020). 
Most of our interviewees, the CF, as well as several external actors such as researchers, 
NGOs and human rights organisations have called for monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms that are independent from Frontex (ECRE, 2018; FRA, 2018b; Fernandez Rojo, 
2016; Frontex, 2015a, 2016a; ‘Under surveillance’: Monitoring at the border, 2020). The CF, 
for example, stated its preference for an independent monitoring mechanism for returns 
(Frontex, 2016b). Yet, other than the involvement of national human rights bodies in return 
monitoring this has never materialised. While internal documents suggest that national human 
rights organisations were to be involved in managing complaints, this does not seem to have 
become the case (Frontex, 2016a). 
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6. Key Issues with Implementation of Monitoring and 
Accountability Mechanisms 
6.1 Responding to Recommendations 
The concentration of decision-making powers in the Executive Director [ED] and Management 
Board [MB], and the corresponding lack of power to take action over fundamental rights is also 
illustrated by responses to the recommendations made by the Consultative Forum [CF] and 
the Fundamental Rights Officer [FRO]. Frontex has acted on some of the recommendations 
of the CF, for example by adopting recommendations on the wording of the Code of Conduct 
(Frontex, 2014a, 2015c) or inserting a clause on fundamental rights protection into operation 
plans concerning Hungary and in general in operational plans (Frontex, 2016t, 2017p). Other 
recommendations were rejected – such as mainstreaming fundamental rights in the annual 
work programme (Frontex, 2014a), making fundamental rights a priority for the annual work 
programme (Frontex, 2014a) or refraining from using the term ‘illegal immigration’ (Frontex, 
2014a, 2015c) – or were adopted later on, such as policies on the protection of children and 
vulnerable groups, and more pertinently, the individual complaints mechanism (Frontex, 
2014a). A CF member observed that ‘at the moment there is no such obligation [to follow 
recommendations] so […] when we draft recommendations […] we don’t know what will 
happen’ (Interview 5). 
Yet, internal documents also suggest that the recommendations and concerns of the CF and 
FRO were not fully taken into account and were even opposed by the MB (Frontex, 2016a). 
For instance, reasons given for not adopting a complaints mechanism included a reluctance 
of the MB to continuously change the rules, concerns raised by the representatives of MS in 
the MB that the mechanism could become an administrative burden, and that ‘if the complaints 
mechanism is not well set-up, then we will be inundated with complaints but the ones of real 
importance will not be handled properly’ (Frontex, 2016a). One reason for not adopting 
recommendations in the earlier years of the functioning of the CF seemed to be lack of clarity 
over the scope of its mandate (Dawson, 2017). 
In 2014, the ED and the MB disagreed with the recommendations of the CF to such an extent 
that they felt obliged to add a section of comments explaining their rejection of the 
recommendations. The statement concerned first the recommendation of the CF on the 
Farmakonisi incident. A boat carrying migrants sunk near the Greek island of Farmakonisi, 
resulting in the drowning of 14 migrants. While the ED and the MB argued that the incident 
‘did not occur within the framework of an operation coordinated by Frontex nor were Frontex 
coordinated assets involved’ (Frontex, 2015c, p.4), the CF felt it should address the 
implications of the incident for accountability in the context of serious fundamental rights 
violations (Frontex, 2015c, p.34; Dawson, 2017). The CF was particularly concerned over the 
decision of the Greek judicial authorities to stop the judicial inquiry into the actions of the 
Hellenic Coast Guard during the incident (Frontex, 2015c, p.34; Dawson, 2017). The second 
disagreement concerned recommendations made by the CF on the Mare Nostrum and Triton 
operations. According to the statement by the MB and ED, these confused the ‘different 
natures of the national operation (“Mare Nostrum”) and Frontex coordinated operation’ 
(“Triton”), which ‘could lead to confusion for the general public about Frontex responsibilities’ 
(Frontex, 2015c, p.5). The CF was concerned about the implications of replacing the Mare 
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Nostrum operation with Triton, which had a more limited mandate for search and rescue 
activities in the Mediterranean (Frontex, 2015c, p.37). The issues raised by the CF were 
echoed in the reports by the FRO, especially in relation to non-refoulement and clear 
guidelines to border guard teams regarding disembarkation (Frontex, 2013c). 
A third point of disagreement was the proposal for an individual complaints mechanism which, 
as discussed in section 2.2.3, was also made by the European Ombudsman, the Council of 
Europe and the European Parliament. For the MB and Executive Director, it was a ‘political 
demand that extends far beyond the mandate of the CF and beyond the mandate of 
Regulation 1168/2011 which did not grant Frontex powers to investigate violations of 
fundamental rights (Frontex, 2015c, p.5). The position of the CF and other institutions was 
eventually accepted, leading to the introduction of the individual complaints with Regulation 
2016/1624. Yet, the reactions of the ED and MB in the 2015 report are reminiscent of their 
initial opposition to the establishment of the CF (Perkowski, 2018). 
While subsequent CF annual reports do not suggest the same level of disagreement as the 
2015 one, not following up recommendations is a pattern persisting to this date. There are 
numerous examples of recommendations that have never been adopted by the Frontex 
management, for example on the inclusion of specific fundamental rights objectives in 
operations plans, including those on return (Frontex, 2017n, 2019n; a) and on the revision of 
the rules on complaints. The response of the ED to the 2016 recommendation to suspend 
operations in Hungary (see also section 8) is probably the most consequential rejection of a 
recommendation. In October 2016, the FRO published a report raising numerous concerns 
over new Hungarian legislation, collective expulsions to Serbia, summary dismissals of asylum 
applications at the border, and incidents of violence (Frontex, 2016n). In parallel, reports by 
human rights organisations and NGOs also documented persistent violations of fundamental 
rights (AIDA, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015). The CF, following a request for information, 
also recommended suspension of operational activities, reiterating the concerns raised by the 
FRO9 (Frontex, 2016n). Following an exchange of letters with the European Commission, the 
ED rejected the recommendation of the FRO and CF in February 2017, adopting the 
Commission’s position that the presence of Frontex presence would help prevent fundamental 
rights violations (Frontex, 2016f, 2017j; European Commission, 2016). The recommendation 
was reiterated several times by the CF in the following years, raising concerns regarding 
persistent FR violations and ongoing infringement procedures by the EU Commission 
(Frontex, 2018f). 
The incident appears to have had an impact on how the possibility to suspend operations is 
viewed by the CF. On the one hand, one interviewee observed that the fact that the 
mechanism for suspension has never been used suggests that there is ‘there has never been 
a willingness to use it, at all’ (Interview 4). On the other hand, another respondent argued that 
the CF recommended the suspension of operations in the past – as in the case of Hungary – 
but moved away from this position (Interview 3). While, for example, concern over pushbacks 
at the Greek-Turkish border were raised in the CF, there is no evidence to suggest they 
recommended withdrawal (see Section 7). 
In essence, recommendations are only followed if the ED and the MB decide to act on them. 
Their decision appears to be shaped by a number of factors, such as perceptions over the 
 
9 However, the FRA, the Council of Europe and EASO abstained. 
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mandate of Frontex, but also on whether there is political will at the management level to follow 
a recommendation. The case of the suspension of operations in Hungary illustrates that in the 
end decisions are based on factors that surpass fundamental rights considerations, such as 
prioritizing border control. The lack of clarity in the legal framework is also a significant factor. 
There is no specific provisions in the legal framework that oblige the Agency to follow the 
recommendations made bythe CF and the FRO, or that stipulate the process for considering 
and adopting recommendations. For a CF member, this raises questions on ‘what really can 
be the impact of the forum not knowing what happens with the advice we provide and not 
actually being able to have any follow up on that’ (Interview 5). The external evaluation of the 
CF also mentioned the reluctance of Frontex to proactively seek advice from the CF and to 
accept its recommendations (Frontex, 2019b). 
6.2 Resources 
One of the key constraints for the operation of the accountability mechanisms such as the 
office of the FRO and the CF is the level of resources allocated to them (Dawson, 2017; Gkliati 
and Rosenfeldt, 2018). Budgetary and staffing issues have been raised in CF reports and 
internal documents such as CF minutes since the establishment of the FRO’s office (Frontex, 
2015c; a): 
Necessary staffing support to fulfil the existing tasks and responsibilities of the FRO, 
as regularly reported, require further consideration by the Frontex management in 
the near future. (Frontex, 2015a) 
Internal documents also suggest that the work of the FRO’s office was relying on temporary 
staff in internship positions (Frontex, 2013c, 2014c; f). The insufficiency of resources become 
more pronounced after 2015 and has been noted both by the CF and the FRO, as well as 
external actors (Baldaccini in Strik and Fotiadis (2020); Frontex (2018f); Frontex (2018k); 
Frontex (2017o)]. The underpinning issue is the expansion of the Agency’s mandate under 
regulation 2016/1624 regulation which engendered a need for more capacity to advise on and 
monitor fundamental rights issues (Frontex, 2018f). Further, the original mandate of the FRO’s 
role did not include the examination of individual complaints, which later became their 
responsibility (Frontex, 2015c; European Ombudsman, 2013b). While strongly supportive of 
the introduction of an individual complains mechanism, the CF warned that it was ‘essential 
that adequate human and other resources be allocated’ to the FRO (Frontex, 2018f, p.38, 
2015fp.6). 
However, the resources allocated to the FRO and CF were still not sufficient (Frontex, 2016b). 
CF reports and internal documents continued to refer to the staffing of the FRO’s office, which 
in 2017 was so understaffed that a secondment of Swedish police officers to it was considered 
(Interview 4; Frontex, 2019a, 2017p; a). Both the CF and the FRO repeatedly raised concerns 
and asked for the increase of resources dedicated to the FROs office (Frontex, 2017p; b; a, 
2018c). The CF stated that ‘Frontex maintained its reluctance to adequately capacitate the 
Fundamental Rights Office’ (Frontex, 2017f, p.5), with none of the administrator positions 
provided for in the 2018 staffing plan of the Agency being allocated to the FRO office, and only 
three senior assistants joining the office in 2018. This reluctance, for CF, risked ‘putting [the] 
FRO’s credibility at stake’ (Frontex, 2017b, p.5) and 
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is seriously undermining the fulfilment of the Fundamental Rights Officer’s mandate 
and, more generally, Frontex’s capacity to fulfil its fundamental rights obligations as 
derived from the EBCG Regulation (Frontex, 2018f) 
Similar requests were placed for increasing support for the CF (Interview 4; Frontex, 2019b). 
A further constraint for the CF, whose members are employed by other organisations and 
meet three times a year is time (Giannetto, 2019). The ‘limited’ capacity’ of the CF constrains, 
for example, the extent to which they can carry out in situ visits: 
We meet more or less three times a year […] all the people sitting on the CF have 
many other things to do as well. We have a limited capacity – if we want to make a 
meaningful recommendation on the situation in Evros, we would have to be there, 
we would have to send a delegation to Evros (Interview 2). 
Similarly, another respondent described visits as ‘difficult’ and ‘time-consuming’ (Interview 4). 
These time constraints, as the quotation above suggests, also affect the scope of 
recommendations that the CF can make. 
6.3 Provision of Information to the Consultative Forum 
The work of the CF is also affected by arrangements concerning the provision of information. 
As discussed in section 2.2.1, the legislative framework since 2016 and previously internal 
working arrangements stipulated that Frontex must make available to the CF information that 
is relevant to its work. The practical arrangements for making information available were, the 
outcome of negotiations between Frontex and the CF in the initial years of their operation. The 
first annual report of the CF indicates some limitations on the information made available to 
the CF, stating that ‘It is clear […] there cannot be full equivalence between the information 
received by the Fundamental Rights Officer and the Consultative Forum members’ (Frontex, 
2014a, p.11). 
However, the transmission of information from Frontex to the CF seems to have remained an 
area of tension. All our CF interviewees identified Frontex practices in this area as problematic, 
although some suggested they have improved over time (Interviews 2, 3, 4, 5). One issue 
identified was that Frontex ultimately decides what information is relevant to the CF’s work 
and hence what to make available (Interview 2). The legal framework and internal guidance 
are too vague and do not specify what constitutes relevant information (Frontex, 2014b). In 
practice, CF members suggested that they ‘only get information when we ask for it’ (Interview 
2) and have to regularly submit requests to receive information ranging from operational plans, 
incident reports or statistics on Serious Incident Reports [SIRs] (Interview 2). Documents that 
have been made available through Freedom of Information applications support this claim10. 
The process can take a long time, partly because the consent of member states is also needed 
for certain types of documents and information (Interview 3; Frontex, 2018l). Further, a point 
raised by the CF was that their access to information was restricted in comparison to what 
released to the public via freedom of information requests (Frontex, 2019c). Another member 
commented that ‘sometimes for freedom of information actions, people out of the forum may 
 
10 Examples of such requests are available here: 
https://aleph.occrp.org/entities/37536636.c147b5ec25a709a5490db3dc2fa087f2ca80ee13 
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get information we can’t get’ (Interview 4). Requesting documents is not a straightforward 
process, either, as CF members might not know the exact documents to request: 
You also have to know which documents exactly you have to ask for and if you don’t 
know which documents are there it makes it even harder (interview 5) 
Documents released to the CF are often redacted (Interview 5), in the same manner as when 
released publicly or to individuals through freedom of information requests, which might affect 
the clarity of the information received (Interview 4). For another interviewee, the level of 
redaction also raised questions of trust, given that CF members are bound by confidentiality 
agreements (Interview 5). Further, information released following a CF request on Hungary 
was incomplete (Frontex, 2018f). 
At the other extreme, another issue raised by CF interviewees was the volume of information 
in relation to the working arrangements of the CF, which one interviewee described as 
‘avalanches of information’. As CF members are unpaid, constrained in terms of time and have 
other work commitments, this rendered processing a high volume of information a laborious 
task (Interviews 4, 5; see also Giannetto, 2019). 
The problematic transmission of information, for one interviewee, has an impact on the 
process of drafting recommendations, which is central to the work of the CF: 
So we can make recommendations, but you never know whether you are 100% 
accurate, […] we don’t have the capacity fully to assess an entire operation. We do 
in local visits, which are also very difficult and time consuming, and we can provide 
advice on that, but we don’t see reports on incidents when they occur, and when the 
incident occurs we try and react to that vast information about it but for the time we 
get something. If we get anything it takes its time and then it’s always difficult 
because our experience up to now is that the press reports are very generic 
(Interview 4). 
6.4 Reporting and Investigating Fundamental Rights Violations 
While accountability mechanisms within Frontex were strengthened in legislation considerably 
since Regulation 2011/1896, there are still many shortcomings in relation to their function, 
operation and consequently the implementation of the provisions of the legal framework and 
the Fundamental Rights Strategy. In this section, we explore some of the shortcomings that 
emerge in the process of implementing the provisions relating to fundamental rights and the 
functioning of the monitoring and accountability mechanisms. 
6.4.1 Reporting and the use of mechanisms on ground 
Three mechanisms are crucial for monitoring and recording fundamental rights violations 
during operations: the Serious Incident Reporting system, the individual complaints 
mechanism and the forced return monitors. The fourth mechanism, the Fundamental Rights 
Monitors, has not been implemented yet. All three mechanisms present shortcomings in their 
effectiveness. 
The Serious Incident Reporting system is widely believed to be underused, since few reports 
on fundamental rights violation are submitted in comparison to violations documented by 
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human rights bodies, NGOs and activists present on the ground (ECRE, 2018; Frontex, 2018l). 
The exact number of fundamental rights SIRs is difficult to establish. It appears that only three 
fundamental rights SIRs were submitted in 2018 (Frontex, 2019m; Council of the European 
Union, 2020b) while the minutes of the CF meeting in May 2017 suggest that no fundamental 
Rights SIRs had been received for more than a year (Frontex, 2017b; Interviews 2, 3). Yet, an 
annual report of the implementation of regulation 656/2014 stated that nine SIRs were 
received in 2017 (Council of the European Union, 2020a). In their majority, SIRs concern 
alleged violations by members of the national forces. We have found only one that clearly 
points to the involvement of deployed officers – SIR 445 on an incident involving a Finnish dog 
team11 (Frontex, 2016l; Fotiadis, 2020). However, as our case study on Frontex operations at 
the Greek-Turkish border suggests (see section 7), there are indications of the involvement of 
Frontex deployed officers in pushbacks since 2017, as well as in another incident dating back 
to 2014. Similarly, Frontex deployed crews were reported to be involved in interception 
operations in the Aegean which resulted in fundamental rights violations, although the extent 
of their responsibility is unclear (Frontex, 2015g). 
There are several explanations for the low numbers of SIRs s. In the case of Hungary, where 
fundamental rights violations were extensively reported by human rights organisations and 
activists, the Deputy ED argued that it might have been due to the ‘reduced number of 
deployed officers’ (Frontex, 2017c). CF respondents suggested that deployed officers might 
not be aware of their ‘explicit obligation’ to submit SIRs, or when they should submit reports 
(Interviews 2, 5; also Frontex, 2019m), or, worse, ‘they don’t care’ (Interview 2). A lack of 
sanctions for failing to report fundamental rights violations might be an additional factor 
(Interview 4). Further, discussions in the 16 th CF meeting suggest that JRO monitors, 
presumably those who are not Frontex staff, cannot submit SIRs. 
More significantly, the FRO raised concerns regarding different perceptions of the 
fundamental rights implications of incidents among officers participating in JROs (Frontex, 
2019h). One reason for this might be unclear internal guidance. An internal document which 
can be found online shows that fundamental rights violations can be reported under a 
Category 2 SIR – incidents that do not involve Frontex staff, officers or members of national 
forces – or under Category 4 – ‘situations of suspected violations of fundamental rights’ 
(Frontex, 2016c, p.3). Yet, incidents that involve violations of the principle of non-refoulement 
and use of violence by national forces have been reported under Category 2 SIRs (Frontex, 
2018i, 2017m, 2016h; k). It is also likely that some incidents which could be interpreted as 
fundamental rights violations were not reported as such at least initially – for example an 
attempted suicide in the Vial hotspot facility in Chios, Greece and a pushback incident in the 
Aegean which both took place in 2016 (Frontex, 2016s; j; k). Deaths and attempted suicides 
are generally recorded as a category 1 SIR, which includes ‘situations of high political and/or 
operational relevance’. 
In other cases, SIRs were not submitted by FX teams or monitors, but were raised by the FRO 
when she received information from human rights organisations (Frontex, 2016s). For 
instance, in 2016 the FRO was alerted by Amnesty International and ECRE that asylum 
seekers who had not exhausted legal remedies were included in return operations from 
Greece to Turkey. Similar cases were reported by the UNHCR in the same year, in return 
 
11 Although other SIRs might implicate deployed officers, they do not concern fundamental rights 
violations. 
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operations with the ‘potential involvement of Frontex’ (UNHCR, 2016b). Given that the Serious 
Incident Reporting system presupposes that Frontex staff do submit SIRs, the low numbers 
and the issues discussed above raise doubts regarding the effectiveness of the mechanism. 
These have been expressed both by the CF and the FRO, who have repeatedly asked for the 
reform of the Serious Incident Reporting system, most recently in 2018 (Frontex, 2019m). 
The shortcomings of the mechanism were further illustrated by a case where a SIR was not 
submitted, despite serious fundamental rights violation having taken place. During a JRO from 
Munich, Germany, to Kabul, Afghanistan in August 2018, a team of observers of the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment [CPT] (Council of Europe, 2018a) recorded two incidents involving the use of 
unauthorised restraint techniques, a headlock that caused shortage of breath to the returnee 
and the application of pressure to his genitals (Council of Europe, 2018a; Nielsen and Fotiadis, 
2019; ECRE, 2019). As this was a Frontex coordinated flight, the national guards involved 
were also bound by the Frontex Code of Conduct for JROs, which stipulates that breaches of 
fundamental rights must be reported (Frontex, 2018e). However, no SIR was submitted by the 
Frontex staff member monitoring the flight and the incident was not reported through the 
Serious Incident Reporting system, and is not mentioned in the FRO report corresponding to 
the period the incident occurred (Council of Europe, 2018a, par. 60; Nielsen and Fotiadis, 
2019; ECRE, 2019; Frontex, 2018l) 
Likewise, the implementation of the individual complaints mechanism presents serious 
shortcomings. Before the establishment of a formal mechanism, concerns were raised 
regarding the process of submitting complaints. For instance, in the case of complaints related 
to JROs, the CF annual report of 2013 stated that 
concerning the already mentioned possibility for the returnee to lodge a complaint, 
the CoC JROs remains unclear as to when and how complaints can be made in 
practice, by whom and how they will be processed (Frontex, 2014a) 
Since its establishment as a formal mechanism in 2016, the individual complaints mechanism 
has resulted in very few complaints being submitted – just 10 in 2018 (Frontex, 2019m), none 
of which concerned sea border operations (Council of the European Union, 2020a). Several 
shortcomings have been identified. Dissemination efforts have been weak, therefore it is still 
uncertain whether people whose rights might have been violated know about the mechanism 
and the process of submitting complaints (Frontex, 2018f; Frontex, 2019m; Frontex, 2017b; 
Interview 3). Questions have also been raised concerning the accessibility of the mechanism 
for children and vulnerable groups (Frontex, 2019a). Further, the use of the individual 
complaints mechanism has been hindered by the non-availability of information in operational 
areas, an observation which has been recorded in various locations including Hungary and 
Greece as well as during return operations (Frontex, 2016d, 2019j; h). In the case of the return 
operation mentioned above, the CPT observed that the process for providing information on 
complaints was 
not to be clearly established in practice; for instance, it was initially not clear who 
could provide returnees with a copy of the official complaint form. The Federal 
Police informed the delegation that the form was provided only upon request and 
that it was only available in the English language’ (Council of Europe, 2018a, par. 
58) 
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A similar concern related to the process for officers to pass on information on the complaints 
procedure, specifically whether this should be done upon request from a potential complainant 
or proactively by officers in operations, while an FRO report of JROs noted the absence of 
complaints forms in operational areas (Frontex, 2017f, 2019m; h; Kohler cited in Correctiv, 
2019). While the CF was in support of the latter option, this is still an area of unclear practice 
(Frontex, 2019m). However, the European Centre for Returns, an office within Frontex, had 
expressed the ‘fear’ that more information on complaints might lead to more complaints being 
submitted (Frontex, 2018b, p.4). 
A further set of deficiencies relates to the protection of complainants. FRO reports suggest 
that victims of violations were reluctant to submit complaints (Frontex, 2014e; f, 2015f, 2016h; 
r). One reason identified was their interactions with national authorities as the perpetrators of 
the fundamental rights violations, and the absence of protections for the complainant (Frontex, 
2016d). A FRO stated, for example, that potential complainants are fearful of the implications 
of being named in a complaint for their asylum applications (Kohler cited in Correctiv, 2019). 
In the case of an alleged pushback at the Greek-Turkish border, the presence of the national 
authorities in the debriefing interview rendered the victim of the pushback reluctant to submit 
a complaint (Frontex, 2018i). An earlier incident in Hungary, concerning the use of violence 
against a migrant, similarly involved the presence of a Hungarian border guard in the 
interview,; subsequently the victim did not wish to submit a complaint against the national 
authorities (Frontex, 2016r; h). While this is standard practice in terms of the operational 
mandate of Frontex, it can be detrimental for the individual whose fundamental rights have 
been violated, especially since complaints cannot be submitted anonymously (Frontex, 2016p; 
Correctiv, 2019). 
In order to improve the individual complaints mechanism, the CF suggested better 
communication and dissemination of information on the individual complaints mechanism 
(Interviews 2, 4; Frontex, 2017f), including the better training of border guards (Frontex, 
2016d). Some improvements were to make the complaints form and information on the 
complaints procedure available in several languages, the production of information posters 
and booklets, as well as the introduction of an online form (Frontex, 2017p, 2018k; l). Similarly, 
the FRO urged Frontex ‘to ensure availability of the complaint forms in hard copies as well as 
envelopes addressed to the FRO address in all operational areas (Frontex, 2017p, p.7). In 
addition, the FRO stated that providing protection to victims of fundamental rights violations 
throughout the process of investigation of complaints would encourage the lodging of 
complaints (Frontex, 2016d). However, as the report on the FRO visit to Evros illustrates, the 
deficiencies of the complaints mechanism seem persistent. A revision of the rules for 
complaints has been repeatedly requested by the CF (Frontex, 2019m, 2018f, 2017b). 
The forced return monitoring system similarly presents several weaknesses. The incident 
during the deportation flight from Munich to Kabul in August 2018 raised concerns as to 
whether serious incidents are efficiently recorded during return operations by the assigned 
monitors. FRO reports suggest that there might have been no SIRs at all submitted on JROs 
between the 1st January 2017 and the 30th June 2019, although incidents were recorded by 
monitors (Frontex, 2017h, 2018g; h, 2019g; h). Yet, Fotiadis notes that two SIR were 
submitted in the context of 508 JROs during 2018 and the first half of 2019, which however 
concerned incidents of violence against escorts (Fotiadis in ‘Under surveillance’: Monitoring 
at the border, 2020). Just one complaint appears to have been submitted which concerned a 
 52 
potential refoulement (Frontex, 2019h). Reports submitted by national monitors are not public 
(Fotiadis in ‘Under surveillance’: Monitoring at the border, 2020). 
The FRO’s reports nevertheless refer to a number of fundamental rights issues such as the 
lack of female escorts, returnees’ right to privacy and property, insufficient information 
provided to returnees in advance of deportation, and the treatment of vulnerable groups 
(Frontex, 2019h; g, 2016d, 2018b, 2017h, 2018h). The 2018 and 2019 reports on returns, in 
particular, mention serious violations of fundamental rights during JROs, including the 
excessive use of constraints, use of unauthorised constraints, and an attempt to return an 
unaccompanied minor, which was in line with national law but against Frontex procedures 
(Frontex, 2019g; h). 
Further, internal documents suggest several issues concerning the cooperation between 
Frontex and national authorities. For instance, implementation plans for the return flights are 
not always shared with monitors (Frontex, 2018g, 2019h, 2017h). Information concerning the 
monitoring of flights is not efficiently conveyed to Frontex and the FRO. Reports drafted by the 
national authorities, both before regulation 2016/1624, and since by outside the pool of forced 
return monitors, were not systematically transmitted to Frontex and received by the FRO 
(Frontex, 2018b, 2016b). 
6.4.2 Investigations of Complaints and Reported Incidents by National 
Authorities and Frontex Mechanisms 
The investigation of complaints and reported incidents is a crucial component of the 
accountability mechanisms of Frontex. Yet, it is equally beset by a range of shortcomings. 
One underreported issue is that few complaints are deemed admissible by the FRO (Frontex, 
2017b; p, 2016t, 2017o, 2018k, 2017o, 2019n). Only five out of fifteen complaints submitted 
in 2017 were declared admissible (Frontex, 2018k). In the reporting period of the FRO’s XXII 
report (February 2018 to January 2019), three out of eight complaints were deemed 
admissible, while in the next reporting period (February to May 2019), one out of five. While 
the 2018 CF annual report refers to complaints received (Frontex, 2019m, p.23), the data 
provided in FRO reports, which are not public, suggest that the admissibility criteria in the legal 
framework and the rules for complaints (Frontex, 2016p) result in the exclusion of more than 
half of the complaints submitted. There is little information to explain why most complaints are 
not deemed admissible, other than that some concerned asylum or had no relevance to 
fundamental rights violations (Frontex, 2017b). Further, it is not clear what the reference to 
asylum entails, as there is no further detail in the minutes of the CF. Nevertheless, violations 
of the right to asylum is explicitly mentioned as a ground for submitting a fundamental rights 
SIR report (Frontex, 2016c). 
If they concern personnel of the home countries, admissible complaints are then the 
responsibility of national authorities to investigate. In the first years of the period we 
investigate, FRO reports suggested persistent concerns regarding national mechanisms for 
investigating fundamental rights violations, with Greece and Bulgaria appear to have been the 
focus of concern because of a number of SIRs being received (Frontex, 2013b; c). According 
the Frontex internal documents, the FRO worked with the national authorities to strengthen 
investigation mechanisms and cooperation between the national authorities and Frontex 
(Frontex, 2014f). Further, in some cases, the national authorities investigating reported 
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incidents and individual complaints are not independent but are often internal units of the 
national agencies responsible for border control (Frontex, 2017b; a). In the case of Bulgaria, 
no official complaints mechanism and investigation process was in place (Frontex, 2017a). 
Further, a 2016 FRO report on SIRs noted that the investigating units might be local rather 
than central, which raises questions regarding their impartiality and objectivity (Frontex, 
2016d; also Carrera and Stefan, 2018). The FRO suggested that such investigations should 
be conducted by central rather than local units and by fundamental rights experts within the 
relevant border control authorities (Frontex, 2016d). It is unclear if this recommendation has 
been followed by member states. In the case of Greece, investigation of violations at the 
Greek-Turkish border is still performed by units within local and regional police directorates 
(Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Citizen Protection, 2018; also section 7). Depending on the 
national context, other independent human rights organisations may have such 
responsibilities, but their role and procedures of investigation complaints may be unclear 
(Carrera and Stefan, 2018). As observed by the FRO, the ‘negligence of such guarantees and 
safeguards can easily result in a violation of the right of an effective remedy and fair trial due 
to the lack of effective investigative process’ (Frontex, 2016d, p.7, 2017a). 
Moreover, several documents mention that national authorities have not always shared 
detailed information on the progress of investigations with FRO and Frontex. Responses by 
national authorities were frequently delayed (Frontex, 2015c, 2016t; q; r; a, 2017a, 2019e, 
2018k), in some cases over a year (Frontex, 2017o; n). This appears to be a consistent issue 
with the Bulgarian and Greek authorities, despite the decision in the case of the latter to form 
joint Frontex and Greek teams to investigate and follow up reports of fundamental rights 
violations (Frontex, 2013b). The issues were persistent and widespread enough for the FRO 
to express the view in 2016 that they would affect the planned individual complaints 
mechanism (Frontex, 2016b). Further, the FRO noted discrepancies in the way different MS 
reported on follow up actions related to the investigation of incidents, which hampered the 
FROs work on detecting patterns of fundamental rights violations during operations (Frontex, 
2016b). Reflecting the vagueness of the legal framework, follow up actions mentioned in 
internal documents consist of contacting the relevant national authorities for follow-up updates 
(Frontex, 2017o). 
Further, there is no mechanism to address institutional and systemic failures of national 
authorities to investigate reports and complaints forwarded to them by Frontex. This, as 
Frontex claims, is beyond the mandate of the Agency (Interview 1). Yet, internal documents 
and external sources suggest a persistent pattern where national authorities either do not 
investigate fully, or the investigations result in no blame attributed to national border 
management actors. This is a frequent practice in Greece in relation to incidents of pushbacks 
and other violations at the Greek Turkish border, as well as in the Aegean. As we observe in 
section 7.5, all of the investigations of submitted SIRs since 2017 were closed without finding 
any offense committed by Greek police officers. The same holds true for cases before 2017 
(Frontex, 2015d, 2016i; d). The Farmakonisi incident referred to in section 6.1 is another key 
example in terms of pushbacks at sea, but not the only one. During Operation Poseidon in 
2016 and in the presence of a Frontex-deployed Romanian and Portuguese coast guard ships, 
the Hellenic coast guard transferred migrants that had been intercepted to a Turkish 
coastguard ship which consequently transferred them to Turkey, where they were detained 
(Frontex, 2016k; Alarm Phone, 2016). The Greek authorities, following requests of information 
by the ED, argued that the incident was a SAR operation and the handover to the Turkish 
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coastguard was in order to ensure the safety of migrants (Frontex, 2016s; k). Despite such 
incidents being reported constantly in the Aegean (AIDA, 2020a; Alarm Phone, 2019), there 
have been few investigations – the Farmakonisi incident being an exception – and no 
attribution of responsibility to officers for fundamental rights violations. 
Similar problems relating to investigations emerge in other national contexts. Several incidents 
involving Bulgarian, Spanish and Hungarian authorities were closed with no responsibility 
attributed to the authorities (Frontex, 2016q; d). Cases closed by the Hungarian authorities 
without liability being attributed included serious violations such as beatings, theft of 
possessions and attacks by dogs handled by police personnel (Frontex, 2016r, 2017o, 2016h). 
In such cases, as well as regarding the pushback at the Greek-Turkish border that emerged 
during a debriefing interview in Evros, the Frontex debriefers noted that the information 
provided by the victims appeared credible and reliable. 
An even more problematic aspect is the investigation of complaints against deployed Frontex 
officers, which falls under the responsibility of their national authorities rather than the host 
state (Frontex, 2015g). As Frontex has repeatedly stated, there have been no complaints 
against deployed personnel (Interview 1; Fotiadis, 2020; Kartali, 2019). Without submitted 
complaints and in particular SIRs, it is unlikely that investigations are initiated. Yet, as the case 
study on Evros illustrate, there have been at least indications that FX deployed personnel may 
have been involved in incidents resulting in fundamental rights violations. Further, there is no 
indication if a SIR was submitted in relation to a 2014 incident involving German speaking 
officers at the Greek-Turkish border, or an investigation took place, regardless of the fact that 
the victim did not wish to submit a complaint (Frontex, 2014f). 
The shortcomings of investigations at the national level highlight the limitations of the 
accountability framework of Frontex. While some complaints are submitted, very few are 
deemed admissible. Admissible complaints and reported incidents are predominantly 
investigated by national authorities, since they concern national border guards. However, 
national systems of investigation present significant structural weaknesses and rarely uphold 
any complaints or conclude that there was a case to answer in a reported incident. In fact, we 
could not find any references to complaints that were upheld by national authorities or 
investigations that resulted in blame being attributed to any national actors. However, as the 
accountability mechanisms of Frontex are largely predicated on national mechanisms, the 
shortcomings of national mechanisms have significant impact on the extent that fundamental 
rights violations can be addressed. 
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7. Case Study: Pushbacks at the Greek-Turkish Border in 
Evros 
Since the RABIT deployment of 2010 (Carrera and Guild, 2010; Fink, 2018), the presence of 
Frontex teams in Evros, the area and prefecture adjoining the Greek-Turkish land border, has 
coincided with practices of border management by the Hellenic Police which have raised 
serious concerns regarding their compliance with international and human rights law (Frelick, 
2008; Amnesty International, 2010; Pro Asyl, 2013). The intensification of pushbacks since 
2017 along with the continuous, if limited, presence of Frontex teams, raises questions 
regarding the fundamental rights responsibilities of the Agency in the operational area of 
Evros. These concern the potential involvement of deployed officers in pushback incidents, 
accountability issues related to the monitoring and investigation of fundamental rights 
violations, and the continuing presence of Frontex, especially under the 2020 RABIT operation 
and in view of serious indications of persistent fundamental rights violations. 
7.1 Pushbacks 
Since 2017 reports of pushbacks across the Greek-Turkish border have intensified, following 
a parallel increase of border crossings through the Greek-Turkish border. Yet they are not a 
new practice. Along with pushbacks at sea, they had attracted the attention of NGOs in the 
late 2000s (Frelick, 2008; Amnesty International, 2010; Pro Asyl, 2013) even before the first 
deployment of the Frontex RABIT force in the winter of 2010. Since the deployment, 
pushbacks possibly reduced in number, but as even Frontex documents suggest, they did not 
stop (Frontex, 2013a; b; c, 2015d, 2016i; d). Since 2017, however, several Greek NGOs and 
human rights organisations documented systematic patterns of pushbacks across the Greek-
Turkish border (ARSIS, Greek Council for Refugees and HumanRights360, 2018; Greek 
Council for Refugees, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2018). These patterns continued in 2019, 
with several more incidents being reported by NGOs, activists and media (Koculu, 2019; 
Mobile Info Team, 2019; Christides, Lüdke and Popp, 2019, 2020). 
Following the ‘opening’ of the Turkish border by the Turkish government, its Greek counterpart 
responded to the increased presence of people on the Turkish side intending to cross the 
border with reinforced border controls and deterrence measures. Reports suggest that the 
Greek security bodies engaged in widespread pushback practices, the use of violence – 
including tear gas, blank bullets and live ammunition - and unlawful detention justified by 
reference to the ‘exceptional’ situation in Evros (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Stevis-Gridneff 
et al., 2020; ’The Turkish authorities drove us to the border’, 2020). Two migrant deaths, 
documented and analysed by investigative media and researchers, are likely to have been the 
responsibility of Greek security forces (Amnesty International, 2020b; Forensic Architecture, 
2020; Bellingcat, 2020; Lighthouse Reports, 2020) Allegations of human rights violations, 
excessive violence and pushbacks were formally dismissed by the Greek government as ‘fake 
news’ (LIBE Committee Meeting, 02 April 2020, 10:00 - 12:00, 2020; LIBE Committee meeting, 
06 July 2020, 16:45 - 18:45, 2020). In March and April 2020, further pushbacks were reported, 
this time involving the transport of people from camps and detention facilities in mainland 
Greece (Border Violence Monitoring Network, 2020; Abdulrahim, 2020; Schmitz, Kalaitzi and 
Karakaş, 2020). Moreover, the government suspended the submission of asylum applications 
on March the 2nd for a month (Greek Government Gazette, 2020). 
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7.2 Operational activities 
On 2 November 2010 the first ever RABIT operation was launched in Evros following a request 
by the Greek government (Carrera and Guild, 2010). 175 team officers, as well as vehicles 
and other assets, were deployed. The RABIT operation ended in March 2011, and operations 
in Evros were incorporated into Operation Poseidon Land, a part of Operation Poseidon Sea 
which was active in the Aegean, with reduced presence of personnel and assets. Since 2015, 
all operational activities in the Greek-Turkish border area take place under JO Flexible 
Operational Activities and JO Focal Points (Fink, 2018; Frontex, 2016o, 2017d, 2018d; Frontex 
Press Office, 2020). According to information we received from the Frontex press office, since 
2017 between 15 and 30 officers are normally present in Evros. Technical equipment includes 
mainly thermovision vans and patrol cars (Frontex Press Office, 2020). Frontex refused to 
reveal any details about assets and the composition of the teams in terms of home countries 
through Freedom of information requests, citing security reasons. However, local police 
directors in 2018 referred to German, Austrian and Polish border control teams, and three 
thermovision vans (Interviews 7, 8). Further, we sighted German Bundespolizei vans stationed 
in Alexandroupoli and Orestiada, and a Dutch patrol car in Orestiada in the course of our 
fieldwork in the area (Images 1-4). During the events at the Greek-Turkish border in March 
2020 and before the RABIT deployment, the German Bundespolizei patrols cars were sighted 
by journalists (Conversations 2, 3). A photo published in a Politico article (von der Burchard, 
2020), later removed, showed a German police car, one of the two we observed in the area 
during fieldwork, next to apprehended migrants. Further, a source present in Evros in March 
2020 told us that they saw two German police vans driving behind two white vans without 
number plates (Conversation 3). We saw such vans, used by the Hellenic Police and often 
linked to pushbacks, in Neo Cheimonio in Evros and the Poros detention centre in Evros 
(Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2020; Images 5, 6). 
Following the decision of the Turkish government to open the borders on 27th February 2020, 
the Greek government reinforced border protection measures in order to prevent entry into 
Greek territory. On the 1st March, the Greek government requested assistance from Frontex, 
including a RABIT deployment at the Greek-Turkish border (To Vima, 2020). The Executive 
Director [ED] agreed to this request on the following day, and the Management Board [MB] 
agreed with his decision on March the 3rd (Frontex 2020 3rd march) An additional 100 border 
guards from 22 Member States, as well as technical equipment, were deployed at the Greek-




Image 1: German Federal Police van, Alexandroupoli, January 2019. Photo: LK 
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Image 2: German Federal Police van, Orestiada, August 2019. Photo: LK 
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Image 3: German Federal Police van, Orestiada, December 2019. Photo: LK 
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Image 4: Dutch Border Police car, Orestiada, December 2019. Photo: LK 
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Image 5: White unmarked van, Neo Cheimonio Border Guard Station, August 2019. Photo: 
LK 
 




7.3 Frontex Responses to Pushbacks in Evros 
While the issue of pushbacks was raised repeatedly in the Consultative Forum [CF] (Frontex, 
2018b, 2019a) and Frontex management have been aware of the practice, the response of 
the Agency consisted largely of asking Greek authorities for information (Frontex, 2018b, 
2019a). Greek authorities, however, appear not to have communicated such information, at 
least not promptly (Frontex, 2018b, 2019a). The Fundamental Rights Officer [FRO] visited the 
area in January 2019, suggesting that there might have been some serious concern regarding 
incidents in the area. 
Pushback incidents have been recorded through the Agency’s Serious Incident Reporting 
system. To our knowledge, only six Serious Incident Reports [SIRs] have been submitted 
since 2017, despite the extensive documentation of incidents in the area. Frontex informed us 
in an email communication that no SIRs were received since 2018, although we later found 
that in fact two have been submitted (Frontex Press Office, 2020; Frontex, 2019n; j; l; k). There 
is no information that any individual complaints have been submitted. The FRO report on their 
visit to the area reported that information on the complaint mechanism was not visible in 
operational areas such as police stations and containers where debriefing activities took place 
(Frontex, 2019j). All reported SIRs concern incidents involving Greek security forces. Frontex 
has consistently and repeatedly denied any involvement of officers deployed in Evros in 
conducting pushbacks, citing the lack of formal complaints against them (Interview 1; Kartali, 
2019; Soguel, 2018). 
One SIR (no 606) was based on a report by a Greek human rights body (Frontex, 2017l) and 
two others (no 676 and no 798) rely on Turkish media sources (Frontex, 2017m, 2018j). One 
appears to have been raised by the FRO (no 676) rather than Frontex officers, while it is 
unclear who has submitted the other two. The remainder three (no 788, no 10025 and no 
10036) appear to have been submitted by Frontex personnel in the Evros area (Frontex, 2018i, 
2019k; l); their details have been redacted in the released SIRs. SIR no 788 provides some 
interesting insights into the process of reporting fundamental rights violations. During a 
debriefing interview, a migrant alleged he was pushed back during a previous attempt to enter 
Greece. The interview took place in the presence of the national authorities, as stipulated by 
the operational plan, which however rendered the victim of the pushback reluctant to share 
information. This lack of procedural safeguards for the victim ‘as well as [the] person 
submitting [the] SIR’ was noted by the FRO (Frontex, 2019j). The report also noted the ‘lack 
of clarity among LCC [Local Coordination Centre] representatives as regards the SIR 
procedure – role of debriefer while receiving information on alleged violation of fundamental 
rights’ (Frontex, 2019j). 
The low number of SIRs in comparison to the extensive reporting of pushbacks raises 
questions regarding the use of the mechanism by deployed officers, an issue more broadly 
identified in internal documents and CF reports (see section 6.4.1). A reason that the number 
of SIRs was low might be, as stated by the Frontex press office, that ‘deployed officers do not 
work in the immediate area of the border, but they conduct checks on the main roads’ (Frontex 
Press Office, 2020, underlined in the original; also Frontex, 2019b; Soguel, 2018). This is 
confirmed by the 2019 report by the FRO on their visit to Evros, which states that Frontex 
deployed personal do not, as a rule, patrol in the immediate border area, or the ‘frontline’ as a 
CF interviewee described it. According to a member of a team deployed in Evros, the Hellenic 
Police directed Frontex teams to patrol areas of Evros outside the frontline zone (Frontex, 
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2019j). The implication of this assertion is that Frontex personnel cannot witness pushbacks, 
as they do not participate in joint surveillance activities at the immediate border area next to 
the river Evros. 
Yet, the claim is challenged by a number of other sources. First, operational plans, which 
include patrols as a key activity of deployed FX teams, refer to the military zone near the 
borderline, where access is ‘only allowed in the presence of a Hellenic Police officer and only 
when on specific duty (e.g. border surveillance)’ (Frontex, 2015e, p.46, 2016o, 2017dp.159, 
2018dp.66). Further, the Deputy ED in the 18th CF meeting seemed to contest the FRO’s 
report, ‘insisting’ that ‘we should not draw conclusions on the basis of something that one FX 
deployed officer told a staff member of the FRO’ (Frontex, 2019a, p.6). Statements by the 
Hellenic authorities also appear to claim that Frontex personnel do patrol the frontline zone. A 
statement to that effect was made to the FRO during her visit in 2019 (Frontex, 2019j). 
Similarly, the response of the Greek Ministry for Public Order to the Council of Europe’s 2018 
report states that 
‘The said Officials, always under the supervision of Greek Police Officers, take part 
both in the prevention operations (entry prevention) and in the management of 
immigrants after their detection (procedures of nationality identification, information, 
interpretation, etc.)’ (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Citizen Protection, 2018, p.2) 
‘Entry prevention’ in this context, suggests involvement in surveillance operations at the green 
border. This is also suggested by press releases of the Hellenic police (Hellenic Police, 2018a; 
b), and the former Head of the Orestiada police directorate, who referred to joint patrols of 
Greek and Frontex officers on national TV (ERT, 2020). Nevertheless, when asked by an MEP 
about the presence of Frontex personnel in the ‘frontline’ during a LIBE session in November 
2019, the Greek Minister for Public Order M. Chrysochoidis did not provide an answer 
(Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Ordinary meeting, 06 November 2019, 
10:00 - 12:29, 2019). We confirmed with the MEP who asked the question that no reply was 
received after the LIBE session. Since the start of RABIT operation in March 2020, Frontex 
deployed personnel appears to be operational in the frontline, not least because it was 
reported that they were shot at by Turkish border guards at the border near the village of 
Tychero (Christides et al., 2020). 
Regardless of the statements of Greek authorities, Frontex officers may have indeed been 
excluded from patrolling in the frontline at least for some periods during Frontex operations in 
the area. However, the differences in the accounts of Frontex and the Greek authorities 
suggest that the actual events are unclear and contested. It is also unclear, given what 
appears to have been agreed in the operational plans, who made this decision. The Deputy 
Executive Director stated in the 18th CF meeting that the Hellenic Police requested further 
assistance, but did not respond to questions by Frontex regarding where this assistance is 
needed (Frontex, 2019a). Other sources suggested two contradictory versions of events: on 
the one hand that Frontex submitted a request to the Greek authorities to participate in 
frontline operations, but this was not answered by the Hellenic Police, and on the other that 
they requested to withdraw from frontline activities12. The FRO, on her part, asked for Frontex 
personnel to be ‘deployed and present in all FX operational areas in order to comprehensively 
support host authorities in border management related activities in full compliance with 
 
12 We cannot disclose the sources of this information. 
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fundamental rights, as set by article 34 of the EBCG regulation’ (Frontex, 2019j, p.5). This 
approach reflects the often held view that the presence of Frontex brings transparency to 
fundamental rights practices by national authorities (Interview 3; European Commission, 
2016). 
7.4 Alleged Involvement of Frontex Officers in Pushbacks 
These operational uncertainties have implications for determining the accountability of Frontex 
teams on the ground, in particular as far as Frontex deployed personnel is concerned. Given 
the difficulty of obtaining visual, incontrovertible evidence on pushbacks in the region, as they 
are conducted within the military border zone where access is prohibited, it is difficult to 
challenge Frontex’s assertion that deployed staff have never been involved in pushbacks. Yet, 
Frontex officers have been implicated through testimonies by migrants subjected to 
pushbacks (ARSIS, Greek Council for Refugees and HumanRights360, 2018; Mobile Info 
Team, 2019; Soguel, 2018) and during fieldwork we conducted in Evros (Karamanidou and 
Kasparek, 2018a). 
Some testimonies referred to German-speaking officers participating in pushbacks: 
The pushback was conducted by Greeks and Germans. In Turkey we were stopped 
by the mafia, who beat us too. I know that lots of people pay them money so as to 
leave unharmed. (ARSIS, Greek Council for Refugees and HumanRights360, 2018, 
p.4) 
They had a black civilian car, wore civilian clothes, and had their faces covered. 
They beat us up with plastic batons, they spoke Greek, and some of them German. 
A while later a truck arrived, with an inflatable boat inside. (ARSIS, Greek Council 
for Refugees and HumanRights360, 2018, p.5) 
When they came close, we could see they were well built and of a fair complexion. 
They didn’t speak Greek, but a language that sounded like German. They were 
wearing dark uniforms; different from the ones the Greek police was (ARSIS, Greek 
Council for Refugees and HumanRights360, 2018, p.6) 
Hearing them shouting and speaking, we understood that some of them were Greek, 
and some were speaking another language, possibly German. (ARSIS, Greek 
Council for Refugees and HumanRights360, 2018, p.7) 
Similar testimonies of officers speaking languages other than Greek – possibly German – are 
given in a report by Mobile Info Team: 
He refers to them as German commando’s, “because we know what the Greeks look 
like. They did not look Greek”. They were really tall, young and muscled and said 
“go, go!”. There were some other persons with them, who tried many times to cross 
the river and they knew. They said to them that these are the German commando’s. 
(Mobile Info Team, 2019, p.t9) 
The respondent claims that he heard the “coast guards” speaking in German when 
their boat was stopped after crossing the river into Greece. (Mobile Info Team, 2019, 
p.t21) 
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An article by D. Soguel, published in December 2018, refers to German speaking officers 
being directly implicated in a pushback. More recently, a Human Rights Watch report based 
on interviews taken between the 7th and 9th of March 2020 similarly reported that 
One person said he was stopped by four armed men and a woman in black13 with 
the German flag on their sleeves and one man in black with the Swedish flag on his 
sleeve and that they handed him and others over to men in black with balaclavas. 
(Human Rights Watch, 2020) 
Although it is not certain beyond doubt that the individuals in question were Frontex officers, 
we confirmed that the migrant who gave the testimony was consequently subjected to arbitrary 
detention and pushed back to Turkey (Conversation 1) and one of the dominant patterns in 
reports on pushbacks is the participation of masked men (ARSIS, Greek Council for Refugees 
and HumanRights360, 2018; Greek Council for Refugees, 2018; Mobile Info Team, 2019). 
Further, another testimony which implicates German and Italian officers in a pushback is cited 
in a BVMN report published in May 2020 (Border Violence Monitoring Network, 2020). 
We also located one testimony that implicates German speaking officers which dates back to 
2014. An FRO report cited a migrant subjected to a pushback who referred to 
Five people arrived, wearing masks and speaking German and took away all their 
belongings. These people were speaking English with the policemen. (Frontex, 
2014f) 
Therefore, migrant testimonies raise doubts concerning the assertions of Frontex that 
deployed staff are not involved in pushback incidents. Yet, these incidents have not been 
reported through the Serious Incident Reporting system at least until the end of 2019, either 
by officers on the ground, the FCO, or, since they are based on publicly available material by 
the FRO. Hence, while the SIR system seems to produce at least some reports insofar the 
national authorities are concerned, often based on press reports, the same does not seem to 
be the case when Frontex deployed staff are implicated. 
7.5 Investigation of Fundamental Rights Violations 
The national authority designated to investigate fundamental rights violations in Evros, 
including the alleged pushback incidents described in the SIRs, are the Hellenic Police 
(Interview 1). The investigations on all six cases reported through the Serious Incident 
Reporting mechanism were completed with no wrongdoing attributed. The Hellenic police 
cited either that there was no credible evidence or that the incidents never took place (Frontex 
Press Office, 2020). SIRs 10024 and 10036 are marked as ‘closed’ but contain no information 
regarding the final outcomes of the investigation. Similarly, outcomes of SIRS submitted 
before 2017 show that the Greek authorities either did not uphold the complaints or failed to 
follow up in a timely manner (Frontex, 2016d). Other investigations conducted by the Hellenic 
Police, not related to Frontex SIRs, also dismissed similar complaints (Council of Europe, 
2019). 
 
13 German police officers deployed with Frontex normally wear dark blue uniforms. 
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Systemic shortcomings of investigations in Greece had been previously reported in internal 
Frontex documents and a CF report (Frontex, 2013c, 2015c). The FRO urged the Greek 
authorities to ensure, as ‘minimum and urgent measures’ 
a more independent national investigation of these types of allegation (i.e. other than 
the local law enforcement units), better collection of detailed information at source 
and enhanced follow-up of allegations in close coordination with Frontex (Frontex, 
2013c) 
The question of the independence of investigations remained an issue. More specifically, it 
appears that allegations of violations are investigated by internal police units, sometimes by 
the same local force accused of conducting the violation (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Citizen 
Protection, 2018). The dismissal of the reported incidents is equally unsurprising and 
consistent with long standing issues of unaccountability of the Hellenic Police and its 
reluctance to investigate or admit responsibility of violence or human rights abuses against 
migrants (Christopoulos, 2014; Karamanidou, 2016). Further, the Greek government – and 
local actors such as the Police Directorate of Orestiada – repeatedly and publicly denied that 
pushbacks are conducted, although the FRO report indicates that police authorities in Evros 
blamed paramilitary groups (Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Citizen Protection, 2018; Mourenza, 
2019; I Kathimerini, 2019; Interview 8). The report by the UN Committee on the Prevention of 
Torture recommended in 2019 that Greek authorities 
Enhance efforts to ensure the criminal accountability of perpetrators of acts that put 
the lives and safety of migrants and asylum seekers at risk, and ensure that victims, 
witnesses and claimants are protected against ill-treatment or intimidation that may 
arise as a consequence of their complaints (UN Committee against Torture, 2019, 
p.4) 
While human rights organisations and NGOs in Greece have assisted victims of pushbacks to 
pursue cases in Greek courts, progress has been slow: an investigation launched by the Greek 
Ombudsman in 2017 has not been concluded by July 2020, an investigation initiated by the 
prosecutor of Orestiada in north Evros in March 2019 was similarly pending, and several 
complaints submitted by the Greek Council for Refugees in 2019 were still in the stage of pre-
trial examination in May 2020 (AIDA, 2020a). Some cases have been reportedly dismissed by 
prosecutors (Christides, Lüdke and Popp, 2020). While submissions to the courts are ongoing, 
the most likely outcome is an eventual recourse to the ECtHR. 
A further significant, albeit under-reported, issue concerns testimonies implicating mainly 
German-speaking individuals in pushback incidents and other fundamental rights violations. 
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no SIR reports or individual complaints related 
to the testimonies referred to in the previous section, although some may have been submitted 
following the launch of the RABIT 2020 operation. We do not know if the case cited in an FRO 
report that implicated German speaking officers in a pushback incident has been investigated 
by Frontex mechanisms, including the FRO, and the host country (Frontex, 2014f). No SIR or 
information in other FRO reports were found. While the Hellenic Police has primary 
responsibility as the host country to investigate alleged incidents of fundamental rights 
violations, violations by deployed staff should also be investigated by their home country, 
which in the above incident could be Germany or Austria. Yet, as no SIRs appear to have 
been submitted by Frontex personnel or the FRO, the process stipulated by regulations 
2016/1624 and 2019/1886 might not have been initiated at all. 
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7.6 The March 2020 RABIT Deployment 
The March 2020 RABIT deployment raised further questions regarding the assessment of the 
fundamental rights situation at the Greek-Turkish border. Regulation 2019/1886 requires that 
the ED, in consultation with the FRO must assess all operations before their launch as to 
whether they could lead to fundamental rights violations. The situation at the Greek-Turkish 
border at the time was such that the possibility of fundamental rights violation was high. The 
FRO had already raised concerns in relation to border management practices in the area 
following its visit on January 2019, recommending the suspension of operations in Evros 
(Frontex, 2019j). Media and NGOs documented practices that suggested systematic violations 
of fundamental rights, such as the extensive use of pushbacks to Turkey, the use of violence 
by both Hellenic Police and armed groups of locals, and illegal practices of detention, as well 
as the use of unmarked vehicles without registration plates (Amnesty International, 2020a; 
’The Turkish authorities drove us to the border’, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2020; Stevis-
Gridneff et al., 2020). In addition, on the 2nd March 2020, the Greek government introduced 
an emergency law which suspended for a month the submission of asylum applications of 
‘individuals entering the country unlawfully’ and stipulated their return, without prior 
registration, to the country of transit or origin (Greek Government Gazette, 2020). These 
provisions elevated pushbacks to official government policy, and, as it has been argued, were 
a direct violation of EU and international law as there is no provision to suspend the right to 
asylum (Amnesty International, 2020a; Monella, 2020). Thus, the Frontex deployment was at 
a severe risk of violating its own legal framework which stipulates that all activities of the EBCG 
must be in compliance with fundamental rights (Monella, 2020; 2019/1896, Art 1, Art 5, Art 
80). 
It is unclear whether fundamental rights issues were taken into account prior to the decision 
to launch a RABIT operation at the Greek-Turkish border. We can observe, however, that a 
very short time passed between the request for Frontex assistance by the Greek authorities 
on the 1st March 2020 and its formal approval by the Management Board, just two days later. 
It is debatable if such a short period of time allowed for the full examination of fundamental 
rights considerations related to the operational area of Evros. This is significant given not only 
the extensive reporting of fundamental rights violations in the area, but also the 2019 report 
by the FRO, which urged Frontex to ‘consider suspension or termination of the activities in 
case violations of fundamental rights violations or international protection obligations are of a 
serious nature or likely to persist’ (Frontex, 2019j, pp.5–6). It appears that Frontex considered 
fundamental rights issues beyond its responsibility, arguing that 
Frontex is not in charge of asylum procedures. The European Commission is 
currently in discussions with Greece about this matter. We continue to refer all 
asylum requests to national authorities as required by law (Monella, 2020) 
Further, in May 2020 the RABIT operation was extended to July 202014. Despite the persistent 
reporting fundamental rights violations since March, including pushback incidents in which, as 
discussed in preceding sections, appear to implicate Frontex deployed personnel (Border 





8. Case Study: Proposed Suspension of Operations in 
Hungary 
In October 2016, the Consultative Forum (CF) and the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) 
proposed that Frontex withdrew from operations in Hungary because of widespread and 
systematic human rights and EU asylum law violations taking place at its external borders. 
This recommendation was never adopted, although it has been reiterated several timessince 
then. However, the recommendation and ensuing responses by the Frontex Executive 
Director (ED) are a valuable illustration of the tensions between border management and 
fundamental rights, and of how they impact on the function of the Frontex accountability 
mechanisms. 
8.1 Fundamental rights violations at the Hungarian borders and 
the 2016 Recommendation to Withdraw 
The Hungarian government introduced a new asylum law with several provisions that were 
incompatible with the EU asylum acquis in 2015 (AIDA, 2015). The Commission initiated 
infringement procedures in December 2015 (European Commission, 2015). In addition, the 
Hungarian government constructed a fence at its border with Serbia, later extended to its 
border with Croatia, and created transit zones at border crossing points (AIDA, 2015; Gyollai 
and Korkut, 2019). In 2016, the Hungarian government introduced a new law which 
established an 8 km border zone and made the destruction of the fence a criminal offense 
(Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). Migrants crossing the border without authorisation and 
apprehended within this zone were ‘escorted’ to the transit zone and the Serbian side of the 
fence and had very limited access to fast track asylum procedures (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, 2016). Moreover, human rights organisations and NGOs documented the use of 
excessive violence at the Hungarian border, as well as practices of pushbacks (Amnesty 
International, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2016; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2017; UNHCR, 
2016a). 
In October 2016, the FRO published a report raising numerous concerns over the new 
legislation, collective expulsions to Serbia, summary dismissals of asylum applications at the 
border, and incidents of violence (Frontex, 2016n). Her assessment also referred to reports 
by human rights organisations and NGOs which also recorded persistent violations of 
fundamental rights, the admission of the Hungarian police of excessive use of force, and four 
prosecutorial investigations against police officers (Frontex, 2016n; Fotiadis, 2020). The FRO 
advised Frontex to 
revise its support in the operational areas where there are several and repeated 
allegations of disrespect to the obligations and the values enshrined in the EU Treaty 
and legislation, as well as in regional and international laws. Otherwise the Agency 
is at risk by omission in respecting, protecting and fulfilling the aforementioned 
Charter of Fundamental Rights’ obligations (Frontex, 2016n, p.7) 
The CF also recommended suspension of operational activities, reiterating the concerns 
raised by the FRO (Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, 2016). However, the 
two EU agencies – FRA and EASO - represented in the CF, as well as the Council of Europe, 
abstained from the vote on the proposal (Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, 
2016). 
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The ED rejected the recommendations on 1st February 2017, one day before the first CF 
meeting after issuing their recommendation. Prior to issuing his decision, the ED requested 
the opinion of the European Commission, who argued that 
Frontex should continue with its operations in Hungary. Due to their presence, guest 
officers and Frontex staff can actively contribute to the improvement of the situation, 
in particular related to any possible risk of a misuse of force against irregular 
migrants, as well as in providing an objective and reliable source of information on 
all the circumstances on the ground and possible future incidents. The deployment 
of Frontex shows solidarity and commitment of the European Union to further 
support Hungary in protecting our common Schengen borders also in the future 
(European Commission, 2016) 
The Commission’s reasoning is reflected in the ED’s reply to the CF on February 1st, and his 
subsequent letter on March, where he aligned with the argument that the presence of 
Frontex’s in Hungary would prevent human rights abuses (Frontex, 2016f; g). He further 
described reports of fundamental rights violations at the Hungarian border as ‘not confirmed’ 
(Frontex, 2016g, p.2), citing the low number of Serious Incident Reports [SIRs] submitted – 
three at the time - and that an investigation by the Hungarian authorities into an incident of 
mistreatment concluded that there was no violation of the law (Frontex, 2017i; j). Similarly, he 
referred to the findings of a Commission visit to Hungary in October 2016, which stated that 
‘when applying the new law on escorting migrants back to the border if found within 8 
kilometres’ zone, the Commission’s mission did not find evidence of any such [violations] 
systematic practices’ (Frontex, 2017j; Fotiadis, 2020). Further, he argued that none of the 
SIRs involved Frontex deployed staff, although in fact one of them concerned a Finnish dog 
team (Frontex, 2017j, 2016l; Fotiadis, 2020). 
The CF, in response to the ED’s February letter, raised concerns both on the situation in 
Hungary but also regarding the ED’s reliance on the number of SIRs, questioning the 
effectiveness of the mechanism against well-documented fundamental rights violations by 
other organisations. They further objected to the ED’s reference to the absence of SIRs in 
relation to ‘operational activities’ (Frontex, 2017j) rather than to the operational area of Frontex 
(Frontex, 2017a) which would suggest a greater degree of responsibility for fundamental rights 
violations and their monitoring. In March, the FRO published a further report on the situation 
at the Hungarian-Serbian border which, while noting the reduction of officers deployed, 
reiterated that ‘[t]he risk for shared responsibility of the Agency in the violation of fundamental 
rights in accordance to Article 34 of the European border and Coast Guard Regulation remains 
very high’ (Frontex, 2017g). In its 2017 May meeting, the CF asked the ED to reconsider 
suspending activities in Hungary given the infringement procedures initiated by the EU 
Commission and the persistence of fundamental rights violations, regardless of the reduction 
of deployed staff and material resources in Hungary (Frontex, 2017f; b). Since May 2017, the 
CF has reiterated its recommendation several times, citing the escalation of the infringement 
procedure by the European Commission, and further reports of fundamental rights violations 
at the Hungarian border (Frontex, 2017c, 2018a, 2019b). In May 2019, the CF recommended 
that Frontex does not support return operations in Hungary because of the shortcomings of 
the Hungarian asylum and return systems, also noting the increase in deployed officers 
(Frontex, 2019b). 
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The responses to the recommendations on Hungary highlight several problematic dynamics. 
First, the low numbers of SIRs were used as evidence for not suspending operations (Frontex, 
2017i; a). Thus, despite its shortcomings (see section 6.4.1), the system fed into the 
justification of significant decisions regarding fundamental rights. Secondly, the evidence of 
external organisations was disregarded, although it was sufficient to inform the infringement 
procedures initiated by the Commission (Baldaccini cited in Fotiadis, 2020). There is in fact 
no procedure for taking such information into account within the Frontex mechanisms. Third, 
it is evident that the balance of power in decision making lies with the Frontex management 
and the European Commission. In the Commission’s answer, the imperative of border control, 
at the time in the context of movements along the Balkan route, was prioritised over 
fundamental rights concerns (European Commission, 2016; Fotiadis, 2020), and this position 
was adopted by the ED. The Commission’s reply to the ED suggested that the responses of  
member states involved also had an influence on the decision not to suspend operations. A 
CF respondent similarly remarked that the recommendation to withdraw from Hungary 
engendered ‘a deep conflict with the representative of Hungary at the Management Board, 
who was furious’ (Interview 2). 
Developments in Hungary since 2016 also cast doubt on the reasoning used by the 
Commission and Frontex. The Commission suggested that the presence of Frontex would 
contribute to the recording and monitoring of fundamental rights violations. However, very few 
SIRs and complaints appear to have been submitted (see section 6.4.1), possibly just one in 
2017, which was raised by the FRO on the basis of NGO reports of violence rather than 
submitted by an officer on the ground (Frontex, 2016m) - despite the continuing documentation 
of fundamental rights violations by organisations external to Frontex (AIDA, 2020b; Border 
Violence Monitoring Network, 2019; UN News, 2019). The low number of SIRs – was 
attributed to the reduction of number of deployed officers (Frontex, 2017p). Equally, the 
Commission and Frontex adopted the view that Frontex presence on the ground would reduce 
the risk for fundamental rights violations, an argument which the continuing violations since 
2017 cast this argument into doubt. 
On the other hand, certain actions by Frontex suggest it took measures to avoid complicity to 
fundamental rights violations. While the recommendation to suspend operations in Hungary 
was rejected, Frontex reduced the number of officers deployed in Hungary to 33 by May 2017 
(Frontex, 2017b) and to six by October of the same year (Frontex, 2017c).15 This action was 
in response to the CF recommendation (Frontex, 2017c). Numbers of officers deployed in 
Hungary, however, increased to twelve by January 2019 (Frontex Press Office, 2019). Further, 
Frontex personnel did not participate in the escorting of migrant to the transit zone and to the 
Serbian side of the fence (Fotiadis, 2020; Frontex Press Office, 2019). Given that the escorting 
of migrants to Serbian territory would constitute a violation of provisions on non-refoulement, 
L. Gall, a human rights lawyer, argued that 
the conspicuous absence of Frontex officers during the final stage of detention and 
pushbacks showed the agency was trying to disassociate itself from any legal 
violations or rights abuses during expulsions (Gall, cited in Fotiadis, 2020) 
Similarly, an email in response to a FOI request stated that deployed staff do not operate in 
the ‘1st line’, an area unclearly described in the email as ‘a first few meters wide’, presumably 
 
15 In another source, Frontex appears to have stated that Frontex deployed 17 dog teams in Hungary. 
It is unclear how many teams were present at the same time (Fotiadis, 2020). 
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from the Hungarian border (Frontex Press Office, 2019). Similarly to the case of operations in 
Evros, where Frontex alleged that deployed officers were not present at the ‘frontline’, it is not 
clear whether this was a decision of the national authorities or the Agency. The non-
participation in escorting tasks has significant implications for fundamental rights monitoring. 
On the one hand, it enables Frontex to avoiding complicity in violations, but also limits the 
capacity of officers to prevent and report violations in the manner suggested in the letters of 




9. Strategies for Evading Accountability 
While the previous sections addressed the legal framework relating to accountability 
mechanisms and the shortcomings of these existing mechanisms, in this section we discuss 
what we define as patterns in the responses of Frontex to criticisms related to fundamental 
rights. Based on the analysis of internal documents, an interview conducted with the Frontex 
press office and an analysis of statements in publicly available documents, we argue that 
Frontex uses five strategies in order to refute criticisms but also to evade responsibility 
regarding violations of fundamental rights within its operational areas. 
9.1 Using Information Instrumentally 
One way that Frontex refutes concerns and criticisms on their fundamental rights record is by 
using their internally produced information, both related to monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms but also to other operations, in an instrumental manner. 
First, data produced by monitoring and accountability mechanisms has been used 
instrumentally to inform key decisions with significant impact of fundamental rights. The CF 
recommendation to withdraw from Hungary was rejected partly because of the low number of 
Serious Incident Reports [SIRs], a justification adopted both by the Frontex Executive Director 
[ED] and the EU Commission (Baldaccini cited in Fotiadis, 2020; Frontex, 2017j, p.2). At the 
same time, evidence of fundamental rights violations by external organisations was 
disregarded (Baldaccini cited in Fotiadis, 2020; ‘Under surveillance’: Monitoring at the border, 
2020). Hence the failure of the mechanism – given the extensive reports of violations by other 
organisations - was used to justify decisions on operations, which were dictated by wider 
political imperatives (European Commission, 2016; Fotiadis, 2020). Documents also illustrate 
that Frontex relied on data produced by the national authorities: the absence of any decisions 
upholding complaints. Yet, reliance on national systems disregards their shortcomings, 
extensively documented in internal Frontex documents, and in the case of Hungary a political 
environment that displayed significant hostility to migration (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). In a 
similar manner, Frontex has argued for example that ‘no complaint has been filed against any 
Frontex officer’ (The Japan Times, 2020; also Kartali, 2019; euractiv.com, 2019) in order to 
address criticisms towards its human rights record. 
Conversely, the 2020 RABIT deployment in Evros illustrates how information produced by its 
monitoring mechanisms can be ignored if it does not serve political decisions. There are still, 
at the time of writing, many unanswered questions regarding the extent to which fundamental 
rights issues, whose existence is documented in various reports of the FRO and CF, were 
considered by Frontex prior to its launch. The decision to launch was taken within days: the 
formal request from Greece was made on March 1st, the formal decision by the Management 
Board [MB] and the ED was taken just two days later, on March 3rd (Frontex, 2020i; To Vima, 
2020). On the same day, the leaders of EU institutions, including EU Commission president 
U. van der Leyen, EP President D. Sassoli and EU Council President C. Michel, visited Evros 
and publicly expressed their support for the actions of the Greek government and the Frontex 
deployment in the area (European Commission, 2020). In a press release on March the 2nd, 
Frontex already stated that their response was positive (To Vima, 2020; Frontex, 2020d). 
Given that the decision was taken in a matter of days, with the evident political support of EU 
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leadership, it is doubtful that knowledge about systemic fundamental rights violations recorded 
in the area over the previous two years were taken into account. 
However, Frontex data on fundamental rights violations should not be seen as limited to what 
is produced through fundamental rights monitoring mechanisms. Technological means of 
surveillance – aircrafts, drones, vessel detection systems, thermovision cameras – that the 
Agency has at its disposal are capable of tracking movements on the ground and at sea, and 
hence could detect incidents such as pushbacks. To our knowledge, Frontex has not fully 
addressed this question and has remained largely silent on this aspect of their data gathering. 
In the case of widely reported pushbacks from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the issue of 
complicity by passing to the Croatian authorities information gained through aerial surveillance 
or the failure to detect any pushback operations during aerial surveillance operations was 
noted by HRW (2019) and in a question submitted by an MEP (European Parliament, 2019). 
The reply provided did not address the MEP’s question regarding ‘the extent to which 
Frontex’s MAS16 and FASS17 services have assisted with, or set in train, illegal deportations 
from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (European Parliament, 2020b). 
Responses to events at the land and maritime Greek-Turkish border by MEPs also highlight 
the significance of this issue. In May 2020, a group of MEPs asked the Commission if Frontex 
was present near the location of a deadly shooting at the Greek-Turkish border on 04 March 
2020, and if they had information from their aerial surveillance of the area (Strik, 2020). A joint 
investigation by Der Spiegel, Lighthouse Reports, Bellingcat, Forensic Architecture, Pointer 
and Sky News in 2020 had pointed to the likely responsibility of the Hellenic authorities, 
something which they denied. The reply by U. von der Leyen in July 2020 stated that no SIRs 
were submitted on the incident but did not address the issue of other sources of information18. 
Similarly, a group of MEPs asked Frontex to account for its knowledge of pushbacks in the 
Aegean during the spring and early summer 2020, specifically inquiring whether the Agency’s 
‘situational awareness’ and ‘surveillance of the pre-frontier area’ enabled them to ‘witness any 
incidents’ or to have knowledge that could help ‘clarify the situation’ (@SyrizaEPInternational, 
2020). Several incidents of pushbacks at the Aegean Sea were reported by NGOs and media 
(Alarm Phone, 2020b; a; astraparis.gr, 2020; Schmitz, Kalaitzi and Karakaş, 2020; Keady-
Tabbal and Mann, 2020; Abdulrahim, 2020). Frontex vessels were in all likelihood very close 
to the locations where pushback incidents occurred, which raised questions regarding what 
knowledge the agency had of these events (dm-aegean, 2020; Christides and Lüdke, 2020). 
Further, a German MEP, Dietmar Köster, stated in a Facebook post that ED F. Leggeri 
admitted he knew about these incidents and had informed the Greek authorities (Köster, 
2020). While it could be argued that the above examples related to a specific practice in a 
given operational area, they apply more widely to the use of technologies that produce 
knowledge and data about events that result in fundamental rights violations. 
Frontex repeatedly describes itself as an ‘intelligence-driven agency’, i.e. that any operational 
activities are planned and based on available data and risk analysis. With the formal 
incorporation of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) into the agency 
through regulation 2019/1896, the agency is in a unique position in that it might well have the 
best, near real-time overview over activities at the European Union’s border. In addition, since 
 
16 Maritime Aerial Surveillance 
17 Framework Contract for Aerial Surveillance 
18 https://twitter.com/Tineke_Strik/status/1281239413704593408 
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regulation 2016/1624, the agency is tasked with carrying out vulnerability assessments of 
members states portions of the European Union’s border, affording the agency a direct window 
into the daily management of the borders. Frequently invoking an absence of information or 
even knowledge either points to an instrumental use of information, or that the data gathering 
and risk analysis practices of the agency do not produce reliable knowledge. 
9.2 Invoking Presence and Absence 
While the shortcomings of the monitoring and investigative mechanisms are reiterated by 
research, NGOs, media and human rights institutions as well as by its own internal bodies, 
the presence of Frontex on the ground is constructed as guaranteeing fundamental rights 
compliance and allow the monitoring and reporting of fundamental rights violations on the 
ground. 
The argument articulated by Frontex, the EU Commission, but also by the FRO and the CF 
(European Commission, 2016; Oel in ‘Under surveillance’: Monitoring at the border, 2020; 
Frontex, 2019j; Frontex, 2016f; g; Interview 3), posits that the presence of Frontex at a border 
area acts as a deterrent for human rights violations. This argument was used to justify the 
non-suspension of operations in Hungary (Frontex, 2017j) and, despite infringement 
procedures by the Commission and continuing reports of human rights violations at the 
Hungarian border, it was still articulated by the Frontex press office in 2020: 
we would highlight that the presence of officers deployed by Frontex and its staff 
can actively contribute to minimise any possible risk of a misuse of force, as well as 
to provide an objective and reliable source of information on all the circumstances 
on the ground (Frontex Press Office cited in Fotiadis, 2020) 
In theory, the presence of Frontex is believed to prevent human rights violations because of 
existing monitoring and accountability mechanisms, which allow for both the recording and 
monitoring of incidents on the ground, but also because they affect the practices of national 
authorities (European Commission, 2016; Interview 3). Unsurprisingly, the validity of this 
argument has been challenged by human rights bodies. In its report on Hungary, the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture of the Council of Europe noted that 
the deployment of foreign police officers provided by the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) cannot be regarded as a safeguard against ill-
treatment, given their participation in a limited number of patrols and their absence 
on the “front line” close to the border fence (Council of Europe, 2018b, p.14) 
Similar observations were also made by C. Woollard of ECRE, one of the organisations in the 
Consultative Forum (CF), on both the situation in Hungary and Greece. ‘[T]he presence of 
Frontex does not appear to be reducing violations’, and equally does 
not appear to have contributed in any significant way to the provision of justice to 
those whose rights have been violated (for instance in terms of documentation of 
incidents, deployments to points where risks are highest, contribution to tracing and 
supporting victims, public or behind the scenes pressure on governments to reduce 
risk of violations). Of course there may be activities that are not publicised and 
information that is shared, for instance with the Commission, it is consideration of 
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infringement. None the less, it is not obvious the FX’s presence is limiting either 
violations or impunity for violations (Strik and Fotiadis, 2020) 
Yet, the presence of Frontex is also used as a legitimation device by member states. The 
Hellenic police, for instance, invoked the presence of Frontex to refute CPT’s findings on 
pushbacks and ill-treatment: 
[…] within the framework of Frontex operations, a great number of officials have 
become active in Evros area, originating from several Member States of the 
Organization, without any incident of illegal retransmissions or violation of human 
rights by police officers of our border agencies having been ever recorded (Hellenic 
Republic, Ministry of Citizen Protection, 2018, p.2) 
The Hungarian government employed the same strategy, arguing that Frontex officers were 
present during patrolling with their Hungarian counterparts, and therefore would have been 
able to observe violations of fundamental rights: 
Regarding the alleged abuses in point 18 of the Report, which were not observed 
by the German and other nationality border guards performing their duties there, the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) emphasized that the joint 
operations could not be suspended on unjustified claims of unjustified use of force. 
In addition, allegations of violations of human rights of migrants have not been 
confirmed, so these cannot be considered as sufficient grounds (Council of Europe, 
2018c, p.4) 
Further, the argument around presence is undermined by another claim put forward by Frontex 
itself. In a rather contradictory manner, the Agency has also argued that deployed officers are 
not present in locations where systematic violations of fundamental rights occur – for example 
at the Greek-Turkish and Hungarian-Serbian border frontlines (see sections 7.3 and 8.1). Our 
analysis of the Evros case study suggests that this claim should not be taken at face value: 
there are many indications that, at least on some occasions, Frontex may have been present 
at the frontline, and that their presence or absence might change over time. Information as to 
why Frontex is absent at the frontline is also contradictory. While the reason might be 
operational decisions taken by the Greek border management authorities, there was a 
suggestion that Frontex itself might have decided not to be present. 
The same argument has been used in the context of operations in Hungary, whereby Frontex 
has denied involvement in the escorting of apprehended migrants to the Serbian side of the 
fence, while they appear to have been involved in detection and apprehension tasks (Frontex 
Press Office, 2019; Fotiadis, 2020). Contrary to the case of the Evros frontline, where it 
appears likely that the Greek authorities block the presence of Frontex personnel, in the 
Hungarian context there are no indications that such a decision was taken by the national 
authorities. On the contrary, the absence of officers from the last stage of border control 
operations, the escorting to the fence, appears to have been the decision of the agency 
(Frontex, 2017e; Fotiadis, 2020). In response to a CF query regarding pushbacks in at the 
Croatian-Bosnian border, the Frontex Deputy Executive Director replied that the Agency was 
only involved in aerial surveillance, as the national authorities objected to Frontex deployment 
on the ground (Frontex, 2019a). The reply given to a parliamentary question on the same 
issue similarly argued that Frontex was not present on the ground and therefore had no ‘direct 
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information about incidents of alleged unprocessed returns except for the ones covered in the 
media and reported by NGOs (European Parliament, 2020b). 
While the presence of Frontex in areas or tasks where systematic violations of fundamental 
rights have been documented creates risks of complicity, the argument of ‘absence’ put 
forward by the Agency serves at reducing this risk. Not being present at the ‘frontline’ – as 
illustrated in the contexts of the Greek and Hungarian borders – enables Frontex to distance 
itself from potential accusations of complicity (Lydia Gall cited in Fotiadis, 2020; also Correctiv, 
2019). In the case of operations in Croatia, while the absence from the ground was invoked in 
this case to explain lack of knowledge on pushbacks, the increasing use of aerial surveillance 
also appears as a strategy to reduce the risk of complicity in fundamental rights violations 
(Correctiv, 2019). Nevertheless, there are inherent contradictions in the two narratives 
identified in this section; in a sense, they claim that Frontex is both present and simultaneously 
absent from key operational activities that are linked to fundamental rights violations. Certainly, 
the putative absence of Frontex from areas with high violations of fundamental rights clashes 
with one of the fundamental tasks of the agency, i.e. ensuring the introduction of professional 
border management practices at the entirety of the European Union’s external border. 
9.3 Monitoring and Accountability Mechanisms as a Fig Leaf 
A strategy frequently used by Frontex, as well as Commission representatives, consists of 
invoking the existence of monitoring and accountability mechanisms to legitimate their border 
management activities and refute criticisms on its fundamental rights practices. This is a 
consistent pattern in Frontex public statements to the media as well as to European 
institutions. In August 2019, Frontex responded to a critical joint investigation by TV magazine 
Report München by national TV broadcaster ARD, newspaper The Guardian and investigative 
group Correctiv by issuing a press release stating that 
Fundamental rights are at the core of all the agency’s activities. They are integrated 
into the Frontex Codes of Conduct, the Common Core Curricula for border guards, 
specialised training for border surveillance officers or officers conducting forced 
return operations. The Code of Conduct obliges every officer who has a reason to 
believe fundamental rights of any person were violated, either by witnessing such 
violation directly, or by hearing about it, to report this immediately to Frontex in form 
of a Serious Incident Report.  […] All those measures – specific guidelines for 
officers, training, monitoring by independent experts, the Fundamental Rights Office 
and Consultative Forum (an independent advisory body on fundamental rights 
comprised of European and international organisations and NGOs) are intended to 
make sure the appropriate checks and balances are in place. Another such measure 
is the complaints mechanism which allows anyone who believes their rights have 
been violated by a Frontex deployed officer to lodge a complaint. (Frontex, 2019f) 
The press release did not explicitly mention the investigation which had been published the 
following day, but can be construed as an indirect response to it. A similar response was 
provided by the press office in a media article on a similar investigation by A. Fotiadis on 
Frontex activities on the Balkan route, stating: 
All officers deployed by Frontex are bound by a strict code of conduct and are 
compelled to respect fundamental rights. On the first day in the operational area, the 
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officers receive an operational briefing that includes specific guidance on the respect 
of fundamental rights, referral procedures, complaint mechanism and the Schengen 
Border Code (Fotiadis, 2020) 
Similarly, M. Oel, Director for Migration, Mobility and Innovation at the European Commission, 
when asked in a webinar organised by the Green Party at the European Parliament on how 
the presence of FX in Evros contributed to greater FR compliance referenced fundamental 
rights provisions and mechanisms, responded in the following manner: 
All persons deployed under a Frontex operation have to respect a code of conduct 
providing for fundamental rights safeguards. A suspicion of violation of these 
fundamental rights must be reported to Frontex via the Serious Incident Report 
procedure. The Executive Director may also terminate any activity of the agency if 
the conditions to fulfil these activities are not longer fulfilled; this includes violations 
of fundamental rights or international protection obligations related to the activity 
concerned that are of a serious nature or are likely to persist. Irrespective of the 
presence of Frontex at a section of the external EU border the border guards of 
member states have to act in conformity with the Schengen Border Code which 
contains fundamental rights safeguards. In case of breach of these safeguards, 
member states have to provide access to effective remedies in line with the EU 
Charter of Fundamental rights and ensure that all allegations should be subject to 
credible investigations as proscribed in national law of the member states concerned 
regarding complaints against the conduct of law enforcement officers, including the 
alleged excessive use of coercive measures (Oel cited in Strik and Fotiadis, 2020) 
It is also clear that this strategy is not only addressed at the media. In a meeting of of the LIBE 
committee, Frontex ED F. Leggeri stated that: 
All the fundamental rights safeguards which are enshrined in all our operational 
plans and in particular operational plan Poseidon and operational plan Land Borders 
they are of course activated and valid so also apply to the rapid intervention. So the 
legal framework has not changed, we have all our commitments regarding 
fundamental rights in place. We have the standard practice of escalating the 
Fundamental rights incidents to the headquarters of the Agency, to the international 
cooperation centre which has the command and control authority at particular level 
in Greece and we also have in the loop our Fundamental Rights Officer and 
fundamental rights office (LIBE Committee Meeting, 02 April 2020, 10:00 - 12:00, 
2020) 
A common thread in the quotations above is that they refer to – and even list – the monitoring 
and accountability mechanisms in place as well as other instruments such as the Codes of 
Conduct which contribute to the governance of fundamental rights within Frontex activities. 
Yet, by referring to their presence rather than their function and implementation, actors deflect 
attention from the many deficiencies of the legal and policy framework and the operation of 
the monitoring and accountability mechanisms. The shortcomings we identified in the previous 
sections – omissions in the legal framework, absence of independent institutions, the under-
utilised Serious Incident Reporting and complaints mechanisms, overreliance in weak national 
investigative systems – do not amount to an effective monitoring and accountability regime. 
Rather, reflecting the political significance of fundamental rights for Frontex and more broadly 
EU border management, the existence of monitoring and accountability mechanisms appears 
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as a fig leaf. On the one hand, it serves at hiding the deficiencies of existing arrangements 
which do not safeguard fundamental rights; on the other, they enable Frontex to hide behind 
a notion of ‘commitment’ – as expressed by F. Leggeri in the quotation above – to fundamental 
rights, despite involvement in practices that render Frontex complicit in, if not directly 
responsible for to fundamental rights violations. 
9.4 Deflecting Responsibility to National Authorities 
Moreover, Frontex has adopted a strategy of deflecting attention to national authorities, 
arguing that it has no powers over their actions. When we asked for an assessment on the 
Frontex accountability mechanisms, the Frontex press officer repeatedly stressed that the 
Agency has no influence over them: 
[…] our mandate does not cover the national authorities 
[…] we do not have any power over national authorities 
[…] we do not have any mandate or any power over the national authorities 
(Interview 1). 
Similarly, when asked about allegations of pushbacks at the Albanian border, the Frontex 
press officer stated ‘that Frontex is not in power over the behaviour of the national border 
guards’ (Border Violence Monitoring Network, 2019). These statements suggest that, much 
like before Regulation 2016/1624, Frontex still designates national authorities as primarily 
responsible for actions that violate fundamental rights and for their investigation. However, the 
reforms of its mandate created a stronger operational role which goes beyond assisting 
national authorities, while also allocating a greater responsibility for promoting, preventing, 
monitoring and addressing fundamental rights violations. Yet, the above mention statements 
by the Frontex press office suggest that Frontex attributes primary responsibility to national 
actors, while avoiding any reference to any possible actions – such as suspending or not 
launching operations – on its part. 
Frontex has equally stressed that it has no responsibility over investigating reports of 
fundamental rights violations, commenting, in relation to SIRs on incidents at the Hungarian 
border, that 
under the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation of 2016, Frontex was not 
provided power to investigate. National authorities are to follow up on charges in 
SIR reports (cited in Fotiadis, 2020) 
A reply to a question in the European parliament regarding pushbacks at the Croatian border 
similarly notes that 
The EU legislator in the European Border and coast Guard Regulation has not 
entrusted Frontex – including its Fundamental Rights Officer and Consultative forum 
– with investigative powers for matters such as the one you have raised. Frontex 
has no general control, nor mandate to investigate, nor disciplinary powers, over 
member states border guard authorities (European Parliament, 2020b) 
While the accountability regime as stipulated by the legal framework is indeed largely reliant 
on national authorities insofar violations are committed by national authorities, the above 
statement could be contested. It could be argued that the agency bears some responsibility 
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through the obligation of deployed officers to raise SIRs, not only when directly witnessing 
violations, but also on the basis on media accounts. Frontex also has investigating powers 
over violations committed by its own staff (see section 4.1.3). Further, while the FRO does not 
have any investigative powers into fundamental rights, they were given powers to investigate 
compliance with fundamental rights by Regulation 2019/1886. Admittedly, these are both very 
vague (see section 5.1) and could be disputed on the grounds of contested responsibility 
between Frontex and member states. However, for precisely the same reasons, they could be 
utilised to investigate serious and persistent violations by national authorities. Moreover, the 
extent of the shortcomings of national authorities – in particular the Greek ones – are known 
to Frontex, something repeatedly evidenced in internal documents (see sections 6.4.2 and 
7.5). 
Yet, invoking the responsibility of national actors does not necessarily imply an overtly critical 
attitude towards them. On the contrary, the attitude of Frontex can be rather diplomatic. An 
example is provided a reply given by ED F. Leggeri in the LIBE meeting of the 2nd April 2020, 
in response to an incident that occurred in the context of Operation Poseidon in Greece, 
whereby a Danish vessel refused to follow an order from by the Greek authorities which would 
have resulted in refoulement (Tritschler, 2020): 
There was a question about an incident involving a Danish vessel that was given 
instruction by the Greek authorities that were not in line with the practice of non-
refoulement and this was explained to the local authorities and since this incident to 
the best of my knowledge there were no more incidents repeated like this. This was 
apparently a misunderstanding. (LIBE Committee Meeting, 02 April 2020, 10:00 - 
12:00, 2020) 
By characterising the incident as a ‘misunderstanding’ Leggeri underplayed the significance 
of the decision of Greek authorities, which could have amounted to refoulement, as well as 
avoid direct condemnation of an action that amounted to a violation of refugee law. In another 
LIBE meeting on the 6th July, F. Leggeri reiterated that the incident was a ‘misunderstanding’ 
and further stated that 
Those instruction were not in line with the operational plan and this was immediately 
recognised and acknowledged by the Hellenic Coast Guard […] it was 
acknowledged there was a misunderstanding and wrong instructions given and this 
stopped, let’s say wrong instructions given in the context of a Frontex operation 
(LIBE Committee meeting, 06 July 2020, 16:45 - 18:45, 2020) 
The repeated characterization of the incident as a ‘misunderstanding’ underplays the fact that 
the instruction given by the Hellenic Coastguard was a clear violation of international and EU 
law. Further, the actions of the Hellenic Coastguard breached the provisions of Regulation 
2019/1896 which stipulate that operational plans are binding (Art. 36 par. 2). In case of 
instructions that ‘are not in compliance with the operational plans’, the ED ‘may, if appropriate’ 
(Art. 43 par. 3) consider withdrawing the financing, suspending or terminating the operation 
(Art. 46, par. 3). It is unlikely that any of these actions were considered. 
In a similar manner, Leggeri praised the ‘very strong decisions’ of the Greek authorities that 
ensured that ‘there was no vulnerability’ at the Greek-Turkish border (LIBE Committee 
Meeting, 02 April 2020, 10:00 - 12:00, 2020). He further stated that 
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We made it clear We wanted to keep order at the external border and not allow 
violent attempts to cross it. Therefore the rule of law was also upheld. (LIBE 
Committee Meeting, 02 April 2020, 10:00 - 12:00, 2020) 
The use of pronoun ‘we’ in this instance suggests joint action with the Greek authorities against 
what is described ‘violent’ attempts to cross. This characterisation also adopted by the Greek 
Minister for Public Order, M. Chrysochoidis, who earlier in the same meeting stated that 
we successfully managed to prevent the significant numbers of migrants that have 
been gathering in large groups at the border line of the Evros river. Although they 
tried to cause damage to the fence on a daily basis as well as to cause injuries to 
our border forces by throwing stones or smoke grenades, firebombs and tear gasses 
at them. We stayed decisive calm and determined to protect our and EU’s external 
borders. (LIBE Committee Meeting, 02 April 2020, 10:00 - 12:00, 2020) 
Hence, inadvertently or not, Leggeri’s statement legitimated the actions performed and 
narratives adopted by the Greek authorities which constructed the events in Evros as a violent 
attack against the country’s borders and security forces. Leggeri’s claim that ‘the rule of law 
was upheld’ also illustrates the prioritisation of border control over fundamental rights, also 
echoing another statement by Chrysochoidis, that 
[a]lthough we were brutally attacked, our forces acted professionally in full respect 
of human rights, national European and international law (LIBE Committee Meeting, 
02 April 2020, 10:00 - 12:00, 2020) 
Violations of fundamental rights, including the suspension of the right to asylum, and violence 
at the time were widespread and widely documented (Amnesty International, 2020a; b; Human 
Rights Watch, 2020). In this context, the statement of Leggeri showed the extent to which 
Frontex refused to consider issues of fundamental rights at the Greek-Turkish border. More 
significantly his statement reflects that while fundamental rights were incorporated in the 
definition of border management in Regulation 2019/1886, in practice they can be excluded 
from perceptions about what constitutes ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law’ at the external borders. 
9.5 Controlling Information and Implications for Accountability 
Another dimension in the Agency’s problematic relation with fundamental rights accountability 
is illustrated by attempts to control the availability of information, both internally and publicly. 
We have discussed the less than ideal practices of information sharing with the CF in section 
6.3, which suggest a level of mistrust towards its own advisory body. There are some 
indications that Frontex has been reluctant to share information with the body it is accountable 
to, the European Parliament. We have observed that at the time of finalizing this report (July 
2020), most questions submitted by MEPs since October 2019 have not been answered by 
the Agency, or at least the replies were not available in the website of the European 
Parliament. MEP Clare Daly called a Frontex reply to a question regarding the use of Israeli-
manufactured drones tested on Palestinian protestors ‘blatantly short on truth’ and further 
remarked on Frontex’s interaction with the LIBE Committee: 
I have to say unless they [Frontex] start changing their attitude in terms of being 
accountable to this committee and being more transparent in their operation then it 
is nothing more than window-dressing […] I think there’s a long way to go if we talk 
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about Frontex being transparent (LIBE Committee meeting, 04 June 2020, 16:45 - 
18:45, 2020) 
Equally problematic dynamics can be observed in what concerns the availability of information 
to the wider public. Internal documents are not publicly available and can only be obtained 
through freedom of information requests under Regulation 1049/2001. Nevertheless, Frontex 
has frequently refused to release documents of the grounds of security (Semsrott and 
Izuzquiza, 2018). To date, there has been only one legal challenge to the refusal of Frontex 
to release documents under FOIs, brought to the CJEU by transparency activists Luiza 
Izuzquiza and Arne Semsrott. After the court ruled in favour of Frontex, the agency presented 
the activists with a legal bill of €23,700.81 (Domínguez, 2020). This move was perceived as 
an attempt to discourage such actions by civil society organisations in the future (Domínguez, 
2020; Fotiadis in ‘Under surveillance’: Monitoring at the border, 2020). 
Further, since the beginning of 2020, Frontex has tried to limit the scope of FOIs and the public 
availability of such documents by introducing its own online form for submitting FOI requests. 
The main effect of this change is that internal documents will not be available publicly but only 
to the individual making the request. In another restrictive move last year, letters to individuals 
making FOI requests include a warning that sharing released documents with ‘third parties in 
this or another form without prior authorisation of Frontex is prohibited’ (Frontex PAD office, 
2019). Yet it is unclear what the consequences of such sharing could be. Freedom of 
information activities are ‘independent of Commission’s monitoring’ (M. Oel, cited in Strik and 
Fotiadis, 2020), although they are subject to the scrutiny of the European Ombudsman. 
Investigations critical to the mechanisms and practices of Frontex in the field of human rights 
(e.g. Correctiv, 2019; Fotiadis, 2020, 2016; Howden, Fotiadis and Campbell, 2020; Nielsen 
and Fotiadis, 2019) largely relied on documents released through FOIs, which would not have 
been otherwise available to journalists and researchers. More importantly, these documents 
are instrumental in revealing discrepancies between information released by Frontex in an 
official capacity and internal knowledge. The documents obtained by Howden, Fotiadis and 
Campbell (2020), for example, highlighted the fact that Frontex had direct communication with 
MRCC Libya on SAR since early 2019, something also confirmed by CF minutes (Frontex, 
2019a). Yet, a reply to a parliamentary question denied that there was such communication 
(European Parliament, 2020a). 
Similarly, while we were informed by Frontex that no SIRs were submitted regarding 
operations in Evros since 2018, we discovered through an FRO report we obtained by a FOI 
request that in fact two SIRs were submitted in 2019. While Frontex and other actors have 
stated that ‘no complaint has been filed against any Frontex officer’ (euractiv.com, 2019), at 
least two incidents that involve deployed staff are recorded in internal documents: one at the 
Greek-Turkish border referred to in an 2014 FRO report and one in Hungary recorded by a 
SIR (also noted in Fotiadis, 2020). It would have been equally impossible to fully capture the 
discussions within Frontex bodies on pushbacks at the Greek-Turkish borders the 
contradictions around the ‘frontline’ presence of Frontex or on the suspension of operations in 
Hungary without access to internal documents. In short, the scrutiny of the practices of Frontex 
related to fundamental rights is possible mainly because of such documents being made 
available. 
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Therefore, the Frontex approach to the availability of information has significant implications 
for what is publicly known regarding fundamental rights during Frontex operations. As 
researcher and journalist Apostolos Fotiadis commented on JROs: 
The picture we see coming from what is publicly available is the perspective the 
Agency prefers to create about what happens during its coordinated returns flights 
[…] this perspective is a very selective one. (Fotiadis in ‘Under surveillance’: 
Monitoring at the border, 2020) 
We would argue that this observation applies to all aspects of Frontex operations and 
fundamental rights governance. The public unavailability of information not only render 
aspects of Frontex activities obscure – the SIR mechanism is one such example– but also 
allows the Agency to control the agenda and narratives around fundamental rights by being 
selective on what information is being released (Fotiadis in ‘Under surveillance’: Monitoring at 
the border, 2020). For example, in contrast to its reluctance to make information on operations 
and fundamental rights available, Frontex very likely passed on documents to journalists 
covering an incident involving the Turkish armed forces shooting at Frontex (Christides et al., 
2020). Frontex attitudes to information and communication thus enable them to maintain 
secrecy over its activities and avoid accountability, if not to European institutions, to the wider 
public. The attempts of Frontex to control information, and its responses to civil society actors 
– such as in the case of requesting legal fees from transparency activists – creates doubts as 
to whether the Agency is willing to truly engage with criticisms on the fundamental rights 






Although the Frontex press officer acknowledged some of the limitations of monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms (‘it takes time, and it might be a question of awareness’), she 
stated that they 
are working, because the serious incident reports are being filed, which shows that 
the officers are using them. The fundamental rights officer is looking into every single 
operation, and there is no operation that takes place without all her comments being 
taken into consideration (Interview 1). 
Yet, our analysis confirms the observations human rights organisations, NGOs, researchers 
and journalists that the monitoring and accountability mechanisms present serious 
deficiencies, to the point we can talk about a failing accountability regime. We discussed 
several such shortcomings throughout the report. At the level of their design, the mechanisms 
are administrative in nature, internal to Frontex and therefore lacking in independence and 
impartiality. The key monitoring mechanism for Frontex operations – the Serious Incident 
Reporting system – is underused and despite its mandatory nature does not seem to be used 
at large within the agency and its staff. 
At a first level, the deficiencies can be attributed to several factors: the design of the role of 
the monitoring and accountability mechanisms within the legal and policy framework, the 
vagueness of provisions and over-reliance on internal guidance, and the implementation of 
provisions both by Frontex and national authorities. However, a deeper reflection of the 
failures of the accountability regime needs to interrogate the commitment of Frontex to 
upholding fundamental rights and be accountable, as well as considering the political context 
of border management. At the level of implementation on the ground, while provisions for the 
training and conduct of deployed and national staff have led to an internalisation of narratives 
of human rights (Perkowski, 2018; Horii, 2012; Aas and Gundhus, 2015), the underuse of the 
Serious Incident Reporting and individual complaints mechanisms suggests that this does not 
necessarily translate into effective action on identifying and reporting violations. Moreover, the 
recommendations of the two bodies designed to advise Frontex on fundamental rights can be 
easily dismissed, as the power to decide is the prerogative of the Executive Director. This is 
not just a theoretical possibility: both publicly available and internal documents record many 
rejected recommendations; our two case studies, on the recommendation to withdraw from 
Hungary and on Frontex’s responses to fundamental rights violations in Evros are two further 
examples of the power of the Executive Director to reject recommendations, at the expense 
of fundamental rights concerns. The absence of independent mechanisms able to overcome 
executive decisions that undermine fundamental rights is exacerbated by equally non-
independent arrangements for investigating violations, since such powers remain largely with 
member states and in some areas with the Executive Director. 
Our findings also suggest that Frontex’s attitude towards accountability remains problematic. 
The weak internal accountability regime is in itself not conducive to actions and decisions that 
would promote greater compliance to fundamental rights – something illustrated for example 
by not reporting and initiating investigations of fundamental rights violations by deployed 
Frontex officers and rejecting recommendations by its advisory bodies. The lack of 
independent monitoring and accountability mechanisms is not conducive to stronger practices 
that would safeguard fundamental rights. However, we can observe this negative stance in 
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other areas of accountability – towards the European Parliament, to which Frontex is politically 
accountable – and accountability towards the wider public. As we have demonstrated, Frontex 
attempts to evade accountability to both actors by utilizing a number of strategies: using 
information instrumentally; claiming it is both present and absent in operational areas; invoking 
the presence of monitoring and accountability mechanisms while underplaying their 
deficiencies in terms of implementation; deflecting responsibility to national authorities; and 
controlling the availability of information on their fundamental practices internally and to other 
institutions and the public. 
More importantly, decisions and practices related to fundamental rights monitoring and 
accountability are subject to pressures by the political imperative of controlling the external 
borders of the European Union, which is the key task of Frontex. The significant tensions 
between Frontex’s border management mandate and their obligations to respect and comply 
with fundamental rights such as international refugee rights have repeatedly been pointed out 
over the last decade (Hruschka, 2020; Keller et al., 2011; Marin, 2014b). Yet, despite the 
strengthening of the accountability regime, and clearer obligations to both monitor and prevent 
fundamental rights violations, these tensions have remained. As our case studies on the 
Greek-Turkish border and Hungary illustrate, border management aims, including supporting 
member states in controlling the external borders of the EU, are consistently prioritised over 
fundamental rights considerations, to the point that they appear as irreconcilable. 
Finally, our report points out severe shortcomings in the way the executive order of the 
European Union has been constructed over the last two decades. Even though delegation of 
powers to secondary institutions is still constrained by the Meroni doctrine, there are around 
40 European Union agencies (depending on the definition). In the case of Frontex, the agency 
has been expanded to maintain a standing corps of border guards numbering 10.000 until 
2027, thus creating the very first EU police force. However, this extraordinary growth of 
executive institutions has not been accompanied by an equally extraordinary expansion of a 
system of checks and balances, e.g. by a stronger supervisory mandate for the European 
Parliament or an expansion of judicial review, on the level of the European Union, of the 
agency’s activities. 
These weaknesses, both within the architecture and functioning of the Frontex accountability 
regime and the wider architecture of Frontex as an EU agency within the EU’s executive 
branch have grave effects on fundamental rights. The expanded border management 
capabilities and law enforcement responsibilities of the Agency have increased the risk of 
violating fundamental rights as well as core tenets of international and EU asylum law such as 
access to asylum and the principle of non-refoulement. The shortcomings in the governance 
framework of Frontex, including its accountability regime, render it nearly impossible to 
safeguard the rights of people attempting to cross the external borders of the EU, or to seek 
redress when their rights are violated. 
Recommendations 
We conclude with the following recommendations: 
1. We recommend that the Parliament and the Council amend the legal mandate of Frontex 
to include data gathering and analytical processing of fundamental rights violations as 
part of its risk analysis activities. We propose to include quantitative and qualitative data 
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as indicators in its Common Integrated Risk Analysis Modell (CIRAM) in order to address 
fundamental rights violations as a risk factor for professional border management (component 
‘vulnerability’) as well as a risk factor for the development of the European Union in line with 
fundamental rights obligations (component ‘impact’). We further propose for visual layers 
representing this data to be included in both EUROSUR and JORA, and to make the 
occurrence of fundamental rights violations an indicator in the periodic vulnerability 
assessments carried out by the agency concerning member states’ borders. 
2. We recommend that the Parliament and the Council establish a legally binding framework 
for the suspension of operations, based on recommendations of the FRO, the CF, or 
competent third parties. 
3. We recommend that the Parliament and the Council provide for access to internal Frontex 
documents through a publicly available database and the creation of an independent 
arbiter such as the European Ombudsperson to balance requests for transparency with the 
operational constraints of the agency. 
4. We recommend that the Parliament and the Council establish a better accountability 
framework for the agency, including a stronger supervisory role of the Parliament and 
provisions for external monitoring. 
5. We recommend for the European Union to adopt a strong constitutional framework for 
executive agencies endowed with an operational mandate, including mechanisms for 
independent adjudication of claims against European Union agencies that constitute effective 
remedies. 
6. Finally, we recommend that Frontex be tasked to develop and implement a renewed 
strategy for preventing fundamental rights violations at the external borders of the 
European Union and to include this strategy as a central part of the agency’s mandate to 





Appendix 1: List of Interviewees/respondents 
Interview 1 Frontex Press Office  
Interview 2 CF member   
Interview 3 CF member  
Interview 4 CF member   
Interview 5 CF member   
Interview 6 Human rights organisation  
Interview 7 Police Director, Greece  
Interview 8 Police Director, Greece  
Conversation 1 Human rights organisation  
Conversation 2 Journalist   
Conversation 3 Journalist   
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